История сбоев 1password

1. 22 июля 2026 г. в 17:55 UTCinvestigating

   В настоящее время SaaS-менеджер не может общаться с управляемыми учетными данными. В результате клиенты, использующие функции Better Together, могут быть не в состоянии внести изменения в учетные данные. Мы активно изучаем проблему и будем предоставлять обновления по мере поступления дополнительной информации.

2. 22 июля 2026 г. в 19:20 UTCresolved

   Было принято решение, и теперь этот вопрос решен.

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 17 июля 2026 г. в 18:52 UTCmonitoring

   Клиенты SaaS-менеджеров с активными рабочими процессами, возможно, испытали ухудшение обслуживания, которое помешало некоторым рабочим процессам работать по расписанию. Наши команды быстро определили проблему и внедрили исправление. Сейчас мы следим за восстановлением, чтобы услуги продолжали возвращаться в нормальное русло.

2. 17 июля 2026 г. в 18:57 UTCresolved

   Этот инцидент был урегулирован.

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 13 июля 2026 г. в 18:59 UTCinvestigating

   Наша инженерная команда изучает проблему, вызывающую ухудшение пользовательских операций для индивидуальных и семейных учетных записей. Пользователи не могут подтвердить или удалить пользователей или создать и удалить учетные записи службы. Пользователи также не могут загрузить страницу Интеграции.

2. 13 июля 2026 г. в 19:37 UTCidentified

   Проблема была выявлена, и наша инженерная команда работает над развертыванием исправления.

3. 13 июля 2026 г. в 19:57 UTCresolved

   Было принято решение, и теперь этот вопрос решен.

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 13 июля 2026 г. в 15:47 UTCresolved

   Решение этой проблемы было реализовано, и наши команды ведут мониторинг. Во время отключения GitHub Actions, возможно, не удалось вытащить последнюю версию CLI, в результате чего трубопровод вышел из строя.

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 2 июля 2026 г. в 19:44 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of an outage of Device Trust and are investigating the issue.

2. 2 июля 2026 г. в 20:05 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate the issue.

3. 2 июля 2026 г. в 20:12 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

4. 2 июля 2026 г. в 20:30 UTCresolved

   A fix has been deployed and all services are operational.

5. 11 июля 2026 г. в 01:05 UTCpostmortem

   # Incident Postmortem - Device Trust Authentication Outage **Date of Incident:** 2026-07-02 **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 19:28 - 20:28 **Service\(s\) Affected:** This incident affected: USA/Global \(Device Trust Authentication Service, Device Trust Checks Server, Device Trust Portal, Device Trust API\) and Europe \(Device Trust Authentication Service, Device Trust Checks Server, Device Trust Portal, Device Trust API\). **Impact Duration:** 1 Hour ## Summary On July 2, 2026, 1Password Device Trust experienced an outage lasting approximately one hour, beginning at 19:28 UTC. During this window, all Device Trust services were unavailable and users were unable to authenticate. We have identified the root cause: an internal configuration change to our cloud load balancing infrastructure was applied more broadly than intended which temporarily made a required endpoint unreachable. This was not a security incident and did not involve any third party. The configuration has been corrected, service has been fully restored, and we have implemented additional safeguards to help prevent this type of issue from recurring. ## Impact on Customers * **All Device Trust services were completely unavailable during the 60-minute outage window. Users were unable to authenticate to any Device Trust service, including the authentication portal \(**[**auth.kolide.com**](http://auth.kolide.com)**\), admin console \(**[**app.kolide.com**](http://app.kolide.com)**\), API endpoints, and device server.** * **Number of Affected Customers \(approximate\):** 100% of Device Trust customers * **Geographic Regions Affected \(if applicable\):** US and EU ## What Happened? On July 2, 2026, A configuration change intended to improve the security configuration of an internal service was applied more broadly than intended, affecting a shared network routing component relied on by Device Trust. The change replaced the underlying network infrastructure supporting Device Trust. However, the traffic routing configuration continued to reference the previous infrastructure instead of the newly provisioned resources. As a result, Device Trust authentication endpoints became unreachable. Reverting the change restored connectivity and service. * **Timeline of Events \(UTC\):** * 19:28: Network configuration change applied; Network Load Balancers responsible for routing traffic for Device Trust services became unreachable * 19:30: Automated monitoring detects the outage and triggers alerts * 19:33: Incident is declared at [status.1password.com](http://status.1password.com) * 20:03: Root cause is identified as a load balancer configuration issue * 20:24: Load balancer is recreated with correct configuration * 20:26 Recovery is confirmed for [app.kolide.com](http://app.kolide.com) * 20:28 Recovery is confirmed for [auth.kolide.com](http://auth.kolide.com) * **Contributing Factors \(if any\):** * **Shared component scope not visible during review or validation.** The network infrastructure class affected by the change was shared across multiple services, but this dependency was not documented or surfaced in the change review process. As a result, the pre-production validation, while performed in a lower environment before production rollout, did not cover all dependent services, and the impact on Device Trust was not identified before the change reached production. * **Concurrent diagnostic signals slowed root cause identification.** At the time the outage began, unrelated certificate renewal errors surfaced alongside the network connectivity failure. Investigating both signals simultaneously delayed identification of the network configuration change as the root cause. ## How Was It Resolved? * **Resolution Steps:** Once the source of the outage was identified, engineers reverted the configuration change. The affected network infrastructure was recreated with its original, publicly accessible configuration, restoring routing to all Device Trust authentication endpoints. Service recovery was confirmed sequentially across affected services before the incident was closed. * **Verification of Resolution:** Following the revert, engineers verified that all Device Trust authentication endpoints were reachable and accepting traffic. Customer confirmation of resolution was subsequently received through the support team. ## What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents * **Require explicit approval for destructive infrastructure changes.** We are implementing safeguards that require manual review and approval before changes that would destroy and recreate critical network infrastructure can be applied. This creates a forcing function to catch unintended scope before changes reach production. * **Improve scope visibility for shared infrastructure components.** We are documenting the dependencies between shared infrastructure components and the services that rely on them, and integrating this information into our change review process. Future changes to shared components will require an explicit assessment of downstream impact before deployment. * **Strengthen pre-production validation across shared dependencies.** We are updating our change promotion process to require validation against all services that share affected components — not only the intended target — before changes are promoted to production. * **Reduce single points of failure in traffic routing.** We are evaluating architectural changes to introduce redundancy into Device Trust's traffic routing configuration, so that a failure in any single component results in degraded service rather than a complete outage. ## Next Steps and Communication * No action is required from our customers at this time. We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

1. 29 июня 2026 г. в 22:08 UTCinvestigating

   Пользователи, которые пытаются принять приглашение, не могут принять приглашение и получить ошибку 403. Наша инженерная команда активно изучает этот вопрос.

2. 29 июня 2026 г. в 22:55 UTCidentified

   Проблема была выявлена, и наша инженерная команда работает над внедрением исправления.

3. 29 июня 2026 г. в 23:40 UTCidentified

   Наша инженерная команда продолжает работать над развертыванием решения этой проблемы. Тем временем был определен обходной путь. Пожалуйста, свяжитесь с нашей службой поддержки непосредственно по адресу [email protected], и они поддержат вас на всех этапах.

4. 30 июня 2026 г. в 14:09 UTCresolved

   Этот инцидент был урегулирован.

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 24 июня 2026 г. в 17:15 UTCinvestigating

   Некоторые пользователи, заблокированные в своей учетной записи 1Password, сталкиваются с ошибкой «Что-то пошло не так» при попытке восстановить доступ с помощью кода восстановления. Наша команда разработчиков знает о проблеме и активно исследует ее причину. Мы будем предоставлять обновления по мере поступления дополнительной информации.

2. 24 июня 2026 г. в 17:30 UTCinvestigating

   Наши команды продолжают расследование этого вопроса. Мы активно работаем над определением причины и будем делиться дополнительными обновлениями по мере их появления.

3. 24 июня 2026 г. в 17:50 UTCinvestigating

   Вопрос все еще находится под следствием. Мы будем продолжать делиться обновлениями по мере их появления.

4. 24 июня 2026 г. в 18:32 UTCinvestigating

   Расследование продолжается. Наши команды активно работают над определением причины и будут делиться обновлениями по мере их появления.

5. 24 июня 2026 г. в 18:35 UTCidentified

   Этот вопрос был определен, и в настоящее время осуществляется исправление.

6. 24 июня 2026 г. в 18:51 UTCmonitoring

   Реализовано исправление, и мы отслеживаем результаты.

7. 24 июня 2026 г. в 19:01 UTCresolved

   Теперь проблема решена, и доступ к сервисам 1Password должен быть полностью восстановлен.

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 18 июня 2026 г. в 17:54 UTCidentified

   We have identified the cause of the synchronization issues affecting legacy 1Password 7 clients (OPI7 and OPM7) with 1Password and are deploying a fix. Affected customers may experience item creations or updates not synchronizing to 1Password, in some cases without a visible error. We expect service to be restored shortly and will provide another update once the fix has been fully deployed and verified. Modern clients and broader 1Password functionality do not appear to be affected.

2. 18 июня 2026 г. в 18:50 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 16 июня 2026 г. в 16:24 UTCidentified

   Sign in attempt audit events are currently delayed and admins are unable to migrate to hosted provisioning. Our engineering team has identified the issue and are actively working on a fix.

2. 16 июня 2026 г. в 16:58 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been deployed and we are now monitoring the results.

3. 16 июня 2026 г. в 21:11 UTCmonitoring

   We are still monitoring the results of the deployed fix. Hosted provisioning issues are resolved. Audit events in some regions are caught up while others are still in progress.

4. 17 июня 2026 г. в 16:00 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 11 июня 2026 г. в 21:49 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting the Device Trust Authentication Service. Customers may experience timeouts or receive 503 responses when attempting to authenticate with Device Trust. Our team is actively working to identify the cause and restore normal service as quickly as possible.

2. 11 июня 2026 г. в 22:02 UTCinvestigating

   Our teams continue to investigate the cause of timeout errors affecting the Device Trust Authentication Service.

3. 11 июня 2026 г. в 22:17 UTCinvestigating

   Our teams continue to investigate the cause of timeout errors affecting the Device Trust Authentication Service. Customers may experience authentication failures, timeouts, or 503 errors when attempting to authenticate with Device Trust. At this time, there is no significant change in impact or scope to report. Investigation and mitigation efforts remain ongoing, and we will provide another update as soon as additional information becomes available.

4. 11 июня 2026 г. в 22:32 UTCinvestigating

   Authentication services have recovered, and our teams continue to investigate the cause of timeout errors affecting the Device Trust Authentication Service. Investigation and mitigation efforts remain ongoing, and we will provide another update as soon as additional information becomes available.

5. 11 июня 2026 г. в 22:47 UTCmonitoring

   Our teams have identified a cause of the issues affecting the Device Trust Authentication Service and have taken steps to provide relief. We are seeing improved service performance and are continuing to monitor the situation closely to ensure stability. We will provide further updates as needed.

6. 12 июня 2026 г. в 23:18 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 16 мая 2026 г. в 15:51 UTCinvestigating

   Files can not be uploaded or downloaded, and images may not be loading properly. Pages within the application may not be loading. Some integrations and workflows may have experienced errors. This issue affects the US and EU regions. Our engineering team is currently investigating.

2. 16 мая 2026 г. в 17:33 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified, and our engineers are working on a fix.

3. 16 мая 2026 г. в 17:46 UTCmonitoring

   Issues with file uploads and downloads, pages not loading, and errors affecting some integrations and workflows are now resolved. Customers may still experience issues with images loading properly, and our engineering team is actively working to resolve them. We expect further progress and resolution later today. The issue affected both the US and EU regions.

4. 16 мая 2026 г. в 20:36 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 4 мая 2026 г. в 17:59 UTCidentified

   Workflows and integrations have not run as of approximately 12:30pm ET today, this means that automatic onboarding and off-boarding are currently not occurring. In addition, the Workflows and Integrations pages are failing to load. Our Engineering team has identified the issue and are currently working on a fix.

2. 4 мая 2026 г. в 18:27 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are now monitoring the results. Failed workflows will need to be manually re-run, failed integrations will re-run automatically within 24 hours but likely sooner.

3. 4 мая 2026 г. в 18:34 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 27 апреля 2026 г. в 14:54 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue causing errors and increased latency across our services. Customers may experience failures or delays when logging in and syncing, including via CLI.

2. 27 апреля 2026 г. в 15:08 UTCinvestigating

   Our teams continue to investigate an issue causing errors and increased latency across our services. Customers may experience failures or delays when logging in and syncing, including via CLI. We are actively working to identify the root cause and will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

3. 27 апреля 2026 г. в 15:22 UTCidentified

   We are seeing signs of recovery for the issue causing errors and increased latency across our services. Some customers may still experience intermittent failures or delays when logging in and syncing, including via CLI. Our teams continue to monitor the situation closely.

4. 27 апреля 2026 г. в 15:41 UTCmonitoring

   Service has largely recovered, and we are continuing to monitor the situation closely. Some customers may still experience intermittent issues with login and syncing, including via CLI.

5. 27 апреля 2026 г. в 17:09 UTCmonitoring

   Traffic levels have returned to normal and service performance has stabilized. We are continuing to monitor to ensure full recovery.

6. 28 апреля 2026 г. в 18:00 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

7. 12 мая 2026 г. в 15:38 UTCpostmortem

   # Incident Postmortem - Login and Sync Issues **Date of Incident:** 2026-04-27 **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 14:15 - 15:41 **Service\(s\) Affected:** All web APIs **Impact Duration:** Approximately 86 minutes ## Summary On April 27, 2026, [1Password.com](http://1password.com/) experienced a period of elevated error and full service unavailability in our USA/Global region. A defect deployed in application scaling logic caused a cascading failure during peak usage. This resulted in a period of service unavailability for customers in the USA/Global region. This was not a security incident, and there was no loss of data. ## Impact on Customers * **Sign-in and account access:** Customers in the USA/Global region experienced errors or were unable to sign in or access their 1Password accounts between approximately 14:15 and 15:41 UTC on April 27, 2026. * **All 1Password clients:** The disruption applied to all client types, including the web app, CLI, browser extensions, and desktop and mobile applications, for customers connecting through the USA/Global region. * **Geographic regions affected:** Only customers on the USA/Global region were affected. Other regions were not impacted. ## What Happened? We deployed a change to how our services signal their readiness to serve requests, which contained a latent defect. * **Timeline of events:** * **2026-04-27 14:15 UTC** - Load increase triggers issues. * **2026-04-27 14:29 UTC** - Incident declared; response team mobilized. * **2026-04-27 15:41 UTC** - Issue identified and fix deployed. * **2026-04-28 18:06 UTC** - Incident formally resolved following monitoring. ## How Was It Resolved? Our on-call engineering team identified the scaling logic as the cause of the cascading failure and disabled it via a configuration change. Once disabled, capacity was restored, and traffic recovered. A subsequent configuration change was made to prevent this logic from being re-enabled in production environments. ## What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents * **Immediate fix:** We disabled the defective health check logic and locked the configuration to prevent it from being re-enabled in production. * **Retrospective:** We are conducting a full retrospective with the incident responders to identify further improvements to our systems and our response processes. ## Next Steps and Communication * No action is required from our customers at this time. We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your patience and understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

1. 22 апреля 2026 г. в 15:18 UTCinvestigating

   We’re aware of an issue affecting sign-in to 1Password SaaS Manager. Our teams are actively investigating and working to resolve this as quickly as possible.

2. 22 апреля 2026 г. в 15:27 UTCmonitoring

   The issue affecting sign-in to 1Password SaaS Manager has been mitigated. Our teams are continuing to monitor the situation to ensure stability.

3. 22 апреля 2026 г. в 16:06 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 14 апреля 2026 г. в 17:25 UTCinvestigating

   The 1Password Hosted Service in the US is experiencing high latency and errors. The response team is currently investigating.

2. 14 апреля 2026 г. в 17:46 UTCinvestigating

   The 1Password engineering team is investigating an issue where customers may be unable to sign in to 1Password. This issue may also prevent changes from syncing between 1Password clients. This issue impacts the 1Password.com (US) service.

3. 14 апреля 2026 г. в 18:00 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 15 апреля 2026 г. в 01:54 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved. We will publish a postmortem as soon as one is completed.

5. 6 мая 2026 г. в 15:31 UTCpostmortem

   # 2026-04-14 SEV1 Incident Postmortem - Hosted Service in the US experiencing high latency and errors # Incident Postmortem - Elevated Application Error **Date of Incident:** 2026-04-14 **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 17:25 - 18:00 **Service\(s\) Affected:** Sign in, Admin console **Impact Duration:** Approximately 35 minutes ## Summary On April 14, 2026, [1Password.com](http://1Password.com) experienced elevated error rates due to an increase in traffic to our USA/Global infrastructure. Requests arrived more quickly than they could be serviced in our USA/global region. Customers experienced errors and high latency. This was not a security incident, and there was no loss of data. ## Impact on Customers * **Sign-in and account access:** Some customers in the USA/Global region experienced errors when attempting to sign in or access their 1Password accounts between 17:25 and 18:00 UTC on April 14, 2026. * **All 1Password clients:** The disruption applied to all client types, including the web app, browser extensions, and desktop and mobile applications, for customers connecting through the USA/Global region. * **Number of affected requests:** Approximately 2.95% of requests over the incident window to [1Password.com](http://1Password.com) \(USA/Global\) during the incident window resulted in errors or timeouts, though for some brief spikes up to 45% of requests failed. * **Geographic regions affected:** Customers on our USA/Global only, other regions were not affected. ## What Happened? An unusually high volume of traffic exceeded the capacity of our controls, and triggered latency and errors in the underlying applications. * **Timeline of events:** * **2026-04-14 17:25** - Start of incident. * **2026-04-14 17:36** - Issue identified. * **2026-04-14 17:51** - Fix implemented. * **2026-04-14 18:01** - Recovery complete. * **Root cause analysis:** An increase in traffic exceeded the capacity of our traffic management layer, causing degraded service for customers in the USA/Global region. ## How Was It Resolved? * Established runbooks for load shedding and system upgrades mitigated the issue. ## What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents * **Resolution:** We made two key changes to prevent recurrence: 1. **Increased capacity of internal systems** 2. **Upgraded traffic controls at the network edge** * **Verification:** Since implementing these changes, we have observed several additional instances of unusually high traffic matching this incident. In each case, the new controls handled the traffic automatically with no impact to customers or our systems. ## Next Steps and Communication * No action is required from our customers at this time. We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

1. 13 апреля 2026 г. в 17:24 UTCmonitoring

   SSO is experiencing degraded functionality because of an upstream provider. We are monitoring, and users may need to retry when authenticating with their IdP.

2. 17 апреля 2026 г. в 15:07 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

3. 22 апреля 2026 г. в 15:17 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 1 апреля 2026 г. в 14:13 UTCidentified

   Teams accounts are currently unable to access their Environments. Our engineering team has identified the issue and are working towards deploying a fix.

2. 1 апреля 2026 г. в 17:52 UTCmonitoring

   Our engineering team has deployed a fix and we are monitoring the results.

3. 2 апреля 2026 г. в 14:23 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 31 марта 2026 г. в 21:28 UTCinvestigating

   Users with Individual and Family accounts are currently unable to access their Environments. The impact is scoped to individual account holders and family account users. Our engineering team is actively investigating.

2. 31 марта 2026 г. в 22:01 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and our engineering team are working towards deploying a fix.

3. 1 апреля 2026 г. в 00:43 UTCresolved

   A fix has been deployed and this issue is now resolved.

1. 16 марта 2026 г. в 17:11 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating an issue where features have been turned off for some customers.

2. 16 марта 2026 г. в 17:26 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 16 марта 2026 г. в 17:43 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 12 марта 2026 г. в 17:53 UTCresolved

   Users were unable to retrieve documents across multiple platforms. This included degraded performance or failures when attempting to access documents via the CLI as well as through other interfaces.