История сбоев Mindtouch

1. 23 июля 2026 г. в 12:30 UTCinvestigating

   Деградация системы управления знаниями CXone. Команда CXone Knowledge Management Engineering изучает сообщения о деградации сайта.

2. 23 июля 2026 г. в 12:48 UTCinvestigating

   Мы продолжаем расследование этого вопроса.

3. 23 июля 2026 г. в 12:59 UTCmonitoring

   Реализовано исправление, и мы отслеживаем результаты.

4. 23 июля 2026 г. в 21:40 UTCresolved

   Этот инцидент был урегулирован.

5. 4 августа 2026 г. в 16:05 UTCpostmortem

   **Impact Start Time \(UTC\) 07/23/2026 07:31 AM UTC** **Impact End Time \(UTC\) 07/23/2026 01:01 PM UTC** **Incident Summary** Updated on 08/04/2026 - On 07/23/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers reported experiencing page formatting failures and API call errors within the CXone Mpower Expert service. The incident was caused by incorrect Web Application Firewall \(WAF\) control rules that were deployed as part of a scheduled software release. The issue was resolved after the Engineering team reverted the incorrect WAF rules that had been implemented across the affected regions, restoring normal service operation. **Root Cause** The incident was caused by incorrect WAF control rules that were deployed as part of a scheduled software release. These rules classified and blocked legitimate web and Application Programming Interface \(API\) requests as bot traffic, resulting in service degradation and errors for affected customers. Although a corrective configuration had been identified and merged during pre-deployment validation activities, a build pipeline checkout failure prevented the corrected configuration from being included in the deployed release. As a result, the unintended WAF configuration remained active, causing legitimate customer traffic to be blocked. **Corrective Actions** * **Detection:** NiCE Internal support teams received reports from customers experiencing page formatting failures and API call errors within the CXone Mpower Expert service. * **Remediation:** The issue was resolved after the Engineering team reverted the incorrect WAF rules that had been implemented across the affected regions, restoring normal service operation. Completed on 07/23/2026. * **Prevention:** The Engineering team has updated the build pipeline configuration to address the checkout failure and improve build reliability. Completed on 07/30/2026. The Engineering team has strengthened release deployment criteria by implementing stricter release guidelines to ensure all required builds are available and verified before deployment. Completed on 08/03/2026. The Engineering team is evaluating monitoring and alerting enhancement opportunities to improve visibility and enable earlier detection. An update will be provided by End of Day MT on 08/14/2026. **Incident Timeline \(UTC\)** **07/23/2026 07:31 AM \(UTC\)** - The first customer case was opened, and Tech Support Engineers \(TSEs\) began their initial validations and troubleshooting investigation. **07/23/2026 11:37 AM \(UTC\)** - TSEs notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. **07/23/2026 12:31 PM \(UTC\)** - Engineers identified a suspected cause and began remediation steps. **07/23/2026 01:01 PM \(UTC\)** - The issue was resolved after the Engineering team reverted the incorrect WAF rules that had been implemented across the affected regions, restoring normal service operation. Following successful validations, the major incident was marked as resolved.

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 9 июля 2026 г. в 07:58 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Mpower Expert Service Degradation: Сайты недоступны. CXone Mpower Expert Engineering Команда расследует сообщения о недоступности сайта.

2. 9 июля 2026 г. в 08:17 UTCidentified

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Сайты недоступны. Эта проблема была выявлена, и в настоящее время ведется работа по ее устранению.

3. 9 июля 2026 г. в 08:29 UTCmonitoring

   CXone Knowledge Management - Fix Deployed - Все службы работают в обычном режиме. Команда CXone Knowledge Management Engineering развернула исправление, и все службы работают нормально. В настоящее время мы отслеживаем места для обеспечения стабильности развертывания. Продолжительность мероприятия 31 минута

4. 9 июля 2026 г. в 08:37 UTCresolved

   CXone Knowledge Management - Service Disruption Resolved - Все службы работают в обычном режиме. Команда CXone Mpower Expert Engineering развернула исправление и контролировала развертывание, чтобы убедиться, что сайты стабильны. Сейчас этот вопрос решен. Продолжительность мероприятия 38 минут

5. 16 июля 2026 г. в 17:12 UTCpostmortem

   **Влияние времени начала \(UTC\) 07/09/2026 07:18 AM UTC** **Время окончания воздействия \(UTC\) 07/09/2026 08:18 AM UTC** ##Резюме происшествия 07/09/2026 некоторые клиенты NiCE CXone Mpower испытывали медленную загрузку страниц, периодические проблемы с доступом или временную недоступность портала знаний CXone Mpower Expert. Проблема возникла из-за запланированного выпуска продукции, который непреднамеренно внес изменения в конфигурацию, сократив выделение ресурсов для автомасштабирования на затронутом производственном кластере. Воздействие было устранено после того, как изменение было отменено, перенаправив трафик на предыдущую стабильную версию и восстановив сервис. ##Коренная причина Проблема возникла из-за запланированного выпуска продукции, который непреднамеренно внес изменения в конфигурацию, сократив выделение ресурсов для автомасштабирования на затронутом производственном кластере. В ходе расследования инженеры определили, что предыдущий прирост ресурса неожиданно не смог успешно слиться в кодовую базу. В результате развертывание повторно применило заданную кодом конфигурацию, непреднамеренно перезаписав существующую производственную настройку и вернув автомасштабир к его предыдущему распределению ресурсов. Это привело к тому, что автомасштабер столкнулся с условиями «вне памяти» и не смог масштабировать емкость кластера по мере необходимости, что привело к ухудшению производительности платформы и временной недоступности сайта для некоторых клиентов. Выпуск успешно прошел стандартную проверку и был развернут в другой производственной среде без проблем. Состояние проявляется только в пострадавшем производственном кластере при более высоком объеме трафика. В то время как инциденты такого рода редки во время рутинных выпусков продукции, это событие выявило возможности для дальнейшего усиления контроля развертывания и проверки конфигурации, чтобы снизить риск подобных инцидентов в будущем. ## Корректирующие действия ** Обнаружение:** Внутренний мониторинг и автоматические оповещения выявили сбой в обслуживании, что впоследствии было подтверждено сообщениями клиентов о деградации обслуживания и временной недоступности некоторых сайтов CXone Mpower Expert. Корректирующие действия ** Восстановление:** Воздействие было устранено после того, как изменение было отменено, перенаправив трафик на предыдущую стабильную версию и восстановив сервис. Это снизило спрос на кластерные ресурсы, что позволило автомасштабируемой службе восстановить и возобновить нормальные операции. Завершено 07/09/2026. **Профилактика:** Инженерная группа восстановила распределение ресурсов автомасштаба в затронутой производственной среде до предполагаемых увеличенных значений, обеспечив достаточную мощность для поддержки спроса на кластеры и снижения риска аналогичных воздействий на услуги в будущем. Завершено 07/10/2026. Трубопровод выпуска будет усовершенствован для введения дополнительной проверки и проверки готовности ранее в процессе развертывания. Это изменение обеспечит полную проверку критических рабочих нагрузок, пропускной способности инфраструктуры и состояния обслуживания до того, как трафик будет направлен на новую версию. Обновление будет предоставлено в конце дня MT 24.07.2026. Команды по обеспечению устойчивости NiCE по-прежнему сосредоточены на укреплении надежности системы, стабильности, устойчивости всей платформы и валидации после развертывания, мониторинге и производительности. Эти усилия увязаны с инициативой Operational Resiliency Excellence для обеспечения устойчивого прогресса и измеримых результатов. ## Инцидент \(UTC\) 07/09/2026 07:18 AM \(UTC\) - Внутренний мониторинг и валидация развертывания выявили сбои в производственной среде. Инженерные бригады немедленно приступили к расследованию вопроса и инициировали восстановительные мероприятия. 07/09/2026 07:23 AM (UTC) - Первое дело клиента было открыто, и инженеры технической поддержки (TS) начали свое первоначальное расследование и устранение неполадок. 07/09/2026 07:56 AM В то время как усилия по восстановлению продолжались, инженеры TS уведомили инженеров Центра сетевых операций о сообщенном воздействии на клиента; был предложен и подтвержден крупный инцидент. 07/09/2026 08:18 AM (UTC) - Пострадавший выпуск был успешно откатан, восстановив нормальное обслуживание. После успешной проверки главный инцидент был отмечен как разрешенный.

Автоматический перевод официального обновления инцидента.

1. 1 июля 2026 г. в 10:26 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team is investigating reports of site unavailability.

2. 1 июля 2026 г. в 17:39 UTCidentified

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites unavailable or slow to load. The issue has been identified and a fix is being worked on for deployment.

3. 1 июля 2026 г. в 17:47 UTCmonitoring

   CXone Knowledge Management - Fix Deployed - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team has deployed a fix and all services are running normally. We are currently monitoring sites for deployment stability. Event duration 3h 11m

4. 1 июля 2026 г. в 20:46 UTCidentified

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The issue has been identified and a fix has been released. Sites may still be experiencing degraded performance but will be coming fully back online shortly.

5. 1 июля 2026 г. в 20:52 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

6. 2 июля 2026 г. в 14:49 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

7. 7 июля 2026 г. в 17:37 UTCpostmortem

   **Impact Start Time \(UTC\) 07/01/2026 07:55 AM UTC** **Impact End Time \(UTC\) 07/01/2026 01:21 PM UTC** **Incident Summary:** On 07/01/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers reported service degradation while accessing and using the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. The recurring service degradation was caused by a Domain Name System \(DNS\) resolution bottleneck within the platform infrastructure during periods of elevated traffic. The impact was mitigated after engineers scaled up resources and implemented a node local DNS cache. Service stability was further improved as traffic volumes decreased, allowing the platform to recover and return to normal operation. ## Root Cause The recurring service degradation was caused by a DNS resolution bottleneck within the platform infrastructure during periods of elevated traffic. Increased DNS request volume exceeded infrastructure processing limits, resulting in intermittent DNS lookup failure. These failures triggered application retries, increased latency, elevated “5xx” errors, and customer-facing service degradation. The issue was traced to an existing configuration gap that prevented application workloads from utilizing the platform's DNS caching capability. As a result, DNS requests continued to follow the standard resolution path, creating unnecessary network overhead and contributing to DNS request saturation under higher traffic volumes. While this condition had existed for some time without widespread impact, continued platform growth, increased workload density, and infrastructure scaling changes increased DNS traffic and exposed the underlying limitation. Once the DNS processing limits were reached, requests were intermittently dropped, resulting in cascading application failures and customer-facing service disruptions. During the investigation, engineers implemented several mitigations to reduce customer impact while continuing to identify the underlying cause. However, because these actions addressed symptoms rather than the root issue, the condition recurred and resulted in multiple major incidents before a permanent corrective solution was implemented. ## Corrective Actions **Detection:** The failure condition triggered system alarms, prompting engineers to initiate incident response procedures to validate, investigate, and reproduce the issue. While the investigation was underway, some customers reported service degradation when accessing and using the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. **Remediation:** The impact was mitigated after engineers scaled up resources and implemented a node local DNS cache. Service stability was further improved as traffic volumes decreased, allowing the platform to recover and return to normal operation. Completed on 07/01/2026. **Prevention:** Engineers developed a dashboard to monitor local DNS cache performance, improving visibility into DNS health and enabling earlier detection, investigation, and remediation of potential issues before they impact service availability or customer experience. Completed on 07/01/2026. The Engineering team implemented an emergency change to correctly enable local DNS caching for applicable workloads, reducing DNS traffic, preventing node-level DNS saturation, and restoring the intended DNS architecture. This improved platform stability and DNS performance while reducing the risk of similar incidents. Additional infrastructure optimizations were also implemented to improve operational efficiency and minimize service impact during scaling activities. Completed on 07/02/2026. Engineers will conduct a comprehensive validation of DNS configurations across all workloads to ensure consistent use of node local DNS cache. While the immediate issue has been remediated, a fleet-wide review will identify and correct any remaining configuration gaps, helping to optimize DNS performance, reduce infrastructure load, and prevent similar service degradation events in the future. In addition, the Engineering team will continue extended monitoring of platform health and stability to verify the long-term effectiveness of the corrective actions and proactively identify any emerging issues. An update will be provided by End of Day MT on 07/17/2026. NiCE resiliency teams remain focused on enhancing system reliability, stability, platform-wide resilience, monitoring capabilities, and overall performance. These ongoing efforts are aligned with the Operational Resiliency Excellence initiative, driving continuous improvement, strengthening operational maturity, and delivering measurable business outcomes. ## Incident Timeline \(UTC\) 07/01/2026 07:55 AM \(UTC\) - Engineers received a service degradation alert and immediately initiated incident response procedures to investigate, validate, and reproduce the issue to determine its scope and potential customer impact. 07/01/2026 08:15 AM \(UTC\) - The first customer case was opened, and Tech Support \(TS\) engineers began the troubleshooting investigation. 07/01/2026 08:39 AM \(UTC\) - TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. 07/01/2026 09:54 AM \(UTC\) - Engineers identified a suspected cause and Incident Timeline \(UTC\) began remediation steps. 07/01/2026 10:31 AM \(UTC\) - A fix was implemented, and engineers closely monitored system performance. While the remediation reduced the impact, it did not fully restore service stability. Engineers continued their investigation and identification of further remediation actions. 07/01/2026 01:21 PM \(UTC\) - The impact was resolved after engineers scaled up resources and implemented a node local DNS cache, while traffic volume returned to normal levels. Following successful validations, the major incident was marked as resolved. Engineering teams continued extended monitoring of platform performance and kept the service disruption notification active on the Status page while validating the long-term effectiveness of the remediation. ‌ **Impact Start Time \(UTC\) 07/01/2026 02:11 PM UTC** **Impact End Time \(UTC\) 07/01/2026 07:18 PM UTC** **Incident Summary:** On 07/01/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers reported service degradation while accessing and using the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. The recurring service degradation was caused by a Domain Name System \(DNS\) resolution bottleneck within the platform infrastructure during periods of elevated traffic. The impact was mitigated after engineers scaled up cluster resources and updated application workloads to utilize node local DNS cache, reducing DNS traffic and preventing nodes from reaching DNS query processing limits. ## Root Cause The recurring service degradation was caused by a DNS resolution bottleneck within the platform infrastructure during periods of elevated traffic. Increased DNS request volume exceeded infrastructure processing limits, resulting in intermittent DNS lookup failure. These failures triggered application retries, increased latency, elevated “5xx” errors, and customer-facing service degradation. The issue was traced to an existing configuration gap that prevented application workloads from utilizing the platform's DNS caching capability. As a result, DNS requests continued to follow the standard resolution path, creating unnecessary network overhead and contributing to DNS request saturation under higher traffic volumes. While this condition had existed for some time without widespread impact, continued platform growth, increased workload density, and infrastructure scaling changes increased DNS traffic and exposed the underlying limitation. Once the DNS processing limits were reached, requests were intermittently dropped, resulting in cascading application failures and customer-facing service disruptions. During the investigation, engineers implemented several mitigations to reduce customer impact while continuing to identify the underlying cause. However, because these actions addressed symptoms rather than the root issue, the condition recurred and resulted in multiple major incidents before a permanent corrective solution was implemented. ## Corrective Actions **Detection:** The failure condition triggered system alarms, prompting engineers to initiate incident response procedures to validate, investigate, and reproduce the issue. While the investigation was underway, some customers reported service degradation when accessing and using the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. **Remediation:** The impact was mitigated after engineers scaled up cluster resources and updated application workloads to utilize node local DNS cache, reducing DNS traffic and preventing nodes from reaching DNS query processing limits. These actions restored normal service behavior and improved overall platform stability. Completed on 07/01/2026. **Prevention:** Engineers developed a dashboard to monitor local DNS cache performance, improving visibility into DNS health and enabling earlier detection, investigation, and remediation of potential issues before they impact service availability or customer experience. Completed on 07/01/2026. The Engineering team implemented an emergency change to correctly enable local DNS caching for applicable workloads, reducing DNS traffic, preventing node-level DNS saturation, and restoring the intended DNS architecture. This improved platform stability and DNS performance while reducing the risk of similar incidents. Additional infrastructure optimizations were also implemented to improve operational efficiency and minimize service impact during scaling activities. Completed on 07/02/2026. Engineers will conduct a comprehensive validation of DNS configurations across all workloads to ensure consistent use of node local DNS cache. While the immediate issue has been remediated, a fleet-wide review will identify and correct any remaining configuration gaps, helping to optimize DNS performance, reduce infrastructure load, and prevent similar service degradation events in the future. In addition, the Engineering team will continue extended monitoring of platform health and stability to verify the long-term effectiveness of the corrective actions and proactively identify any emerging issues. An update will be provided by End of Day MT on 07/17/2026. NiCE resiliency teams remain focused on enhancing system reliability, stability, platform-wide resilience, monitoring capabilities, and overall performance. These ongoing efforts are aligned with the Operational Resiliency Excellence initiative, driving continuous improvement, strengthening operational maturity, and delivering measurable business outcomes. ## Incident Timeline \(UTC\) 07/01/2026 02:11 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers observed service degradation alert and the first customer case was opened. Engineers began their initial validation and troubleshooting investigation. 07/01/2026 02:55 PM \(UTC\) - TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. 07/01/2026 03:14 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers identified a suspected cause and began remediation steps. 07/01/2026 03:49 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers began increasing cluster capacity Incident Timeline \(UTC\) and redistributed workloads to use the node local DNS cache. 07/01/2026 05:29 PM \(UTC\) - Sites became accessible but engineers were still seeing some “500” errors. Engineers planned to implement additional configuration changes to fully restore the service. 07/01/2026 05:55 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers continued resetting pods to stabilize and fully restore service. 07/01/2026 06:40 PM \(UTC\) - Problematic pods were removed from the affected nodes as part of ongoing recovery actions. 07/01/2026 07:18 PM \(UTC\) - The impact was resolved after engineers increased cluster resources and updated the application service with the node local DNS cache. Following successful validation, the major incident was marked as resolved. Since implementation of the fix, engineers have observed significant improvements in platform stability and continue to monitor performance to ensure sustained effectiveness.

1. 30 июня 2026 г. в 14:25 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites are slow to load or inaccessible at this time. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team is investigating reports of site unavailability.

2. 30 июня 2026 г. в 14:41 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Mpower Expert Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team is investigating reports of site unavailability.

3. 30 июня 2026 г. в 14:52 UTCidentified

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The issue has been identified and a fix is being worked on for deployment.

4. 30 июня 2026 г. в 15:53 UTCmonitoring

   CXone Knowledge Management - Fix Deployed - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team has deployed a fix and all services are running normally. We are currently monitoring sites for deployment stability. Event duration 31 mins

5. 30 июня 2026 г. в 23:40 UTCresolved

   CXone Knowledge Management - Service Disruption Resolved - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team has deployed a fix and monitored the deployment to make sure sites are stable. The issue is now resolved at this time. Event duration 31 mins

6. 7 июля 2026 г. в 17:33 UTCpostmortem

   **Impact Start Time \(UTC\) 06/30/2026 02:07 PM UTC** **Impact End Time \(UTC\) 06/30/2026 02:57 PM UTC** **Incident Summary:** On 06/30/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers reported service degradation while accessing and using the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. The recurring service degradation was caused by a Domain Name System \(DNS\) resolution bottleneck within the platform infrastructure during periods of elevated traffic. The impact was mitigated by increasing pod capacity and provisioning additional healthy pods, which reduced the load on affected nodes and restored service availability. ## Root Cause The recurring service degradation was caused by a DNS resolution bottleneck within the platform infrastructure during periods of elevated traffic. Increased DNS request volume exceeded infrastructure processing limits, resulting in intermittent DNS lookup failure. These failures triggered application retries, increased latency, elevated “5xx” errors, and customer-facing service degradation. The issue was traced to an existing configuration gap that prevented application workloads from utilizing the platform's DNS caching capability. As a result, DNS requests continued to follow the standard resolution path, creating unnecessary network overhead and contributing to DNS request saturation under higher traffic volumes. While this condition had existed for some time without widespread impact, continued platform growth, increased workload density, and infrastructure scaling changes increased DNS traffic and exposed the underlying limitation. Once the DNS processing limits were reached, requests were intermittently dropped, resulting in cascading application failures and customer-facing service disruptions. During the investigation, engineers implemented several mitigations to reduce customer impact while continuing to identify the underlying cause. However, because these actions addressed symptoms rather than the root issue, the condition recurred and resulted in multiple major incidents before a permanent corrective solution was implemented. ## Corrective Actions **Detection:** Corrective Actions The failure condition triggered system alarms, prompting engineers to initiate incident response procedures to validate, investigate, and reproduce the issue. While the investigation was underway, some customers reported service degradation when accessing and using the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. **Remediation:** The impact was mitigated by increasing pod capacity and provisioning additional healthy pods, which reduced the load on affected nodes and restored service availability. These new pods were not experiencing the DNS-related issues, allowing the impacted service to recover and return to normal operation. Completed on 06/30/2026. **Prevention:** Engineers developed a dashboard to monitor local DNS cache performance, improving visibility into DNS health and enabling earlier detection, investigation, and remediation of potential issues before they impact service availability or customer experience. Completed on 07/01/2026. The Engineering team implemented an emergency change to correctly enable local DNS caching for applicable workloads, reducing DNS traffic, preventing node-level DNS saturation, and restoring the intended DNS architecture. This improved platform stability and DNS performance while reducing the risk of similar incidents. Additional infrastructure optimizations were also implemented to improve operational efficiency and minimize service impact during scaling activities. Completed on 07/02/2026. Engineers will conduct a comprehensive validation of DNS configurations across all workloads to ensure consistent use of node local DNS cache. While the immediate issue has been remediated, a fleet-wide review will identify and correct any remaining configuration gaps, helping to optimize DNS performance, reduce infrastructure load, and prevent similar service degradation events in the future. In addition, the Engineering team will continue extended monitoring of platform health and stability to verify the long-term effectiveness of the corrective actions and proactively identify any emerging issues. An update will be provided by End of Day MT on 07/17/2026. NiCE resiliency teams remain focused on enhancing system reliability, stability, platform-wide resilience, monitoring capabilities, and overall performance. These ongoing efforts are aligned with the Operational Resiliency Excellence initiative, driving continuous improvement, strengthening operational maturity, and delivering measurable business outcomes. ## Incident Timeline \(UTC\) 6/30/2026 02:07 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers received a service degradation alert and immediately initiated incident response procedures to investigate, validate, and reproduce the issue to determine its scope and potential customer impact. 6/30/2026 02:11 PM \(UTC\) – The first customer case was opened, and Tech Support \(TS\) engineers began initial validation and troubleshooting investigation. 6/30/2026 02:30 PM \(UTC\) – TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. 6/30/2026 02:42 PM \(UTC\) – Engineers identified a suspected cause and began remediation steps. 6/30/2026 02:57 PM \(UTC\) – The impact was mitigated after engineers increased pod capacity. After successful validation, the major incident was resolved. Engineers continued monitoring and root cause investigation.

1. 29 июня 2026 г. в 16:29 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team is investigating reports of degraded performance

2. 29 июня 2026 г. в 16:34 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 29 июня 2026 г. в 21:51 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 7 июля 2026 г. в 17:27 UTCpostmortem

   **Impact Start Time \(UTC\) 06/29/2026 01:22 PM UTC** **Impact End Time \(UTC\) 06/29/2026 04:31 PM UTC** **Incident Summary:** On 06/29/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers reported service degradation while accessing and using the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. The recurring service degradation was caused by a Domain Name System \(DNS\) resolution bottleneck within the platform infrastructure during periods of elevated traffic. The impact was resolved after traffic volumes returned to normal levels. ## Root Cause The recurring service degradation was caused by a DNS resolution bottleneck within the platform infrastructure during periods of elevated traffic. Increased DNS request volume exceeded infrastructure processing limits, resulting in intermittent DNS lookup failure. These failures triggered application retries, increased latency, elevated “5xx” errors, and customer-facing service degradation. The issue was traced to an existing configuration gap that prevented application workloads from utilizing the platform's DNS caching capability. As a result, DNS requests continued to follow the standard resolution path, creating unnecessary network overhead and contributing to DNS request saturation under higher traffic volumes. While this condition had existed for some time without widespread impact, continued platform growth, increased workload density, and infrastructure scaling changes increased DNS traffic and exposed the underlying limitation. Once the DNS processing limits were reached, requests were intermittently dropped, resulting in cascading application failures and customer-facing service disruptions. During the investigation, engineers implemented several mitigations to reduce customer impact while continuing to identify the underlying cause. However, because these actions addressed symptoms rather than the root issue, the condition recurred and resulted in multiple major incidents before a permanent corrective solution was implemented. ## Corrective Actions **Detection:** Corrective Actions The failure condition triggered system alarms, prompting engineers to initiate incident response procedures to validate, investigate, and reproduce the issue. While the investigation was underway, some customers reported service degradation when accessing and using the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. **Remediation:** The impact was resolved after traffic volumes returned to normal levels. Completed on 06/29/2026. **Prevention:** Engineers developed a dashboard to monitor local DNS cache performance, improving visibility into DNS health and enabling earlier detection, investigation, and remediation of potential issues before they impact service availability or customer experience. Completed on 07/01/2026. The Engineering team implemented an emergency change to correctly enable local DNS caching for applicable workloads, reducing DNS traffic, preventing node-level DNS saturation, and restoring the intended DNS architecture. This improved platform stability and DNS performance while reducing the risk of similar incidents. Additional infrastructure optimizations were also implemented to improve operational efficiency and minimize service impact during scaling activities. Completed on 07/02/2026. Engineers will conduct a comprehensive validation of DNS configurations across all workloads to ensure consistent use of node local DNS cache. While the immediate issue has been remediated, a fleet-wide review will identify and correct any remaining configuration gaps, helping to optimize DNS performance, reduce infrastructure load, and prevent similar service degradation events in the future. In addition, the Engineering team will continue extended monitoring of platform health and stability to verify the long-term effectiveness of the corrective actions and proactively identify any emerging issues. An update will be provided by End of Day MT on 07/17/2026. NiCE resiliency teams remain focused on enhancing system reliability, stability, platform-wide resilience, monitoring capabilities, and overall performance. These ongoing efforts are aligned with the Operational Resiliency Excellence initiative, driving continuous improvement, strengthening operational maturity, and delivering measurable business outcomes. ## Incident Timeline \(UTC\) 06/29/2026 01:22 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers received a service degradation alert and immediately initiated incident response procedures to investigate, validate, and reproduce the issue to determine its scope and potential customer impact. 06/29/2026 01:30 PM \(UTC\) - The first customer case was reported, and Technical Support \(TS\) engineers began validation and troubleshooting activities. 06/29/2026 03:34 PM \(UTC\) - TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. 06/29/2026 03:39 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers identified a suspected contributing factor and initiated mitigation efforts to stabilize the service. 06/29/2026 04:31 PM \(UTC\) - Service performance recovered as traffic volumes returned to normal levels. Following successful validation of platform

1. 26 июня 2026 г. в 16:27 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites are slow to load or inaccessible. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team is investigating reports of site unavailability.

2. 26 июня 2026 г. в 16:45 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Mpower Expert Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team is investigating reports of site unavailability

3. 26 июня 2026 г. в 17:31 UTCidentified

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The issue has been identified and a fix is being worked on for deployment.

4. 26 июня 2026 г. в 18:27 UTCmonitoring

   CXone Knowledge Management - Fix Deployed - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team has deployed a fix and all services are running normally. We are currently monitoring sites for deployment stability. Event duration 1h 8m

5. 26 июня 2026 г. в 18:46 UTCresolved

   CXone Knowledge Management - Service Disruption Resolved - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team has deployed a fix and monitored the deployment to make sure sites are stable. The issue is now resolved at this time. Event duration 1h 8 mins

6. 7 июля 2026 г. в 17:19 UTCpostmortem

   **Impact Start Time \(UTC\) 06/26/2026 04:07 PM UTC** **Impact End Time \(UTC\) 06/26/2026 05:36 PM UTC** **Incident Summary:** On 06/26/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers reported service degradation while accessing and using the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. The recurring service degradation was caused by a Domain Name System \(DNS\) resolution bottleneck within the platform infrastructure during periods of elevated traffic. The issue was mitigated through an emergency change that introduced timeout controls to prevent backend processes from remaining stuck for extended periods, allowing orphaned processes to be released and system resources to be recovered. Service stability was further aided by a reduction in traffic volume. ## Root Cause The recurring service degradation was caused by a DNS resolution bottleneck within the platform infrastructure during periods of elevated traffic. Increased DNS request volume exceeded infrastructure processing limits, resulting in intermittent DNS lookup failure. These failures triggered application retries, increased latency, elevated “5xx” errors, and customer-facing service degradation. The issue was traced to an existing configuration gap that prevented application workloads from utilizing the platform's DNS caching capability. As a result, DNS requests continued to follow the standard resolution path, creating unnecessary network overhead and contributing to DNS request saturation under higher traffic volumes. While this condition had existed for some time without widespread impact, continued platform growth, increased workload density, and infrastructure scaling changes increased DNS traffic and exposed the underlying limitation. Once the DNS processing limits were reached, requests were intermittently dropped, resulting in cascading application failures and customer-facing service disruptions. During the investigation, engineers implemented several mitigations to reduce customer impact while continuing to identify the underlying cause. However, because these actions addressed symptoms rather than the root issue, the condition recurred and resulted in multiple major incidents before a permanent corrective solution was implemented. ## Corrective Actions **Detection:** The failure condition triggered system alarms, prompting engineers to initiate incident response procedures to validate, investigate, and reproduce the issue. While the investigation was underway, some customers reported service degradation when accessing and using the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. **Remediation:** The issue was mitigated through an emergency change that introduced timeout controls to prevent backend processes from remaining stuck for extended periods, allowing orphaned processes to be released and system resources to be recovered. Service stability was further aided by a reduction in traffic volume. Completed on 06/26/2026. **Prevention:** Engineers developed a dashboard to monitor local DNS cache performance, improving visibility into DNS health and enabling earlier detection, investigation, and remediation of potential issues before they impact service availability or customer experience. Completed on 07/01/2026. The Engineering team implemented an emergency change to correctly enable local DNS caching for applicable workloads, reducing DNS traffic, preventing node-level DNS saturation, and restoring the intended DNS architecture. This improved platform stability and DNS performance while reducing the risk of similar incidents. Additional infrastructure optimizations were also implemented to improve operational efficiency and minimize service impact during scaling activities. Completed on 07/02/2026. Engineers will conduct a comprehensive validation of DNS configurations across all workloads to ensure consistent use of node local DNS cache. While the immediate issue has been remediated, a fleet-wide review will identify and correct any remaining configuration gaps, helping to optimize DNS performance, reduce infrastructure load, and prevent similar service degradation events in the future. In addition, the Engineering team will continue extended monitoring of platform health and stability to verify the long-term effectiveness of the corrective actions and proactively identify any emerging issues. An update will be provided by End of Day MT on 07/17/2026. NiCE resiliency teams remain focused on enhancing system reliability, stability, platform-wide resilience, monitoring capabilities, and overall performance. These ongoing efforts are aligned with the Operational Resiliency Excellence initiative, driving continuous improvement, strengthening operational maturity, and delivering measurable business outcomes. ## Incident Timeline \(UTC\) 06/26/2026 04:07 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers received a service degradation alert and immediately initiated incident response procedures to investigate, validate, and reproduce the issue to determine its scope and potential customer impact. 06/26/2026 04:10 PM \(UTC\) - The first customer case was opened, and Tech Support \(TS\) engineers began the troubleshooting investigation. 06/26/2026 04:35 PM \(UTC\) - TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. 06/26/2026 04:55 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers identified a suspected cause and began remediation steps. 06/26/2026 05:36 PM \(UTC\) - The impact was resolved after implementing timeout controls to prevent backend processes from becoming stalled and as traffic levels returned to normal. Following successful validations, the major incident was marked resolved.

1. 12 мая 2026 г. в 15:23 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

2. 12 мая 2026 г. в 15:46 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team is investigating reports of site unavailability.

3. 12 мая 2026 г. в 16:01 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 13 мая 2026 г. в 00:53 UTCresolved

   CXone Knowledge Management - Service Disruption Resolved - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team has deployed a fix and monitored the deployment to make sure sites are stable. The issue is now resolved at this time.

1. 11 мая 2026 г. в 08:52 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Expert Service Degradation. The CXone Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of site unavailability.

2. 11 мая 2026 г. в 09:25 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 11 мая 2026 г. в 20:45 UTCidentified

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The issue has been identified and a fix is being worked on for deployment.

4. 11 мая 2026 г. в 21:19 UTCidentified

   CXone Knowledge Management - Fix Deployed - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team has deployed a fix and all services are running normally. We are currently monitoring sites for deployment stability.

5. 12 мая 2026 г. в 14:50 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

6. 27 мая 2026 г. в 15:58 UTCpostmortem

   **Major Incident# 02796435** **Impact Start Time \(UTC\) 05/12/2026 02:50 PM UTC** **Impact End Time \(UTC\) 05/12/2026 03:36 PM UTC** ### Incident Summary Updated on 05/22/2026 - On 05/12/2026, some NiCE CXone Knowledge customers experienced slowness when accessing sites, while others were unable to access the platform entirely with a “504 Gateway Timeout” error within the CXone Knowledge portal. The recurring service degradation incidents were caused by increased traffic volumes combined with performance limitations in certain backend processes, primarily impacting the US regional platform due to higher demand. The impact was mitigated after restarting the affected pods, which restored platform stability ### Root Cause The recurring service degradation incidents were caused by increased traffic volumes combined with performance limitations in certain backend processes, primarily impacting the US regional platform due to higher demand. Under elevated traffic conditions, including automated crawler activity, some requests followed less optimized processing paths, increasing system load. This was further amplified by legacy or complex page content requiring more intensive processing. While scaling actions helped restore capacity, they also introduced temporary overhead that contributed to intermittent performance degradation. Additionally, although autoscaling functioned as designed, it reached its limits and was insufficient to address constraints related to per-pod Central Processing Unit \(CPU\) capacity. ### Corrective Actions **Detection:** Internal support teams detected partial service failures through proactive alerting and monitoring. Subsequently, engineers received customer reports of slowness when accessing sites within the CXone Knowledge portal. **Remediation:** The impact was mitigated after restarting the affected pods, which restored platform stability. Completed on 05/12/2026. **Prevention:** The Engineering team implemented interim mitigation measures to maintain system stability and ensure consistent performance while permanent improvements are finalized and deployed. Completed on 05/12/2026. Baseline system capacity was increased by raising the minimum number of pods and allocating higher CPU resources. This ensures sufficient resources are consistently available, reduces reliance on dynamic scaling, and improves overall system stability during periods of increased demand. Completed on 05/12/2026. The Engineering team will implement targeted software optimizations, including improvements to a specific endpoint that previously introduced cascading effects during scaling events. These enhancements are designed to reduce resource contention and improve system efficiency under high load conditions. The changes are currently undergoing validation and will be deployed following comprehensive testing. Completed on 05/21/2026. The Engineering team will enhance alert notification delivery to ensure alarms are reliably triggered and routed to the appropriate response teams as expected, enabling faster detection and more timely corrective action when issues arise. Completed on 05/22/2026. ### Incident Timeline \(UTC\) 5/12/2026 02:50 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers identified partial service failures through proactive alerting and monitoring. A corresponding service disruption notification was promptly published on the Status Health page while engineers initiated their investigation and remediation efforts to prevent customer impact. 5/12/2026 03:09 PM \(UTC\) - The first customer case was opened, and Tech Support \(TS\) engineers began their initial validation and troubleshooting investigation. 5/12/2026 03:27 PM \(UTC\) - TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. 5/12/2026 03:36 PM \(UTC\) - The impact was resolved after engineers restarted the affected pods and validated recovery through internal testing, marking the end of customer impact. Following confirmation of sustained stability and no further customer impact, the incident was subsequently marked as resolved.

1. 11 мая 2026 г. в 06:53 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Expert Service Degradation. The CXone Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of Service Degradation.

2. 11 мая 2026 г. в 07:05 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 11 мая 2026 г. в 07:19 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 27 мая 2026 г. в 15:53 UTCpostmortem

   **Major Incident# 02795089** **Impact Start Time \(UTC\) 05/11/2026 06:02 AM UTC** **Impact End Time \(UTC\) 05/11/2026 06:25 AM UTC** ### Incident Summary Updated on 05/22/2026 - On 05/11/2026, a NiCE CXone Knowledge customer experienced slowness when accessing sites, while others were unable to access the platform entirely with a “504 Gateway Timeout” error within the CXone Knowledge portal. The recurring service degradation incidents were caused by increased traffic volumes combined with performance limitations in certain backend processes, primarily impacting the US regional platform due to higher demand. The impact was mitigated after restarting the affected pods, which restored platform stability ### Root Cause The recurring service degradation incidents were caused by increased traffic volumes combined with performance limitations in certain backend processes, primarily impacting the US regional platform due to higher demand. Under elevated traffic conditions, including automated crawler activity, some requests followed less optimized processing paths, increasing system load. This was further amplified by legacy or complex page content requiring more intensive processing. While scaling actions helped restore capacity, they also introduced temporary overhead that contributed to intermittent performance degradation. Additionally, although autoscaling functioned as designed, it reached its limits and was insufficient to address constraints related to per-pod Central Processing Unit \(CPU\) capacity. ### Corrective Actions **Detection:** Although built in alerting mechanisms were in place to detect this type of condition, alerts did not consistently reach the responsible teams as expected. In some cases, alerts were grouped or suppressed, delaying timely visibility of the issue. As a result, internal teams became aware of the impact primarily through a customer report of slowness when accessing sites within the CXone Knowledge portal. **Remediation:** The impact was mitigated after restarting the affected pods, which restored platform stability. Completed on 05/11/2026. **Prevention:** The Engineering team implemented interim mitigation measures to maintain system stability and ensure consistent performance while permanent improvements are finalized and deployed. Completed on 05/12/2026. Baseline system capacity was increased by raising the minimum number of pods and allocating higher CPU resources. This ensures sufficient resources are consistently available, reduces reliance on dynamic scaling, and improves overall system stability during periods of increased demand. Completed on 05/12/2026. The Engineering team will implement targeted software optimizations, including improvements to a specific endpoint that previously introduced cascading effects during scaling events. These enhancements are designed to reduce resource contention and improve system efficiency under high load conditions. The changes are currently undergoing validation and will be deployed following comprehensive testing. Completed on 05/21/2026. The Engineering team will enhance alert notification delivery to ensure alarms are reliably triggered and routed to the appropriate response teams as expected, enabling faster detection and more timely corrective action when issues arise. Completed on 05/22/2026. ### Incident Timeline \(UTC\) 05/11/2026 06:02 AM \(UTC\) - A customer case was opened, and Tech Support \(TS\) engineers began their initial validation and troubleshooting investigation. 05/11/2026 06:21 AM \(UTC\) - TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) of the reported customer impact, and internal validation confirmed that site load times had degraded to approximately 15 seconds. 05/11/2026 06:22 AM \(UTC\) - Engineers identified a suspected cause and began remediation steps. 05/11/2026 06:25 AM \(UTC\) - The impact was resolved after engineers restarted the affected pods and validated recovery through internal testing, marking the end of customer impact. 05/11/2026 07:41 AM \(UTC\) - After extended validation and monitoring confirmed that the platform had stabilized, a major incident was formally declared to document the service impact. Following confirmation of sustained stability and no further customer impact, the incident was subsequently marked as resolved.

1. 10 мая 2026 г. в 21:41 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Expert Service Degradation. The CXone Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of site service degradation

2. 10 мая 2026 г. в 21:58 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 11 мая 2026 г. в 01:12 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 7 мая 2026 г. в 11:52 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Mpower Expert Service Degradation. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of Service Degradation.

2. 7 мая 2026 г. в 13:42 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 7 мая 2026 г. в 13:52 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 7 мая 2026 г. в 16:21 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Mpower Expert Service Degradation: Sites Service Degradation. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of Site Service Degradation.

5. 7 мая 2026 г. в 17:40 UTCidentified

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The issue has been identified and a fix is being worked on for deployment.

6. 7 мая 2026 г. в 17:56 UTCmonitoring

   CXone Knowledge Management - Fix Deployed - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team has deployed a fix and all services are running normally. We are currently monitoring sites for deployment stability.

7. 7 мая 2026 г. в 18:21 UTCresolved

   CXone Knowledge Management - Service Disruption Resolved - All Services Running Normally. The NiCE Knowledge Management Engineering team has deployed a fix and monitored the deployment to make sure sites are stable. The issue is now resolved at this time. Event duration - 5hr 48m

8. 14 мая 2026 г. в 15:01 UTCpostmortem

   **Major Incident# 02793015** **Impact Start Time \(UTC\) 05/07/2026 11:43 AM UTC** **Impact End Time \(UTC\) 05/07/2026 02:07 PM UTC** ### Incident Summary On 05/07/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers experienced slowness when accessing sites, while others were unable to access the platform entirely with a “504 Gateway Timeout” error within the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. The recurring service degradation incidents were caused by increased traffic volumes combined with performance limitations in certain backend processes, primarily impacting the US regional platform due to higher demand. The impact was resolved after scaling up pod resources and restarting the proxy pods, which restored platform stability. ### Root Cause The recurring service degradation incidents were caused by increased traffic volumes combined with performance limitations in certain backend processes, primarily impacting the US regional platform due to higher demand. Under elevated traffic conditions, including automated crawler activity, some requests followed less optimized processing paths, increasing system load. This was further amplified by legacy or complex page content requiring more intensive processing. While scaling actions helped restore capacity, they also introduced temporary overhead that contributed to intermittent performance degradation. Additionally, although autoscaling functioned as designed, it reached its limits and was insufficient to address constraints related to per-pod Central Processing Unit \(CPU\) capacity. Overall, evolving traffic patterns exposed underlying performance limitations, highlighting the need for targeted code optimizations and increased per service capacity. ### Corrective Actions **Detection:** Although built in alerting mechanisms were in place to detect this type of condition, alerts did not consistently reach the responsible teams as expected. In some cases, alerts were grouped or suppressed, delaying timely visibility of the issue. As a result, internal teams became aware Corrective Actions of the impact primarily through customer reports of slowness when accessing sites within the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. **Remediation:** The impact was resolved after scaling up pod resources and restarting the proxy pods, which restored platform stability. Completed on 05/07/2026. **Prevention:** The Engineering team enhanced traffic filtering rules at the Web Application Firewall \(WAF\) layer to identify and block a significant portion of automated bot traffic contributing to elevated system load. These actions reduced unnecessary requests and improved overall platform stability. Completed on 05/07/2026. The Engineering team implemented interim mitigation measures to maintain system stability and ensure consistent performance while permanent improvements are finalized and deployed. Completed on 05/12/2026. Baseline system capacity was increased by raising the minimum number of pods and allocating higher CPU resources. This ensures sufficient resources are consistently available, reduces reliance on dynamic scaling, and improves overall system stability during periods of increased demand. Completed on 05/12/2026. The Engineering team will implement targeted software optimizations, including improvements to a specific endpoint that previously introduced cascading effects during scaling events. These enhancements are designed to reduce resource contention and improve system efficiency under high load conditions. The changes are currently undergoing validation and will be deployed following comprehensive testing. An update will be provided by End of Day \(EOD\) MT on 05/22/2026. The Engineering team will enhance alert notification delivery to ensure alarms are reliably triggered and routed to the appropriate response teams as expected, enabling faster detection and more timely corrective action when issues arise. An update will be provided by EOD MT on 05/22/2026. ### Incident Timeline \(UTC\) 05/07/2026 11:43 AM \(UTC\) - The first customer case opened, and Tech Support \(TS\) engineers began the troubleshooting investigation. 05/07/2026 11:44 AM \(UTC\) - TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. 05/07/2026 12:09 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers identified a suspected cause and increased the resources of the web pods to improve system performance. 05/07/2026 12:18 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers also scaled up resources for the Application Programming Interface \(API\) pods to further stabilize performance. 05/07/2026 01:30 PM \(UTC\) - The platform continued to catch-up and engineers were already seeing improvements in system performance. 05/07/2026 01:52 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers restarted proxy pods, resulting in continued performance improvements while monitoring system stability. 05/07/2026 02:00 PM \(UTC\) - Platform performance returned to normal levels, with continued validation and monitoring underway. 05/07/2026 02:07 PM \(UTC\) - The platform stabilized fully. The impact was resolved following resource scaling, and after successful validation, the major incident was marked as resolved. ‌ **Major Incident# 02793390** **Impact Start Time \(UTC\) 05/07/2026 03:03 PM UTC** **Impact End Time \(UTC\) 05/07/2026 05:53 PM UTC** ### Incident Summary On 05/07/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers experienced slowness when accessing sites, while others were unable to access the platform entirely with a “504 Gateway Timeout” error within the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. The recurring service degradation incidents were caused by increased traffic volumes combined with performance limitations in certain backend processes, primarily impacting the US regional platform due to higher demand. The impact was mitigated after restarting the affected pods, which restored platform stability ### Root Cause The recurring service degradation incidents were caused by increased traffic volumes combined with performance limitations in certain backend processes, primarily impacting the US regional platform due to higher demand. Under elevated traffic conditions, including automated crawler activity, some requests followed less optimized processing paths, increasing system load. This was further amplified by legacy or complex page content requiring more intensive processing. While scaling actions helped restore capacity, they also introduced temporary overhead that contributed to intermittent performance degradation. Additionally, although autoscaling functioned as designed, it reached its limits and was insufficient to address constraints related to per-pod Central Processing Unit \(CPU\) capacity. Overall, evolving traffic patterns exposed underlying performance limitations, highlighting the need for targeted code optimizations and increased per service capacity. ### Corrective Actions **Detection:** Although built in alerting mechanisms were in place to detect this type of condition, alerts did not consistently reach the responsible teams as expected. In some cases, alerts were grouped or suppressed, delaying Corrective Actions timely visibility of the issue. As a result, internal teams became aware of the impact primarily through customer reports of slowness when accessing sites within the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. **Remediation:** The impact was mitigated after restarting the affected pods, which restored platform stability. Completed on 05/07/2026. **Prevention:** The Engineering team enhanced traffic filtering rules at the Web Application Firewall \(WAF\) layer to identify and block a significant portion of automated bot traffic contributing to elevated system load. These actions reduced unnecessary requests and improved overall platform stability. Completed on 05/07/2026. The Engineering team implemented interim mitigation measures to maintain system stability and ensure consistent performance while permanent improvements are finalized and deployed. Completed on 05/12/2026. Baseline system capacity was increased by raising the minimum number of pods and allocating higher CPU resources. This ensures sufficient resources are consistently available, reduces reliance on dynamic scaling, and improves overall system stability during periods of increased demand. Completed on 05/12/2026. The Engineering team will implement targeted software optimizations, including improvements to a specific endpoint that previously introduced cascading effects during scaling events. These enhancements are designed to reduce resource contention and improve system efficiency under high load conditions. The changes are currently undergoing validation and will be deployed following comprehensive testing. An update will be provided by End of Day \(EOD\) MT on 05/22/2026. The Engineering team will enhance alert notification delivery to ensure alarms are reliably triggered and routed to the appropriate response teams as expected, enabling faster detection and more timely corrective action when issues arise. An update will be provided by EOD MT on 05/22/2026. ### Incident Timeline \(UTC\) 05/07/2026 03:03 PM \(UTC\) - The first customer case was opened, and Tech Support \(TS\) engineers began their initial validation and troubleshooting investigation. 05/07/2026 05:02 PM \(UTC\) - TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. 05/07/2026 05:30 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers identified a suspected cause and began evaluating the most appropriate remediation approach. 05/07/2026 05:40 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers began their remediation efforts. 05/07/2026 05:53 PM \(UTC\) - The impact was resolved after engineers adjusted traffic filtering and handling. Following successful validations, the major incident was marked as resolved.

1. 29 апреля 2026 г. в 11:19 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team is investigating reports of site unavailability.

2. 29 апреля 2026 г. в 11:38 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of site unavailability.

3. 29 апреля 2026 г. в 11:54 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Knowledge Management - Fix Deployed - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team has deployed a fix and all services are running normally. We are currently monitoring sites for deployment stability. Event duration 51 mins

4. 29 апреля 2026 г. в 11:55 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

5. 29 апреля 2026 г. в 12:13 UTCresolved

   Service Disruption Resolved - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team has deployed a fix and monitored the deployment to make sure sites are stable. The issue is now resolved at this time. Event duration 51 mins

6. 5 мая 2026 г. в 18:32 UTCpostmortem

   **Impact Start Time \(UTC\) 04/29/2026 10:31 AM UTC** **Impact End Time \(UTC\) 04/29/2026 11:56 AM UTC** **Incident Summary** On 04/29/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers initially experienced slowness when accessing sites within the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. The issue subsequently worsened, leading to complete inaccessibility, with users encountering “503 Service Unavailable” and “504 Gateway Timeout” errors. The service disruption was caused by a short-term resource saturation within one of the platform’s backend Application Programming Interface \(API\)\* components. The issue was resolved by scaling up multiple services, increasing Central Processing Unit \(CPU\) allocation per-pod to better handle traffic spikes, and restarting the affected API services to apply the updated resource configurations, restoring normal service operation. **Root Cause** The service disruption was caused by a short-term resource saturation within one of the platform’s backend API components. Under certain conditions, a burst of long running requests placed higher than expected demand on processing resources, leading to slower response times and errors for some customers. Certain subset of API requests required significantly more CPU than others. When many of these requests were processed concurrently, CPU utilization on affected pods became saturated, causing requests to slow down or time out. This saturation cascaded to upstream services, more broadly impacting site availability. Although a built in autoscaling mechanism was in place and functioned as designed, it reached its maximum limit and proved insufficient because the underlying issue was related to per-pod CPU constraints rather than the number of pods. The observed workload pattern required additional per-service processing capacity to compensate for these limitations and restore stable operation. ### Corrective Actions: **Detection:** Although a builtin alerting mechanism was in place to detect the failure condition, the alarm did not trigger to the responsible team as expected. Subsequently, internal support teams began receiving customer reports of slowness when accessing sites within the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. The condition later escalated to complete service inaccessibility, with users encountering “503 Service Unavailable” and “504 Gateway Timeout” errors. **Remediation:** The issue was resolved by scaling up multiple services, increasing CPU allocation per-pod to better handle traffic spikes, and restarting the affected API services to apply the updated resource configurations, restoring normal service operation. Completed on 04/29/2026. **Prevention:** The Engineering team will enhance alert notification delivery to ensure alarms are reliably triggered and routed to the appropriate response teams as expected, enabling faster detection and more timely corrective action when issues arise. An update will be provided by End of Day \(EOD\) MT on 05/15/2026. While the risk of recurrence is currently low following the increase in resource capacity, the Engineering team will implement targeted performance improvements to the affected API component that contributed to this incident. In addition, code level safeguards will be introduced to ensure that, under similar conditions, inefficient requests are terminated sooner, and system resources are released more quickly. These measures are intended to enable faster failure handling and prevent prolonged CPU saturation. An update will be provided by EOD MT on 06/05/2026. **Incident Timeline \(UTC\)** 04/29/2026 10:31 AM \(UTC\) - Telemetry detected initial slow responses and timeout errors, marking the start of customer impact. 04/29/2026 10:51 AM \(UTC\) - The first customer case opened, and Tech Support \(TS\) engineers began the troubleshooting investigation. 04/29/2026 11:20 AM \(UTC\) - TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. 04/29/2026 11:41 AM \(UTC\) - Engineers identified a suspected cause and began remediation steps. 04/29/2026 11:56 AM \(UTC\) - The issue was resolved after scaling up resources and restarting the affected API services. Following successful validation, the major incident was marked as resolved.

1. 24 апреля 2026 г. в 22:35 UTCinvestigating

   MindTouch Engineering is looking into issues related to slow load time on sites.

2. 24 апреля 2026 г. в 22:49 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 24 апреля 2026 г. в 22:58 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 16 марта 2026 г. в 13:41 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Mpower Expert Service Degradation: Site Degradation. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of site degradation.

2. 16 марта 2026 г. в 13:45 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 16 марта 2026 г. в 14:18 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 25 марта 2026 г. в 17:09 UTCpostmortem

   **Impact Start Time \(UTC\)** - 03/16/2026 12:55 PM UTC **Impact End Time \(UTC\)** - 03/16/2026 01:44 PM UTC ## **Incident Summary** Updated on 03/24/2025 - On 03/16/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers experienced degraded performance and intermittent errors within the CXone Mpower Expert application. The impact was caused by elevated system utilization resulting from increased traffic load, which placed excessive demand on the high-availability load-balancing layer. This led to increased response times and reduced request processing efficiency. The impact was resolved when engineers increased the pod capacity of both the web application tier and the load balancer later, thereby restoring system throughput, stabilizing response times, and returning the platform to normal operating conditions. ## **Root Cause** The impact was caused by elevated system utilization resulting from increased traffic load, which placed excessive demand on the high-availability load-balancing layer. This led to increased response times and reduced request processing efficiency. Further investigation determined that the performance degradation was caused by a combination of constrained application processing capacity and insufficient load-balancing scale under peak traffic conditions. Web worker throughput was limited due to a known performance constraint, which reduced the rate at which incoming requests could be processed. This condition was further amplified by the load balancing layer operating below its expected production capacity, resulting in suboptimal traffic distribution and increased system latency during periods of elevated demand. Engineering teams are implementing targeted preventive actions to improve auto-scaling responsiveness and ensure the timely promotion of critical performance fixes to production. ## **Corrective Actions** **Detection:** Internal teams received alerts indicating increased of high availability load balancer response times. Shortly after, customers reported degraded performance and intermittent errors within the CXone Mpower Expert application. **Remediation:** The impact was resolved when engineers increased the pod capacity of both the web application tier and the load balancer later, thereby restoring system throughput, stabilizing response times, and returning the platform to normal operating conditions. Completed on 03/16/2026. **Prevention:** Engineers will adjust the auto-scaling policies to improve responsiveness and enable more aggressive scale-out behavior during peak traffic periods, ensuring capacity aligns with demand in near real time. An update will be provided by End of Day \(EOD\) MT on 03/26/2026. Engineers will implement auto-scaling for the high-availability load-balancing layer to ensure traffic distribution capacity scales proportionally with application workload. An update will be provided by EOD MT on 03/26/2026. ## **Incident Timeline \(UTC\)** 03/16/2026 12:55 PM \(UTC\) - First customer case opened, and Tech Support \(TS\) engineers began the troubleshooting investigation. 03/16/2026 01:07 PM \(UTC\) - TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. 03/16/2026 01:44 PM \(UTC\) - Impact was resolved after engineers made an increase in available resources and internal tests were successful. Impact and major incident resolved.

1. 3 марта 2026 г. в 16:37 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Mpower Expert Service Degradation: Degradation Performance. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of site Degradation Performance.

2. 3 марта 2026 г. в 17:09 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Mpower Expert Service Degradation: Degraded Performance. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of degraded performance.

3. 3 марта 2026 г. в 17:22 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 3 марта 2026 г. в 18:34 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

5. 16 марта 2026 г. в 22:10 UTCpostmortem

   **Impact Start Time** 03/03/2026 02:24 PM UTC **Impact End Time** 03/03/2026 05:00 PM UTC **Incident Summary** Updated on 03/11/2026 - On 3/3/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers elevated latency within the CXone Expert application, resulting in delayed retrieval of knowledge-base articles and impacting agents’ ability to efficiently access customer support content. The impact stemmed from a processing latency issue within the application layer. The impact was resolved when engineers restored normal service by scaling up the infrastructure components responsible for handling inbound web requests, ensuring sufficient processing capacity to stabilize throughput and eliminate request bottlenecks. **Root Cause** The root cause stemmed from a processing latency issue for the application layer. The system briefly took longer than usual to handle requests. For a short period, more activity came in than the system typically manages at once, which slowed things down. As a result, some requests took longer to finish and a few timed out, leading to the performance issues customers noticed. **Corrective Actions** _Detection_: Internal support teams received a customer reported issue and confirmed an ongoing latency issue with the CXone Expert application. _Remediation_: Engineers restored normal service by scaling up the infrastructure components responsible for handling inbound web requests, ensuring sufficient processing capacity to stabilize throughput and eliminate request bottlenecks. Completed on 03/03/2026. _Prevention_: The Engineering team developed and deployed a code fix to address an underlying issue with instance scaling. Completed on 03/05/2026. **Incident Timeline \(UTC\)** 03/03/2026 02:24 PM \(UTC\) - First customer case opened, and Tech Support \(TS\) engineers began the troubleshooting investigation. 03/03/2026 04:31 PM \(UTC\) - TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. 03/03/2026 04:35 PM \(UTC\) - Engineers identified a suspected cause and began remediation steps. 03/03/2026 05:00 PM \(UTC\) - Impact was resolved after engineers increased capacity for components responsible for processing web requests and internal tests were successful. Impact and major incident resolved.

1. 6 февраля 2026 г. в 13:39 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites are experiencing slow load times and sometimes unavailable. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team is investigating reports of slow load times and sometimes not resolving.

2. 6 февраля 2026 г. в 14:26 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: The Knowledge Management Engineering team is continuing to investigate reports of slow load times and sometimes not resolving.

3. 6 февраля 2026 г. в 20:00 UTCidentified

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: The issue has been identified and a fix is being worked on for deployment.

4. 6 февраля 2026 г. в 22:13 UTCmonitoring

   CXone Knowledge Management – Service Degradation: Stable All U.S. sites are currently in a stable state, and our teams are monitoring to ensure continued recovery.

5. 6 февраля 2026 г. в 22:24 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 5 февраля 2026 г. в 18:26 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Mpower Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Sites are loading slow or unavailable. The CXone Knowledge Management Engineering team is investigating reports of slow load times and occasional site unavailability.

2. 5 февраля 2026 г. в 19:29 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Knowledge Management Service Degradation: Slow Load Times and Unavailability. The Engineering team is still investigating at this time.

3. 5 февраля 2026 г. в 20:53 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being worked on for deployment.

4. 5 февраля 2026 г. в 21:39 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

5. 5 февраля 2026 г. в 22:33 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

6. 6 февраля 2026 г. в 03:52 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

7. 6 февраля 2026 г. в 04:10 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 3 февраля 2026 г. в 18:15 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Knowledge Service Degradation: Slow Load times and occasional page loading failure. The CXone Knowledge Engineering team is investigating reports of slow load times and occasional page load failure.

2. 3 февраля 2026 г. в 20:20 UTCidentified

   CXone Knowledge Service Degradation: Slow Load times and occasional page loading failure. The CXone Knowledge Engineering team is investigating reports of slow load times and occasional page load failure.

3. 3 февраля 2026 г. в 21:40 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

4. 3 февраля 2026 г. в 21:43 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

5. 3 февраля 2026 г. в 21:59 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

6. 3 февраля 2026 г. в 22:31 UTCmonitoring

   CXone Knowledge - Fix Deployed - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Knowledge Engineering team has deployed a fix and all services are running normally. We are currently monitoring sites for deployment stability. Event duration 9 minutes

7. 4 февраля 2026 г. в 00:00 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 27 января 2026 г. в 16:27 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Mpower Expert Service Degradation: Search unavailable. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of search unavailability.

2. 27 января 2026 г. в 16:38 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 27 января 2026 г. в 18:09 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 16 марта 2026 г. в 23:05 UTCpostmortem

   **Impact Start Time \(UTC\):** 01/27/2026 03:16 PM UTC **Impact End Time \(UTC\):** 01/27/2026 04:20 PM UTC ‌ **Incident Summary:** Updated on 02/02/2026 - On 1/27/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers reported significant functional and performance degradation within the CXone Mpower Expert application. Affected users experienced pronounced latency, recurring Hyper Text Transfer Protocol \(HTTP\) 503 service unavailable errors, and search related faults. These issues collectively resulted in Knowledge Base \(KB\) pages failing to load, along with intermittent authentication issues. The impact stemmed from a severe socket exhaustion between the Application Programming Interface \(API\) service and the proxy tier. The issue was fully mitigated after engineers executed a rolling update of the API backend services, which re-established socket connections and restored normal functionality. ‌ **Root Cause:** The incident was traced to socket exhaustion occurring between the API service and the proxy layer, driven by a combination of prolonged network timeouts and the application’s connection retry behavior. Intermittent network latency caused existing socket connections to remain in a hung or half-open state, preventing them from closing and being returned to the connection pool. When the application initiated retry attempts, it failed to reuse these open sockets and instead created additional outbound connections. This pattern progressively consumed all available socket resources allocated by the proxy tier. Once socket capacity was saturated, the API service could no longer establish new connections to downstream backend services, resulting in significant degradation of search operations. Under these constrained conditions, only a small subset of search requests successfully completed, while the majority failed with service level errors due to connection unavailability. Key contributing factors included insufficient observability into socket consumption and proxy connection thresholds, which delayed detection and mitigation. In addition, the proxy’s connection limits were not provisioned to accommodate the increased load generated by retry amplification during periods of network instability. ‌ **Corrective Actions:** _Detection_: Internal support teams received a customer reported issue and confirmed an ongoing functional and performance degradation within the CXone Mpower Expert application. _Remediation_: Engineers executed a rolling update of the API backend services, which re-established socket connections and restored normal functionality. Completed on 01/27/2026. _Prevention_: The Engineering team is implementing a monitoring enhancement and alerting to proactively detect abnormal connection usage and capacity saturation before customer impact occurs. Internal teams are implementing an increase in connection and service capacity to better handle peak traffic and retry scenarios. Additionally, improvements are being made to capacity planning to account for traffic spikes and cascading retry behavior. An update will be provided by EOD MT of 03/02/2026. ‌ **Incident Timeline \(UTC\):** 01/27/2026 03:16 PM \(UTC\) - First customer case opened, and Tech Support \(TS\) engineers began the troubleshooting investigation. 01/27/2026 03:41 PM \(UTC\) - TS engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. 01/27/2026 04:20 PM \(UTC\) - Impact was resolved after engineers restarted services and internal tests were successful. Impact and major incident resolved.

1. 13 января 2026 г. в 01:28 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Expert Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of site unavailability.

2. 13 января 2026 г. в 01:44 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Expert Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The CXone Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of site unavailability.

3. 13 января 2026 г. в 01:59 UTCinvestigating

   CXone Expert Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The CXone Expert Engineering team is investigating reports of site unavailability

4. 13 января 2026 г. в 02:08 UTCidentified

   CXone Expert Service Degradation: Sites unavailable. The issue has been identified and a fix is being worked on for deployment.

5. 13 января 2026 г. в 02:34 UTCmonitoring

   CXone Expert - Fix Deployed - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Mpower Expert Engineering team has deployed a fix and all services are running normally. We are currently monitoring sites for deployment stability. Event duration (1h 3m)

6. 13 января 2026 г. в 02:50 UTCresolved

   CXone Expert - Service Disruption Resolved - All Services Running Normally. The CXone Expert Engineering team has deployed a fix and monitored the deployment to make sure sites are stable. The issue is now resolved at this time. Event duration (1h 3m)

7. 20 января 2026 г. в 20:47 UTCpostmortem

   **Impact Start Time** \(UTC\) 01/13/2026 01:05 AM UTC **Impact End Time** \(UTC\) 01/13/2026 02:15 AM UTC **Incident Summary** Updated on 01/20/2026 - On 01/13/2026, some NiCE CXone Mpower customers reported experiencing service disruptions when accessing the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. During this time, incorrect authentication settings in the production environment prevented users from successfully signing in. The issue was traced to an unexpected behaviour on a deployment tool that caused a component to be deployed to multiple environments, including production, at the same time. The impact was resolved when engineers corrected the configuration by redeploying the correct resources and configuration to the production environment. Following the fix, user access, cluster health, and overall platform functionality were validated, confirming full restoration of service. **Root Cause** During routine deployment testing, a commandline interface \(CLI\) tool encountered an edgecase condition that caused part of a deployment script to run across several environments simultaneously. Although the script commands were valid, the tool incorrectly mixed environment context, one role was targeting a lower environment while another component pointed to production. This resulted in unintended changes to Identity and Access Management \(IAM\) settings in the production environment. The incorrect IAM configuration disrupted authentication workflows, making the portal temporarily inaccessible. * Detection: Internal support teams received reports from customer experiencing service disruptions when accessing the CXone Mpower Expert knowledge portal. * Remediation: The impact was resolved when engineers corrected the configuration by redeploying the correct resources and configuration to the production environment. Following the fix, user access, cluster health, and overall platform functionality were validated, confirming full restoration of service. Completed on 01/13/2026. **Corrective Actions** Prevention: * While the risk of recurrence is low, the Engineering team is working in standardizing the command-line interface tool’s environment initialization to prevent implicit profiles, regions, or cluster context leakage. This will include improved visibility into environment-targeted deployments by adding clearer logging of the target account, region, and cluster prior to execution to prevent similar incidents in the future. An update will be provided by End of Day \(EOD\) MT on 01/30/2026. * The Engineering team will implement separate deployment workflows for application resources and for cluster and IAM control plane components, minimizing the risk of accidental deployments to unintended environments due to configuration errors. An update will be provided by EOD MT on 01/30/2026 **Incident Timeline \(UTC\)** 01/13/2026 01:05 AM \(UTC\) - The first customer case opened, and Tech Support \(TS\) engineers began their initial validations and troubleshooting investigation. 01/13/2026 01:14 AM \(UTC\) - Engineers notified the Network Operations Center \(NOC\) engineers about the reported customer impact; a major incident was proposed and confirmed. The service disruption was also posted on the Status page for customers’ awareness. 01/13/2026 02:10 AM \(UTC\) - Engineers identified a suspected cause and began remediation steps. 01/13/2026 02:15 AM \(UTC\) - The impact was resolved after engineers corrected the configuration on the affected component. Following successful validations, the major incident was marked as resolved.