Alphavps kesinti geçmişi

1. 30 Temmuz 2026 12:50 UTCidentified

   Aşağıdaki düğümlere karşı önleyici donanım bakımı başlattık: SOFS SOFSTORAGE06 SOFSETİ07 Etkilenen düğümlere ev sahipliği yapan VPS örnekleri geçici bir kesinti yaşayabilir. Bekleme süresi, VPS başına yaklaşık 15 ila 30 dakikadır. Ekibimiz bakımı yakından takip ediyor ve iş ilerlemeleri olarak daha fazla güncelleme sağlayacaktır.

2. 30 Temmuz 2026 13:13 UTCidentified

   SOFSTORAGE07 üzerinde çalışmaya başlıyoruz. VM'ler zarif bir şekilde kapatılmış ve kısa bir süre sonra geri kaldırılacaktır.

3. 30 Temmuz 2026 13:25 UTCidentified

   Çalışmayı SOFSTORAGE07 ve sanal makineler üzerinde tamamladık. SOFSTORAGE01 ile ilerliyoruz, sanal makineler kapanıyor ve bakım başlıyor.

4. 30 Temmuz 2026 14:00 UTCidentified

   Çalışmayı SOFSTORAGE01 ve sanal makineler üzerinde tamamladık. SOFSTORAGE06 ile ilerliyoruz, sanal makineler kapanıyor ve bakım başlıyor.

5. 31 Temmuz 2026 10:55 UTCidentified

   SOFSTORAGE06 bakım yapılır ve tüm VM'ler kaldırılır.

6. 21 Ağustos 2026 11:11 UTCresolved

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1. 29 Haziran 2026 18:42 UTCidentified

   Şu anda ağ altyapımızın porsiyonlarını hedef alan büyük ölçekli bir DDoS saldırısı yaşıyoruz. Bu saldırı, bazı müşteriler için geçici bağlantı sorunlarına neden oluyor ve geç kaldı. Ağ mühendisliği ekibimiz, bu saldırıyı tam olarak ele almak ve altyapımızın dayanıklılığını güçlendirmek için sürekli olarak ek kalıcı tazminat önlemleri dağıtmak için aktif olarak çalışmaktadır. Geçici mitigation zaten yerinde ve saldırı geliştikçe savunmalarımızı izlemeye devam ediyoruz. Bu herhangi bir kesinti için içtenlikle özür dileriz ve sabrınızı tam ve kalıcı bir karara doğru çalışırken takdir ederiz. Daha fazla güncelleme, ilerlemenin yapıldığı gibi sağlanacaktır.

2. 29 Haziran 2026 19:39 UTCidentified

   Bu sorun için bir düzeltme üzerinde çalışmaya devam ediyoruz.

3. 29 Haziran 2026 20:01 UTCidentified

   Nürnberg'de mession uyguluyoruz. Sofia bekliyor ve kısa sürede uygulanmalıdır. Bir extortion/ransom DDoS saldırıları ile uğraştığımızda, kamu olarak daha fazla ayrıntı paylaşamayız.

4. 29 Haziran 2026 21:22 UTCidentified

   Kötü niyetli saldırganlar sürekli saldırı modellerini değiştiriyor olsa da, davaları uyguluyoruz ve müşterilerimizin çoğunluğu online olarak geri dönüyor. Durumda da yerel hukuk uygulamaları yapıyoruz. Takip etmek için daha fazla bilgi.

5. 30 Haziran 2026 00:52 UTCmonitoring

   Tüm yerlerimiz ve trafiğimiz boyunca umursadık. ICMP'de varyasyonlar olabilir, ancak konunun tam olarak çözülmesine inanıyoruz.

6. 30 Haziran 2026 07:30 UTCmonitoring

   Durumu izlemeye devam ediyoruz ve tazminat düzenlemeleri uyguluyoruz. Tüm lokasyonlardaki tüm hizmetler online ve şu anda istikrarlı olarak kabul edilir.

7. 30 Haziran 2026 07:36 UTCmonitoring

   Daha fazla sorun için izlemeye devam ediyoruz.

8. 30 Haziran 2026 16:38 UTCmonitoring

   Konumu takip ediyoruz ve mekandaki mitigation profilini minimum kesintiye sahip mitigation aletlerinin sorunsuz çalışmasını sağlamak için izliyoruz.

9. 9 Temmuz 2026 03:44 UTCresolved

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1. 27 Mayıs 2026 12:56 UTCidentified

   New York lokasyonumuzda acil ağ bakımı başlattık, mevcut tedarikçilerimizin tesisin beklenmedik çıkışından sonra yeni bağlantı kurmak için. Daha fazla ayrıntı tüm etkilenen sanal makine müşterilerine e-posta yoluyla gönderilir. Bu bakım sırasında, bazı müşteriler ağ geçiş faaliyetleri yapılırken geçici bağlantı kesintileri veya geçici kesintiler yaşayabilir. Bakım penceresinin 8 saate kadar sürmesi bekleniyor, ancak gerçek kesintinin önemli ölçüde daha kısa olacağına inanıyoruz. Kısa bildirim ve herhangi bir rahatsızlıktan dolayı içtenlikle özür dileriz. Bu yükseltme, New York hizmetlerimizin uzun vadeli istikrarı ve kalitesini geliştirmeye yönelik önemli bir adımdır. Daha fazla güncelleme burada ilerleme devam ettikçe yayınlanacak.

2. 27 Mayıs 2026 15:28 UTCmonitoring

   Ağ yükseltmesi ve 1 saat olarak bitiriyoruz - tüm ağ stabil. Davayı kapatmaya devam edeceğiz.

3. 30 Haziran 2026 00:51 UTCresolved

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1. 7 Nisan 2026 09:31 UTCidentified

   Eleştirel bir RAID dizi başarısızlığı bugün daha önce Tistorage01'de gerçekleşti. RAID kontrolörü istikrarsız bir duruma girdi ve birçok KVM disk görüntülerinin yolsuzluklarına yol açtı. Node, daha fazla etkiyi önlemek için hemen çevrimdışı alındı. RAID kontrolörü değiştirildi ve kurtarma prosedürleri şu anda ilerliyor. Dizi büyüklüğü nedeniyle, kurtarma zaman yoğun ve veri tutarlılığı garanti edilemez. Bu zamanda Dallas'ta mevcut kapasite sınırlıdır. Aktif olarak ek donanım dağıtma üzerinde çalışıyoruz, ancak tam bir ETA henüz doğrulanmadı. Etkilenen müşteriler alternatif yerlerde yedek hizmetlerle sağlanır. Kurtarma erişimi, en iyi niyetli veri kurtarma talebinde bulunabilir. Daha fazla güncelleme devam ettiği gibi sağlanacaktır. VPS’niz bundan etkileniyorsa, zaten daha fazla adımla bir e-posta gönderdiniz. Hiçbir e-posta size gönderilirse - hemen bir bilet açın.

2. 30 Haziran 2026 00:52 UTCresolved

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1. 22 Eylül 2025 22:05 UTCinvestigating

   We've been alerted of an issue with our sofstorage22 node. We've dispatched DC engineers to check the status of the server and attempt recovery.

2. 24 Eylül 2025 17:35 UTCidentified

   We continue working on the sofstorage22 host node. Unfortunately, at the moment we're unable to restore the RAID array. We're continuing with data recovery and further updates will be posted within 24 hours.

3. 29 Ocak 2026 20:02 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 4 Eylül 2025 05:13 UTCinvestigating

   We've been alerted of a problem with our nuestorage03 KVM storage Node. Upon checking, we've discovered the node is completely unreachable by IPMI. We've dispatched on-site techs to check the condition of the node. Further updates to follow.

2. 4 Eylül 2025 05:26 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 3 Eylül 2025 05:09 UTCidentified

   We've been alerted by our system that our nueryzenkvm01 host node is currently down. As we're unable to open an IPMI connection, we have engaged Datacenter technicians on-site. Updates to follow.

2. 3 Eylül 2025 05:27 UTCidentified

   We're currently experiencing a hardware failure and we'll be replacing some parts of the chassis with on-site spares. ETA of resolution: 2-3 hours.

3. 3 Eylül 2025 07:33 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 5 Temmuz 2025 08:58 UTCidentified

   On July 4th, 2025, we detected a catastrophic RAID10 SSD array failure on node nueovz04. Fortunately, this node was in the process of being decommissioned and actively migrated to new infrastructure, so the impact is limited to a small number of customers. Since discovery, we have attempted multiple recovery approaches, including replacing RAID controllers and utilizing advanced data recovery techniques. We are currently preparing an identical server chassis to import the array and attempt further recovery efforts. At this time, we cannot guarantee recovery success or provide a precise ETA, but we are targeting the first half of the upcoming week for the next update or resolution. We sincerely apologize for the inconvenience and thank you for your patience while we work through this. — The AlphaVPS Team

2. 9 Temmuz 2025 08:33 UTCresolved

   Status: Recovery Unsuccessful – Services Being Recreated Following extensive recovery efforts on node nueovz04, we regret to inform you that we have not been able to restore the RAID10 SSD array. Our team has attempted: - Replacing the RAID controller cache - Replacing the entire RAID controller with multiple known working controllers - Transplanting the drives into an identically configured chassis, with fully matching firmware and hardware Despite all recovery attempts, the RAID array remains inaccessible. At this stage, we must consider the data on this node to be lost. We are now moving forward with recreating affected services on a new node. Our team will be reaching out individually to each impacted customer to coordinate this process. If you were hosted on nueovz04 and have not received an email from us, we urge you to contact our support team as soon as possible. We deeply regret this outcome and sincerely apologize for the disruption. Thank you for your patience and understanding during this time. — The AlphaVPS Team

1. 25 Haziran 2025 16:40 UTCidentified

   We've detected an issue with our sofovz06 node. We're working on resolving it. Please stand by for updates.

2. 26 Haziran 2025 07:44 UTCresolved

   We've resolved the issue as of 14 hours ago. We've monitored the situation throughout the time and believe that system is now stable.

1. 31 Mayıs 2025 03:59 UTCidentified

   We've been informed of an urgent DataCenter maintenance in our NYC facility, affecting some of our services there. ETA of service restoration is 1-2 hours.

2. 31 Mayıs 2025 12:59 UTCresolved

   The incident is fully resolved.

1. 20 Aralık 2024 07:49 UTCinvestigating

   We've been alerted of a catastrophic RAID failure on our nuestorage07 node. Earlier this morning, the controller started flapping, which jumped the I/O load to over 90. This made every VM on the host hypervisor unresponsive. We've proceeded with replacing the RAID adapter and we're moving towards an attempted recovery. At this point, we're unsure if recovery would be possible.

2. 20 Aralık 2024 09:31 UTCidentified

   We're currently working on bringing the node back online in a stable state. We estimate that it would take us 3-4 additional hours before we start booting the virtual machines up and assessing the damage. Please stand by for further updates.

3. 20 Aralık 2024 13:54 UTCidentified

   We are starting with restoration of individual KVM machines. Further updates to follow.

4. 20 Aralık 2024 21:04 UTCidentified

   We're continuing to work on restoring VMs, if your VM is affected - please wait until it's booted up.

5. 21 Aralık 2024 14:01 UTCmonitoring

   We'll be booting up the remaining virtual servers in the next 1 hour and continue with monitoring the hypervisor.

6. 21 Aralık 2024 15:44 UTCmonitoring

   Unfortunately, as we booted up the majority of the affected VMs, the node started becoming unstable again with flush operations starting to get queued. We're looking into alternative solutions at the moment. Further updates to come.

7. 21 Aralık 2024 23:35 UTCmonitoring

   We've proceeded with replacing additional hardware. After we've performed manual fsck on each virtual machine's virtual drive - we've proceeded with booting up all affected VPS. As of now, all services are restored. We'll be monitoring the situation throughout the next days.

8. 1 Ocak 2025 12:08 UTCresolved

   We've monitored the situation for the past 11 days and as of now, everything is stable and we're closing the issue.

1. 27 Eylül 2024 12:04 UTCidentified

   We've identified an issue with our Nuremberg network. We're working on resolving it.

2. 27 Eylül 2024 12:10 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented. The issue was related to a reboot of a virtual chassis member, causing multiple BGP sessions to start flapping. We're monitoring the environment and we'll apply further fixes as necesary.

3. 28 Eylül 2024 15:38 UTCresolved

   We've been monitoring the situation and a fix has been implemented for this specific edge case. We're closing this as resolved.

1. 9 Eylül 2024 16:47 UTCinvestigating

   Our monitoring has alerted us that our laxryzenkvm07 node is currently offline. During our investigation, we've found out that we're unable to reach IPMI/BMC as well. We're dispatching on-site technicians to check the status of the server. Further updates to follow!

2. 9 Eylül 2024 17:15 UTCresolved

   Services are back online now.

1. 18 Mayıs 2024 10:00 UTCidentified

   Our engineers have identified an upstream-related problem, causing packet loss from certain routes towards our London infrastructure. The issue was identified to be upstream-caused. We're awaiting our London connectivity partners to further update us with an estimation of time for service restoration.

2. 18 Mayıs 2024 10:10 UTCmonitoring

   The issue seems to be currently resolved but we're awaiting updates from our upstream. We will keep monitoring throughout the day.

3. 18 Mayıs 2024 13:40 UTCmonitoring

   Our London connectivity partners state that the issue has been identified and resolved. We will continue to monitor the network throughout the day.

4. 18 Mayıs 2024 17:44 UTCresolved

   As per now - we consider this to be resolved.

1. 12 Aralık 2023 09:12 UTCidentified

   We've identified a hardware issue with our nueovz04 node and we've immediately taken it offline, pending remote hands in DC to swap some hardware components.

2. 12 Aralık 2023 10:06 UTCmonitoring

   The node is back online and we'll be monitoring it for stability and further issues.

3. 3 Nisan 2024 08:57 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 10 Kasım 2023 06:09 UTCidentified

   Hello, We've identified an issue in our Sofia location, affecting our network. We've isolated it to our QFX Virtual Chassis Core. We've restored back connectivity on a single member of our Virtual Chassis and no redundancy is present at the moment. We're working on bringing the rest of our VC members online to restore redundancy.

2. 10 Kasım 2023 09:04 UTCidentified

   We've identified the main problem, which was related to one of the members of our Juniper QFX Virtual Chassis. At the moment, we believe that one of the virtual chassis members suffered a catastrophic failure of internal storage. Unfortunately, this specific Juniper QFX device was the active master in our VC configuration. As per best practices, we run multiple devices, which can take over the mastership when the current master fails, however in this case - this has not happened, as JunOS was partially running on the failing device. The master killed the internal routing sessions and no packets were being transmitted via the secondary devices. Once we determined the root cause, we've done a manual switchover to another VC member and connectivity was restored. We're working on replacing the failing device and bringing it back in our VC to restore redundancy. Service redundancy should still be considered to be at risk. IPv6 connectivity is not restored on 100% yet, as our priority is bringing v4 redundancy back in place. Further updates to follow.

3. 10 Kasım 2023 09:39 UTCidentified

   As of now, IPv6 connectivity is also restored. We're proceeding with replacing the virtual chassis member.

4. 10 Kasım 2023 12:34 UTCmonitoring

   We've installed a new QFX member, after initial configuration and restored full redundancy. As of now, all systems are back to being fully redundant again. We'll continue monitoring the infrastructure and close this issue later today.

5. 10 Kasım 2023 18:19 UTCresolved

   We're closing this incident as resolved.

1. 22 Mayıs 2023 07:58 UTCidentified

   As per our previous email - we're beginning the pre-scheduled migration of nuestorage* nodes.

2. 22 Mayıs 2023 08:08 UTCidentified

   We're taking down nuestorage01 node down.

3. 22 Mayıs 2023 08:23 UTCidentified

   Nuestorage01 is ready and booting up, nuestorage02 is currently being shutdown.

4. 22 Mayıs 2023 08:47 UTCidentified

   We've shutdown nuestorage03. As of the moment - nuestorage02 shows further hardware problems and we'll shut it down again to further debug.

5. 22 Mayıs 2023 09:05 UTCidentified

   We've completed the maintenance on nuestorage03 and we've taken back nuestorage02 for further checks. As of now - both nuestorage01 and nuestorage03 can be considered stable.

6. 22 Mayıs 2023 09:23 UTCresolved

   nuestorage02 node is back up and running. As of now - all nodes are back online and all instability issues should be permanently resolved! We're closing this as resolved.

1. 15 Mayıs 2023 08:38 UTCinvestigating

   Our monitoring has detected network connectivity issues and packetloss in our LAX location. This seems to be related to our upstream and is out of our scope. We're currently awaiting their network engineers to sort out the problem.

2. 15 Mayıs 2023 11:22 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 15 Mayıs 2023 12:42 UTCresolved

   The incident has been resolved and the main cause was a significant peering disturbance in the LA ANY2 peering platform.

1. 25 Ocak 2023 12:47 UTCinvestigating

   We've started the pre-scheduled network maintenance in Sofia. Minor and short service disruptions might occur.

2. 25 Ocak 2023 15:54 UTCresolved

   We've completed the maintenance without any disruption to client services and are closing the maintenance window.

1. 2 Ocak 2023 15:03 UTCinvestigating

   We're investigating a complete network outage in London, related to our upstream. Further news to follow.

2. 2 Ocak 2023 16:16 UTCidentified

   As of now, we've restored connectivity to the majority of our clients in London. A small portion of clients residing on a specific network segment are still affected. We're dealing with a large-scale network attack and working closely with our upstreams on completely mitigating the attack.

3. 2 Ocak 2023 17:00 UTCresolved

   Our upstream applied some additional mitigation rules on the Corero device and as of now - all clients are back online.