История сбоев Confluence

1. 27 августа 2026 г. в 04:22 UTCinvestigating

   Наши команды определили, что эта проблема также влияет на управление услугами Jira. Мы будем обновляться как можно скорее.

2. 27 августа 2026 г. в 04:25 UTCinvestigating

   Мы расследуем проблему с доступом к продуктам, которые влияют на клиентов Confluence, Jira Cloud и Jira Serivce Management. Наша команда срочно изучает этот вопрос, и мы предоставим дополнительную информацию в течение часа или раньше, если информация будет доступна.

3. 27 августа 2026 г. в 04:33 UTCidentified

   Наши команды определили возможное решение проблем, влияющих на Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management и Confluence. В настоящее время это развертывается в пострадавших регионах, и мы обновим в течение одного часа или раньше, если будет доступна дополнительная информация.

4. 27 августа 2026 г. в 04:51 UTCmonitoring

   Проблемы, связанные с загрузкой Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management и Confluence, в настоящее время находятся в стадии восстановления. Мы продолжим внимательно следить, чтобы подтвердить стабильность и предоставить обновление в течение одного часа или раньше, по мере поступления дополнительной информации.

5. 27 августа 2026 г. в 05:16 UTCresolved

   27 августа 2026 года UTC, продукты Atlassian, включая Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management и Confluence, столкнулись с перебоями, и услуги были недоступны для пострадавших пользователей. Теперь проблема решена, и сервис работает нормально для всех пострадавших клиентов. Публичное вскрытие этого инцидента будет доступно на этой странице, когда наше полное расследование инцидента будет завершено.

6. 7 сентября 2026 г. в 02:53 UTCpostmortem

   **Резюме** 27 августа 2026 года, между 03:51 и 04:35 UTC, клиенты Atlassian в регионах Западной Европы и Юго-Восточной Азии не смогли достичь продуктов Atlassian Cloud, включая Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search и Talent. Событие было вызвано дефектным изменением кода на уровне маршрутизации одного из наших прокси-парков. Это привело к тому, что ошибки HTTP 404 обслуживали весь трафик клиентов через эти прокси-флоты в Западной Европе и Юго-Восточной Азии. Инцидент был обнаружен в течение 1 минуты нашими автоматизированными системами мониторинга и смягчен путем возврата к предыдущему выпуску конфигурации, который привел прокси-флот в известное хорошее состояние. После восстановления прокси-парка некоторые клиенты Jira и Confluence (независимо от местоположения) получили ошибки HTTP 503 между 04:33 и 04:53 UTC, поскольку серверные парки приспосабливались к притоку трафика. **ИМПАКТ** Общее воздействие было разделено на два дискретных периода: - Во-первых, 27 августа 2026 года, между 03:51 и 04:35 UTC на Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search и Talent. Инцидент вызвал сбои в обслуживании трафика клиентов из стран Западной Европы и Юго-Восточной части Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона, при этом были возвращены ошибки HTTP 404. Не было никакого влияния на трафик клиентского API, независимо от местоположения. Во-вторых, 27 августа 2026 года, между 04:33 и 04:53 UTC, некоторые клиенты Jira и Confluence независимо от местоположения получили ошибки HTTP 503 после того, как ошибки HTTP 404 были решены: ~32% запросов в ap-юго-востоке-2, ~4% запросов в eu-западе-1, ~2,5% запросов в us-западе-2 и ap-юго-востоке-1 и <1% запросов во всех оставшихся глобальных регионах. **Корневая причина** Это событие было вызвано изменением кода одного из наших прокси-парков. Однако в развернутом коде был дефект, который не был обнаружен ручным и автоматизированным тестированием. Это привело к неправильной конфигурации функции поиска арендатора в прокси-уровне, что привело к тому, что трафик не имел действительного сетевого пути, в результате чего ошибки HTTP 404 обслуживались для всего трафика клиентов через эти прокси-флоты в Западной Европе и Юго-Восточной Азии. После того, как воздействие прокси-уровня восстановилось, был вызван второй период воздействия на некоторых клиентов Jira и Confluence. Из-за сокращения трафика, обслуживаемого Jira и Confluence прокси-флотом, уровни обслуживания Jira и Confluence автоматически масштабировались в количестве серверов, обслуживающих трафик клиентов. Как только функциональность прокси-флота была восстановлена, всплеск трафика переполнил уровень сервиса Jira, который возвращал повышенную скорость HTTP 503s, пока она автоматически не уменьшилась снова. **ПЛАН РЕМЕДИАЛЬНЫХ ДЕЙСТВИЙ И СЛЕДУЮЩИХ СТЭПОВ** Мы знаем, что перебои влияют на вашу производительность. Хотя у нас есть ряд тестовых и профилактических процессов, эта конкретная проблема не была выявлена, потому что изменение было связано с очень конкретным типом краевого корпуса, который не был подобран нашими автоматизированными пакетами непрерывного развертывания и сценариями ручного тестирования. Мы отдаем приоритет следующим действиям по улучшению, чтобы избежать повторения этого типа инцидента: ** Добавление дополнительных гарантий развертывания:** Трубопровод развертывания для конфигурации затронутого прокси-уровня использует устаревшую систему и не имеет надлежащих функций медленного регионального развертывания, настроенных правильно. Мы уже добавили правильные меры предосторожности, и мы переносим это на стандартный конвейер развертывания нашей компании, который включает все наши средства контроля безопасности, включенные по умолчанию. Мы также проверяем все сетевые службы, чтобы подтвердить, что все они находятся в новой стандартной службе развертывания трубопроводов. ** Усиление политики масштабирования парка услуг:** Конфигурация автоматического масштабирования для наших парков обслуживания Jira и Confluence была настроена на масштабирование слишком агрессивно. Мы тщательно изучаем и обновляем все сложные политики автоматического масштабирования Jira и Confluence, чтобы убедиться, что это не повторится. Мы приносим извинения клиентам, чьи услуги пострадали во время этого инцидента; мы предпринимаем немедленные шаги для повышения производительности и доступности платформы. Спасибо. Атласская поддержка клиентов

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 25 августа 2026 г. в 08:42 UTCinvestigating

   Мы активно изучаем сообщения о ухудшении производительности, что приводит к увеличению задержки для электронной почты, мобильных и слабых уведомлений для Jira, JSM и Confluence. Наши команды расследуют этот вопрос, и более подробная информация будет предоставлена в течение следующих 1 часа.

2. 25 августа 2026 г. в 09:44 UTCinvestigating

   Наши команды определили пострадавшие регионы и активно работают над смягчением проблемы. Мы предоставим дополнительные обновления в течение часа или раньше, если у нас будет значительный прогресс.

3. 25 августа 2026 г. в 10:49 UTCinvestigating

   Наши команды приняли несколько корректирующих мер для смягчения проблемы в одном из пострадавших регионов и наблюдают некоторые улучшения. Мы продолжаем следить за ситуацией и будем принимать необходимые меры, пока инцидент не будет полностью восстановлен. Мы предоставим дополнительные обновления в течение следующих двух часов или раньше, если у нас будет значительный прогресс, чтобы поделиться.

4. 25 августа 2026 г. в 13:01 UTCmonitoring

   Наши команды продолжают смягчать проблему и наблюдают некоторые улучшения. Мы продолжаем следить за ситуацией и будем принимать необходимые меры, пока инцидент не будет полностью восстановлен. Мы предоставим дополнительные обновления в течение следующих двух часов или раньше, если у нас будет значительный прогресс, чтобы поделиться.

5. 25 августа 2026 г. в 14:33 UTCresolved

   25 августа 2026 года некоторые пользователи, возможно, испытали повышенную задержку в уведомлениях по электронной почте, мобильным телефонам и слабые уведомления. Сейчас проблема решена, и сервис работает в штатном режиме для всех клиентов.

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 24 августа 2026 г. в 19:22 UTCinvestigating

   Мы активно изучаем сообщения о ухудшении производительности, что приводит к увеличению задержки уведомлений по электронной почте, мобильным устройствам и Slack для JIRA, JSM и Confluence. Мы будем делиться обновлениями здесь, так как больше информации доступно.

2. 24 августа 2026 г. в 20:25 UTCinvestigating

   Наши команды определили три пострадавших региона и продолжают исследовать увеличение задержки, затрагивающей уведомления электронной почты, мобильных устройств и Slack для JIRA, JSM и Confluence.

3. 24 августа 2026 г. в 21:30 UTCidentified

   Мы определили вероятную причину проблемы, и наши команды усердно работают над смягчением последствий. Пострадавшие пользователи могут испытывать повышенную задержку в уведомлениях электронной почты, мобильных устройств и Slack для JIRA, JSM и Confluence. Мы будем продолжать делиться дополнительными обновлениями здесь, поскольку доступна дополнительная информация.

4. 24 августа 2026 г. в 23:15 UTCresolved

   24 августа 2026 года некоторые пользователи JIRA, JSM и Confluence, возможно, испытали ухудшение производительности, что привело к увеличению задержки в уведомлениях по электронной почте, мобильным устройствам и Slack. Проблема решена для вновь созданных уведомлений, и сервис работает в штатном режиме. Могут быть старые уведомления, которые обрабатываются, и мы ожидаем, что они будут завершены в ближайшие несколько часов.

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 21 августа 2026 г. в 07:16 UTCidentified

   Мы определили первопричину проблемы, влияющей на макросы приложений Marketplace в Confluence. Пользователи могут испытывать макросы, которые неправильно отображают или отображают ошибки. Наша инженерная команда определила первопричину и идет восстановление. Мы предоставим дополнительные обновления в течение следующих 60 минут.

2. 21 августа 2026 г. в 08:15 UTCidentified

   Установлено исправление, которое в настоящее время внедряется. Пользователи должны начать видеть затронутое приложение MarketPlace - подключите макросы, чтобы начать правильно отображать, как только исправление будет полностью распространено. Мы предоставим дополнительные обновления в течение следующих 2 часов.

3. 21 августа 2026 г. в 10:10 UTCresolved

   21 августа 2026 года, между 04:26 UTC и 09:33 UTC, некоторые пользователи, возможно, столкнулись с проблемами с макросами, которые неправильно отображаются в Confluence. Теперь проблема решена, и сервис работает нормально для всех клиентов.

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 12 августа 2026 г. в 20:11 UTCidentified

   Some Confluence Cloud users visiting public links saw a Something went wrong error page. The issue affected anonymous access paths for public links, and some related Confluence areas could also show the same error message.

2. 12 августа 2026 г. в 22:13 UTCresolved

   On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 6 июля 2026 г. в 09:23 UTCinvestigating

   Мы расследуем вопросы, затрагивающие ваши услуги. Мы активно работаем над выявлением причины и решением вопроса. Мы предоставим дополнительные обновления в течение часа.

2. 6 июля 2026 г. в 10:04 UTCmonitoring

   Мы успешно применили исправление и наблюдаем восстановление. Возможности автоматизации восстанавливаются и должны нормально работать в будущем. Запросы на обработку данных, поданные в период сбоя, не были завершены из-за отсутствия услуг. Мы продолжаем следить за ситуацией и ожидаем полного выздоровления в течение следующего часа. Мы предоставим дополнительные обновления в течение следующего часа или раньше.

3. 6 июля 2026 г. в 11:46 UTCinvestigating

   Мы все еще видим некоторые проблемы с поиском пользователей, пользовательским пикером и активами в регионе ЕС. Мы продолжаем расследовать ситуацию и предоставим дополнительные обновления в течение следующего часа или раньше.

4. 6 июля 2026 г. в 12:25 UTCmonitoring

   Мы применили исправление для смягчения проблемы и наблюдаем восстановление. Мы продолжаем следить за ситуацией и должны быть полностью восстановлены в ближайшее время. Мы сможем предоставить больше обновлений в течение следующего часа или раньше.

5. 6 июля 2026 г. в 13:04 UTCresolved

   6 июля 2026 года, между 06:51 UTC и 09:39 UTC некоторые пользователи могли столкнуться с проблемами, связанными с автоматизацией, а между 08:10 UTC и 11:50 UTC некоторые пользователи могли столкнуться с проблемами, связанными с поиском пользователей, пользовательским пикером и активами в регионе ЕС. Теперь проблемы решены, и сервисы работают нормально для всех клиентов.

6. 17 июля 2026 г. в 16:59 UTCpostmortem

   ##Резюме 6 июля 2026 года, между 06:51 и 20:17 UTC, клиенты Atlassian, использующие облачные продукты в европейских (ЕС) регионах, испытали сбои в обслуживании, влияющие на выполнение правил автоматизации, поиск пользователей, сборщик пользователей и связанные с ними рабочие процессы. Инцидент начался, когда базовая служба идентификации испытала насыщение базы данных в регионах ЕС, увеличивая задержку и частоту ошибок. В то время как ответчики работали над восстановлением пропускной способности, было применено аварийное смягчение, которое блокировало правила автоматизации доступа к конечной точке идентификации. Параллельно повышенная задержка идентификации способствовала каскадному сбою в поисковой службе пользователя вниз по течению, ухудшая пользовательский поиск и пользовательский выбор между несколькими продуктами. Сервис постепенно восстанавливался после добавления дополнительной емкости считывания базы данных, удаления аварийного блока и ручного расширения службы поиска пользователей. # # Влияние Инцидент затронул потребителей нескольких продуктов Atlassian в регионах ЕС 6 июля 2026 года между 06:51 и 20:17 UTC. **Деградация основных услуг по идентификации:** в регионах ЕС наблюдались повышенные показатели отказов в доступе. **Сбои в выполнении правил автоматизации: ** правила автоматизации с использованием пользователя по умолчанию (Automation for Jira) в Jira, Jira Service Management и Jira Product Discovery в регионах ЕС потерпели неудачу с ошибкой разрешения. **Пользовательский поиск и отказы в выборе пользователей: ** показатели успеха поиска пользователей значительно снизились в регионах ЕС, при этом возможности выбора пользователей в значительной степени недоступны для всех продуктов. ##Коренная причина Инцидент произошел из-за недавнего изменения конфигурации, которое сократило срок службы кэша для базовой службы идентификации. По мере того, как 6 июля 2026 года трафик рабочих дней в ЕС увеличивался, большая доля запросов стала поступать непосредственно в базу данных поддержки, а не обслуживаться из кэша. Базы данных ЕС не обладали достаточным региональным потенциалом для поглощения возросшей нагрузки, а ЦП базы данных достиг насыщения, что привело к повышению частоты отказов в доступе. В рамках смягчения последствий был применен аварийный блок для снижения нагрузки на насыщенную базу данных службы идентификации и определения приоритетности восстановления базовой службы идентификации. Это непреднамеренно помешало правилам автоматизации пройти проверку разрешения до исполнения, в результате чего они потерпели неудачу. Длительность была обусловлена, прежде всего, вторичной волной сбоев правил автоматизации, вызванных дросселированием предела обработки. Параллельно устойчивая деградация вызвала повышенную задержку и периодические сбои в продуктах, которые зависят от этих проверок, и способствовала каскадному сбою в поисковой службе пользователя. В результате в регионах ЕС практически не было доступа к поиску пользователей и их выбору до тех пор, пока не была восстановлена служба разрешений и не была расширена служба поиска пользователей для восстановления работоспособности. ## План действий по исправлению положения и следующие шаги Мы знаем, что перебои влияют на производительность клиентов. Atlassian уделяет приоритетное внимание следующим действиям, которые помогут предотвратить подобные инциденты в будущем: **Улучшить гарантии для смягчения последствий чрезвычайных ситуаций с высокой отдачей:** Укрепление операционного инструментария таким образом, чтобы меры по смягчению последствий, которые могут отключить рабочие процессы, ориентированные на клиента, требовали дополнительного рассмотрения. ** Укрепление потенциала инфраструктуры идентификации и повышение безопасности:** Проанализируйте размер региональной базы данных и запас хода для снижения риска насыщения в пиковые периоды движения и уточните процесс оценки изменений конфигурации, чтобы оценить влияние нагрузки вниз по течению до развертывания производства. ** Укрепить устойчивость к каскадным отказам от деградации вверх по течению:** Обработка обратного давления, конфигурация выключателя и поведение автомасштабирования в службах, так что деградация вверх по течению не вызывает более широкого влияния продукта на поиск пользователей, сборщик пользователей и связанный с ним опыт. **Сложные механизмы повтора для сбоев правил автоматизации: ** Повышение устойчивости правил автоматизации для снижения воздействия, связанного с инцидентами, происходящими в зависимостях. Мы понимаем, насколько важны надежные рабочие процессы для наших клиентов, и приносим извинения клиентам, которые пострадали от этого инцидента. Спасибо. Атласская поддержка клиентов

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 16 июня 2026 г. в 13:46 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating degraded performance affecting your service. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

2. 16 июня 2026 г. в 14:28 UTCidentified

   We have identified the source of degraded performance affecting some Confluence Cloud users. A subset of users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or editing pages. Our team has initiated a remediation and is actively monitoring recovery. We will provide another update within one hour or once the issue is fully resolved.

3. 16 июня 2026 г. в 14:53 UTCmonitoring

   We have been able to apply the fix to mitigate the issue and we are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

4. 16 июня 2026 г. в 15:56 UTCresolved

   On June 16, 2026, Confluence Cloud users for some customers may have experienced performance degradation of view and edit page experiences. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23 июня 2026 г. в 18:25 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary ### On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT ### The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ### ROOT CAUSE ### 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. We have already deployed the following fix: - Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: - Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. - Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 июня 2026 г. в 07:39 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing experiencing degraded performance in Confluence Cloud affecting view page and edit page functionality. Our teams are actively investigating and will be sharing more updates in next 1 hour or sooner.

2. 12 июня 2026 г. в 08:45 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing degraded performance with view content, create and edit functionality on Confluence Cloud primarily in the EU region. Our teams are actively working to identify the root cause of the issue. We will share additional updates in next 2 hours or sooner as more information is available.

3. 12 июня 2026 г. в 10:29 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause of this issue and implemented a fix. We are beginning to observe signs of recovery, with some affected users regaining access to view, create, and edit content on Confluence Cloud. We will provide a further update within one hour, or sooner if we confirm full recovery for all affected customers.

4. 12 июня 2026 г. в 11:15 UTCresolved

   On June 12th 2026, between 07:04 to 11:06 UTC, some Confluence users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23 июня 2026 г. в 18:28 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ‌ ### ROOT CAUSE ‌ 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ‌ ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ‌ We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. ‌ We have already deployed the following fix: * Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. * Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ ‌ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 10 июня 2026 г. в 06:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating reports of extended delays being experienced across tasks such as processing of Incoming Emails, Notifications relating to changes or creation of Work Items, in addition to delays in processing Scheduled Triggers from Marketplace apps. Our team is looking into this with urgency and we will provide further update within one hour as our investigation continues.

2. 10 июня 2026 г. в 06:14 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause for this issue and has now deployed a fix that is rolling out across impacted products. At this time we are monitoring for the recovery of these events across Jira Service Management, Jira Cloud and Ecosystem app Scheduled Triggers. We will provide further update within one hour or when we have seen a full recovery of all task processing across these products.

3. 10 июня 2026 г. в 06:14 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has now determined that performance has returned to expected levels for those impacted by this incident. Additional products that are now known to have been impacted by this incident are Confluence, Customer Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery. These products would have seen similar impact where email notifications or processing of events may have been delayed while this incident was underway. We are now monitoring for the full recovery of performance across all products and will update when we are confident this issue is fully resolved, or within one hour, whichever is sooner.

4. 10 июня 2026 г. в 06:31 UTCresolved

   We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 27 мая 2026 г. в 06:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where customers attempting to view Calendars receive an error message on Confluence Cloud pages. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 27 мая 2026 г. в 07:06 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause and are in process of deploying a fix. We will share further updates in next 1 hours, or sooner if we have any meaningful developments to report.

3. 27 мая 2026 г. в 07:48 UTCresolved

   Between 00:50 UTC and 07:30 UTC on 27 May 2026, some users were facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and this incident has been fully restored.

1. 26 мая 2026 г. в 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where some custom extensions may fail to load when editing Confluence Cloud pages. Affected users may see 'Error loading the extension!' messages or notice that certain macros are missing from the editor's extension selection menu. Viewing published pages is not affected. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 26 мая 2026 г. в 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating an issue affecting the editing macros in Confluence Cloud editor. Our team is working to identify the root cause. We will provide an update within approximately one hour.

3. 26 мая 2026 г. в 13:55 UTCresolved

   Between 08:30 UTC and 13:51 UTC on 26 May 2026, some users were unable to load or edit certain macros in the Confluence Cloud page editor. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and macro functionality has been fully restored.

1. 14 мая 2026 г. в 04:54 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue with multiple Atlassian products that is impacting a large number of Confluence and Jira Cloud customers. We are continuing to investigate and will add further details about additional impact as our investigation continues. We will provide more details within the next hour or sooner if further information becomes available

2. 14 мая 2026 г. в 05:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

3. 14 мая 2026 г. в 05:11 UTCidentified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

4. 14 мая 2026 г. в 05:24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

5. 14 мая 2026 г. в 05:34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

6. 14 мая 2026 г. в 05:43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

7. 14 мая 2026 г. в 06:40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

8. 14 мая 2026 г. в 06:41 UTCmonitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

9. 14 мая 2026 г. в 06:48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

10. 19 мая 2026 г. в 19:04 UTCpostmortem

    ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 8 мая 2026 г. в 01:31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 8 мая 2026 г. в 04:10 UTCidentified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 8 мая 2026 г. в 04:10 UTCidentified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 8 мая 2026 г. в 04:10 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 8 мая 2026 г. в 05:53 UTCmonitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 8 мая 2026 г. в 08:03 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 8 мая 2026 г. в 11:12 UTCmonitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 8 мая 2026 г. в 19:45 UTCresolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 20 мая 2026 г. в 06:55 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 14 апреля 2026 г. в 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Rovo, specifically for customers using automation rules that invoke Rovo agents. Some customers may find that these automations are not completing as expected. We'll share updates here as more information becomes available.

2. 14 апреля 2026 г. в 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified that this incident also affects automation rules in Confluence that use Rovo agents. We are investigating and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. 14 апреля 2026 г. в 14:11 UTCidentified

   We have identified the issue, and our teams are working to resolve it and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as they become available.

4. 14 апреля 2026 г. в 15:46 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 14 апреля 2026 г. в 16:11 UTCresolved

   On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 13 апреля 2026 г. в 07:29 UTCmonitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 13 апреля 2026 г. в 08:33 UTCmonitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 13 апреля 2026 г. в 10:17 UTCresolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 21 апреля 2026 г. в 02:33 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 8 апреля 2026 г. в 06:01 UTCinvestigating

   The impact of this incident is now understood to also be impacting search in Jira and Confluence, as well as additional downstream impacts to Rovo Chat, User Management, Administration and Guard. Our team is continuing to investigate with urgency and we will provide further update within 1 hour.

2. 8 апреля 2026 г. в 06:25 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is aware that users are currently experiencing errors while attempting to search in Confluence and Jira. Our team is investigating with urgency and will be providing an update within 1 hour.

3. 8 апреля 2026 г. в 07:40 UTCidentified

   Confluence and Jira search reliability is improving, and we expect full recovery shortly; we will continue to closely monitor the services to ensure they remain stable.

4. 8 апреля 2026 г. в 08:33 UTCidentified

   We have restored core search functionality and services are operating again, but some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour while new data continues to be indexed. We are actively working to complete reindexing and will update this page as performance fully recovers.

5. 8 апреля 2026 г. в 09:03 UTCidentified

   We are also aware of impact as a result of these search failures to Customer Service Management, Asset Reports, Jira Service Management and dashboards within Focus. Our team have identified the potential root cause of the issue and our teams are working with urgency on a resolution. We will provide further update within 1 hour.

6. 8 апреля 2026 г. в 09:03 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally. Some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour, while new data continues to be indexed. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

7. 8 апреля 2026 г. в 11:43 UTCresolved

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

8. 17 апреля 2026 г. в 16:24 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 марта 2026 г. в 13:38 UTCinvestigating

   Confluence Cloud users may experience errors when accessing certain Marketplace macros. Affected customers are seeing the message Error rendering macro 'static-macro': Page loading failed. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner.

2. 12 марта 2026 г. в 13:38 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the cause of this issue, and a fix is currently being deployed. We are monitoring the deployment, and we will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner if needed.

3. 13 марта 2026 г. в 00:26 UTCresolved

   On March 12, 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 10 марта 2026 г. в 00:15 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of customers experiencing delays with their automations within Jira, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Jira Product Discovery and Confluence. Our team is investigating with urgency and we will provide an update within one hour.

2. 10 марта 2026 г. в 00:15 UTCidentified

   Our team has now identified the cause of this issue relating to delayed automation events and has put a hotfix in place to help restore automation performance. We will continue to monitor performance as the backlog of issues is now being processed.

3. 10 марта 2026 г. в 00:51 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of automations has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 10 марта 2026 г. в 00:59 UTCresolved

   On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 20 февраля 2026 г. в 04:14 UTCidentified

   Customers using Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours as we continue our investigation.

2. 20 февраля 2026 г. в 12:26 UTCidentified

   We understand that customers using Customer Service Management, Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours or sooner based on significant progress.

3. 20 февраля 2026 г. в 12:26 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.

1. 19 февраля 2026 г. в 15:44 UTCmonitoring

   We have received and investigated reports of a partial service disruption affecting Confluence Cloud for some customers in AP South, APSE, APSE2, East, and Central. The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

2. 19 февраля 2026 г. в 17:47 UTCresolved

   On February 19 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption in AP South, APSE, APSE2, East, and Central regions. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.