Confluence kesinti geçmişi

1. 1 Ekim 2026 02:55 UTCinvestigating

   İş işleme ve iş zamanlaması bozuluyor, bu, Jira, Confluence ve Bitbucket Cloud dahil olmak üzere birkaç ürün arasında planlanmış ve eşdeğer bir iş yaratıyor. Etkilenen kullanıcılar gecikmiş veya eksik iş infazını görebilirler, gecikmiş e-to-ticket işleme ve beklenmeyen programları da.

2. 1 Ekim 2026 03:47 UTCidentified

   Takımlarımız bu olayın kök nedenini belirlediler ve şimdi konuyu azaltmak için aktif olarak çalışıyor. Bir saat içinde daha fazla güncelleme sağlayacağız veya daha önce paylaşmak için önemli bir ilerlememiz varsa.

3. 1 Ekim 2026 04:03 UTCidentified

   Takımlarımız sorunu azaltmak için doğru adımlar attı ve bazı gelişmeleri gözlemliyor. Durumu izlemeye devam ediyoruz ve olay tamamen geri kazanılıncaya kadar gerekli eylemler alacağız.

4. 1 Ekim 2026 05:00 UTCidentified

   Takımlarımız olay tamamen çözülene kadar kurtarma üzerinde çalışmaya devam ediyor. Paylaşmak için önemli ilerlememiz varsa daha fazla güncelleme sağlayacaktır. Birkaç üründe planlanan ve asynchronous iş için de etkinin yanı sıra, Jira Service Management'daki SLA bileşeninin beklendiği gibi görünmediğini tespit ettik.

5. 1 Ekim 2026 07:01 UTCidentified

   Takımlarımız olay tamamen çözülene kadar kurtarma üzerinde çalışmaya devam ediyor. Paylaşmak için önemli ilerlememiz varsa daha fazla güncelleme sağlayacaktır. Ayrıca eksik SLA bileşeni açısından yaratılan yeni destek biletlerine de etkisi var, bazı biletlerin yanıt süresini ve gerilog yönetimini etkileyen bildirimler.

6. 1 Ekim 2026 07:51 UTCresolved

   01 Ekim 2026'da, 10:00 UTC ve 07:25 UTC arasında, kullanıcılar gecikmiş iş infazı görmüş olabilir, gecikmiş e-ticket işleme ve beklenmeyen programlar da olabilir. Şimdi etkilenen müşteriler için normal bir işlem için bir düzeltme ve hizmetler uygulandık. Kayıp SLA bileşeni olan biletleri desteklemenin etkisi ve gecikmiş bildirimleri de kurtarmayı doğruladı. Not: Bitbucket müşterileri için, olay penceresinde koşmadığı planlanan boru hatları olsaydı, bir sonraki planlanan infazı bekleyebilir veya onları manuel olarak tetikleyebilirsiniz.

7. 9 Ekim 2026 18:24 UTCpostmortem

   # ### Özet 1 Ekim 2026, 10:00 ve 07:25 UTC arasında, Bitbucket Cloud, Confluence, Forge apps, Jira ve Jira Service Management dahil olmak üzere, Bitbucket Cloud, Confluence, Forge apps, Jira ve Jira Service Management tüm ticari bulut bölgelerinde. Bu, e-to-ticket işleme ve planlanan boru hatları gibi gecikmiş veya kaçırılmış arka plan görevlerine yol açtı; interaktif ürün kullanımı etkilenmedi. Olay, beklenmedik bir görev hacminin aynı anda gerçekleştiğinde, paylaşılan iş zamanlama platformumuzu ezici bir şekilde tetiklendi. Otomatik izleme olayı üç dakika içinde tespit etti. Kurtarma yaklaşık 03:45 UTC mühendislik ölçekli kapasite olarak başladı ve platform 6 saat ve 25 dakika içinde tam bir çözüme ulaştı. # ## IMPACT Planlanan görevlerin çoğu saat 10:00 UTC'de koşmayı bıraktı ve yaklaşık 03:45 UTC'den yeniden başladı. Çoğu gecikmiş iş yaklaşık 06:00 UTC tarafından yakalandı ve kalan gecikmeler 07:25 UTC tarafından temizlendi. Etkilenen ürünler: - Planlanan görevleri olay sırasında atladı ya da gecikti; atlanan koşular otomatik olarak geri alındı ve görevleri bir sonraki planlı zamanda yeniden başladı. Çoğu zaman planlanan görevleri geç geçirdi; küçük bir sayı çalıştırılamaz. - Planlanan kurallar dahil olmak üzere Otomasyon kuralları, aşağıda belirtildiği gibi normalde koştu. Bitbucket Cloud Saatler arası ve yaklaşık 03:50 UTC arasındaki boru hatları çalışmıyordu. Eğer planlanan bir boru hattı olay sırasında çalışmazsa, bir sonraki planlanan infazı bekleyebilir veya manuel olarak tetikleyebilirsiniz. Diğer boru hatları etkilenmedi. Güvensizlik Bazı takvim hatırlatmaları 10:00 ve yaklaşık 03:45 UTC gönderilmedi. Forge uygulamaları Scheduled triggers 10:00 UTC'de durdu ve yaklaşık 04:00 UTC'den geri döndü; iptal edilmeleri tekrar oynamadı. Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedef Hedefleri güncellemek için ay e-posta hatırlatmalarından başlayın gecikebilir. Jira ve Jira Service Management Gelen e-postalar posta kutularında kaldı ve kurtarmadan sonra otomatik olarak işlendi. Filtre abonelikleri gibi zamanlamalı bildirimler gecikti. Bazı hizmet projelerinde, statüsünde SLAs veya zaman tarafından tetiklenen otomasyon kuralları ve bildirimleri geç kaldı. SLA zamanlayıcı veriler bozulmadı. Atlassian Support 07:25 UTC'ye kadar, destek araçlarımızla ilgili sorunlar bazı tepkilerimizi yavaşlatabilir. Bugüne kadar soruşturmamıza dayanarak, herhangi bir çalışma eşyası, sayfaları, havuzlar veya gelen e-posta kaybı tespit etmedik. ## ROOT CAUSE Paylaşılan iş zamanlama platformumuz normal koşullar altında yüksek ölçekli çalışır. Platform tüketicilerinden biri, 1 Ekim'de 10:00 UTC'de aynı anda gerçekleştirilecek anormal yüksek bir görev hacmini planladı. Bu düzen-eşitlik dalgalanması mimarimizi ve ölçeklendirme limitlerimizi aştı, bağımlı hizmetlere karşı bir işlem başlatdı. Mühendislik, anormal yükü işlemek için kapasiteyi manuel olarak artırdı, hizmeti gerilog işlemek ve normal işlemlere geri dönmesine izin verdi. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS Gecikmiş ve kaçırılmış işlerin üretkenliğinizi etkilediğini biliyoruz. Bu eylemlere benzer olayların olasılığını ve etkisini azaltmaya yardımcı olmak için öncelik veriyoruz: **Enhance iş yükü izolasyonu:** Adil planlama muhafızları bu kadar hacim tek bir kaynaktan dalgalanmalar, diğer ürünlerde yıldız veya gecikme görevleri yapmaz. **Strengthen artış kontrolleri:** Beklenmeyen trafik aksakları sırasında belirli kaynaklardan hızlıca throttle veya duraklama yeteneklerini ekleyin. **İmprove sistemi ölçeklendirme ve kurtarma:** Gelişmiş platform kapasitesi ve aşırı talep artışlarını işlemek ve daha hızlı geri kazanmak için ölçeklendirme süreçleri optimize edin. Bu olay sırasında hizmetleri etkileyen müşterilere özür dileriz. Teşekkürler, Atlassian

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1. 27 Ağustos 2026 04:22 UTCinvestigating

   Ekiplerimiz bu sorunu da Jira Service Management'ı etkiliyor. En kısa zamanda daha da güncelleyeceğiz.

2. 27 Ağustos 2026 04:25 UTCinvestigating

   Confluence, Jira Cloud ve Jira Serivce Yönetim müşterilerini etkileyen ürünlere erişim konusunda bir sorun araştırıyoruz. Ekibimiz bu konuyu acilen araştırıyor ve bir saat içinde daha fazla ayrıntı sağlayacağız veya bilgi mevcutsa daha erken.

3. 27 Ağustos 2026 04:33 UTCidentified

   Takımlarımız Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management ve Confluence'ı etkileyen sorunlar için mümkün bir düzeltme belirlediler. Bu şimdi bölgeleri etkileyecek ve bir saat içinde güncelleyeceğiz veya daha fazla bilgi mevcutsa daha erken.

4. 27 Ağustos 2026 04:51 UTCmonitoring

   Jira Cloud'u yüklemeyle ilgili sorunlar, Jira Service Management ve Confluence şimdi kurtarmada. Stabiliteyi doğrulamak ve bir saat içinde bir güncelleme sağlamak için yakından takip etmeye devam edeceğiz veya daha fazla bilgi mevcut hale gelir.

5. 27 Ağustos 2026 05:16 UTCresolved

   27 Ağustos 2026 UTC, Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management ve Confluence dahil olmak üzere Atlassian ürünleri, etkilenen kullanıcılar için bir kesinti yaşadı. Sorun şimdi çözüldü ve hizmet normalde etkilenen tüm müşteriler için çalışıyor. Bu olay için bir halk postmortem, olayın tam soruşturması tamamlandığında bu sayfada yapılacaktır.

6. 7 Eylül 2026 02:53 UTCpostmortem

   **SUMMARY** 27 Ağustos'ta, 03:51 ve 04:35 UTC arasında, Batı Avrupa ve Güneydoğu APAC bölgelerinde Atlassian Cloud ürünlerine ulaşamadı, Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search ve Yetenek. Olay, filo proxylerimizden birinin routing katmanına kusurlu bir kod değişikliği ile tetiklendi. Bu, Batı Avrupa ve Güneydoğu APAC bölgelerindeki bu proxy filoları aracılığıyla tüm müşteri trafiğine hizmet eden HTTP 404 hatasına yol açtı. Olay, otomatik izleme sistemlerimiz tarafından 1 dakika içinde tespit edildi ve önceki konfigürasyon salıverilerek azaltıldı ve proxy filosunu bilinen iyi bir duruma koydu. Filo proxy geri döndükten sonra, bazı Jira ve Confluence müşterileri (yersiz) 04:33 ve 04:53 UTC arasında sunucu filoları trafik akınına ayarlanıyor. **IMPACT** Genel etki iki ayrı döneme bölündü: - İlk olarak, 27 Ağustos 2026'da, 03:51 ve 04:35 UTC Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search ve Yetenek. Olay, Batı Avrupa ve Güneydoğu APAC bölgelerinden gelen müşteri trafiğine hizmet kesintisine neden oldu, HTTP 404 hataları geri döndü. Müşteri API trafiğine etkisi yoktu, kökeni konumuna bakılmaksızın. İkinci olarak, 27 Ağustos 2026'da, 04:33 ve 04:53 UTC arasında, bazı Jira ve Confluence müşterileri, HTTP 503 hatalarından sonra HTTP 404 hataları çözüldü: -% 32 ap-southeast-2, ~4% of requests in eu-west-1, ~2.5% of requests in us-west-2 and ap-southeast-1, ve kalan tüm küresel bölgelerdeki isteklerin% <1'i. **ROOT CAUSE** Olay, proxy filolarımızdan birine bir kod değişikliği ile tetiklendi. Ancak, manuel ve otomatik test tarafından tespit edilmeyen kodda bir hata vardı. Bu, Batı Avrupa ve Güneydoğu APAC bölgelerindeki tüm müşteri trafiğine servis edilen HTTP 404 hatalarına yol açmama yol açan proxy seviyesindeki onant görünüm fonksiyonunun yanlış yapılandırılmasına yol açtı. Proxy'nin iyileştiğinden sonra, bir ikinci etki, bazı Jira ve Confluence müşterilerine neden oldu. Jira ve Confluence'a proxy filosu tarafından servis edilen trafik azaltımı nedeniyle, Jira ve Confluence hizmeti tiers otomatik olarak müşteri trafiğine hizmet eden sunucularda ölçeklendi. Filo proxy işlevselliği restore edildikten sonra, trafik artışı Jira hizmeti tier'i aştı ve bu da otomatik olarak tekrar ölçekleninceye kadar HTTP 503'lerin yüksek oranda geri döndü. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXTS** Ekstraajların üretkenliğinizi etkilediğini biliyoruz. Yerinde birkaç test ve önleyici süreç olsak da, bu özel konu tespit edilmedi çünkü değişim otomatik sürekli dağıtım setlerimiz ve manuel test senaryolarımız tarafından alınmadığı çok özel bir tür kenar davasıyla ilgiliydi. Bu tür olayı tekrarlamak için aşağıdaki iyileştirme eylemlerine öncelik veriyoruz: **Daha fazla dağıtım koruması:** Etkilenen proxy katmanının konfigürasyonu için dağıtım hattı bir miras sistemi kullanıyor ve doğru yapılandırılan uygun yavaş bölgesel rollout özelliklerine sahip değildi. Biz zaten doğru korumaları ekledik ve bunu varsayılan olarak etkinleştirilen tüm güvenlik kontrollerimizi içeren firmamız standart dağıtım hattımıza taşıdık. Ayrıca tüm ağ hizmetlerini yeni standart boru dağıtım servisinde olduklarını doğrulamaya da denetim ediyoruz. **Enhancing service filosu ölçeklendirme politikaları:** Jira ve Confluence hizmet filolarımız için otomatik ölçeklendirme konfigürasyonu çok agresif bir şekilde ölçeklendirmek için yapılandırıldı. Tüm karmaşık Jira ve Confluence otomatik ölçeklendirme politikalarının tekrar gerçekleşmemesini sağlamak için iyice gözden geçiriyoruz. Bu olay sırasında hizmetleri etkileyen müşterilere özür dileriz; platformun performansını ve kullanılabilirliğini geliştirmek için hemen adımlar atıyoruz. Teşekkürler, Atlassian Müşteri Desteği

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1. 25 Ağustos 2026 08:42 UTCinvestigating

   Aktif olarak, Jira, JSM ve Confluence için e-posta, mobil ve slack bildirimlerine yol açan performans bozulma raporlarını araştırıyoruz. Takımlarımız konuyu araştırıyor ve bir sonraki 1 saat içinde daha fazla bilgi paylaşılacaktır.

2. 25 Ağustos 2026 09:44 UTCinvestigating

   Takımlarımız etkilenen bölgeleri tespit ettiler ve sorunu azaltmak için aktif olarak çalışıyorlar. Bir saat içinde daha fazla güncelleme sağlayacağız veya daha önce paylaşmak için önemli bir ilerlememiz varsa.

3. 25 Ağustos 2026 10:49 UTCinvestigating

   Ekiplerimiz, etkilenen bölgelerden birinde sorunu azaltmak için birkaç doğru önlem aldı ve bazı gelişmeleri gözlemliyor. Durumu izlemeye devam ediyoruz ve olay tamamen geri kazanılıncaya kadar gerekli eylemler alacağız. Önümüzdeki iki saat içinde daha fazla güncelleme sağlayacağız veya daha önce paylaşmak için önemli bir ilerlememiz varsa.

4. 25 Ağustos 2026 13:01 UTCmonitoring

   Takımlarımız sorunu azaltmaya devam ediyor ve bazı gelişmeleri gözlemliyor. Durumu izlemeye devam ediyoruz ve olay tamamen geri kazanılıncaya kadar gerekli eylemler alacağız. Önümüzdeki iki saat içinde daha fazla güncelleme sağlayacağız veya daha önce paylaşmak için önemli bir ilerlememiz varsa.

5. 25 Ağustos 2026 14:33 UTCresolved

   25 Ağustos 2026'da, bazı kullanıcılar e-posta, mobil ve slack bildirimlerinde gecikme yaşamış olabilirler. Sorun şimdi çözüldü ve hizmet normalde tüm müşteriler için çalışıyor.

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1. 24 Ağustos 2026 19:22 UTCinvestigating

   JIRA, JSM ve Confluence için e-posta, mobil ve Slack bildirimlerinde ortaya çıkan performans bozulmalarının raporlarını aktif olarak araştırıyoruz. Güncellemeleri burada daha fazla bilgi olarak paylaşacağız.

2. 24 Ağustos 2026 20:25 UTCinvestigating

   Takımlarımız üç etkileştirilmiş bölgeleri belirledi ve e-posta, mobil ve Slack bildirimleri JIRA, JSM ve Confluence için araştırmaya devam etti.

3. 24 Ağustos 2026 21:30 UTCidentified

   Sorunun muhtemel nedenini tespit ettik ve ekiplerimiz bir mitigation üzerinde titizlikle çalışıyorlar. Etkilenen kullanıcılar e-posta, mobil ve Slack bildirimleri JIRA, JSM ve Confluence için daha geç kalmış yaşayabilirler. Burada daha fazla bilgi olduğu gibi ek güncellemeleri paylaşmaya devam edeceğiz.

4. 24 Ağustos 2026 23:15 UTCresolved

   24 Ağustos 2026'da, bazı JIRA, JSM ve Confluence kullanıcıları e-posta, mobil ve Slack bildirimlerinde geç kalmış performans bozulmaları yaşayabilirler. Sorun yeni oluşturulan bildirimler için çözüldü ve hizmet normalde çalışıyor. İşlendiği eski bildirimler olabilir ve önümüzdeki birkaç saat içinde tamamlanmasını bekliyoruz.

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1. 21 Ağustos 2026 07:16 UTCidentified

   Bir konu etkileyici Market App makrolarını Konfederasyonta tespit ettik. Kullanıcılar makroları doğru bir şekilde veya hataları göstermeyebilir. Mühendislik ekibimiz kök nedeni tespit etti ve remediasyon devam ediyor. Önümüzdeki 60 dakikada daha fazla güncelleme sağlayacağız.

2. 21 Ağustos 2026 08:15 UTCidentified

   Bir düzeltme tespit edildi ve şu anda konuşuluyor. Kullanıcılar, etkilenen MarketPlace App'i görmeye başlamalıdır - Uygulamayı doğru bir şekilde yapmaya başlamak için makrolar, bir kez düzeltme tamamen ortaya çıktı. Önümüzdeki 2 saat içinde daha fazla güncelleme sağlayacağız.

3. 21 Ağustos 2026 10:10 UTCresolved

   21 Ağustos 2026'da, 04:26 UTC ve 09:33 UTC arasında, bazı kullanıcılar Confluence'de doğru bir şekilde işlememiş makrolarla ilgili sorunlar yaşayabilir. Sorun şimdi çözüldü ve hizmet normalde tüm müşteriler için çalışıyor.

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1. 12 Ağustos 2026 20:11 UTCidentified

   Some Confluence Cloud users visiting public links saw a Something went wrong error page. The issue affected anonymous access paths for public links, and some related Confluence areas could also show the same error message.

2. 12 Ağustos 2026 22:13 UTCresolved

   On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 6 Temmuz 2026 09:23 UTCinvestigating

   Hizmetlerimizi etkileyen sorunları araştırıyoruz. Nedeni tanımlamak ve sorunu çözmek için aktif olarak çalışıyoruz. Bir saat içinde daha fazla güncelleme sağlayacağız.

2. 6 Temmuz 2026 10:04 UTCmonitoring

   Düzeltmeyi başarıyla uyguladık ve kurtarma görüyoruz. Otomasyon yetenekleri restore ediliyor ve normalde ileriye dönük çalışmalıdır. Outage döneminde sunulan veri işleme talepleri,avatansız hizmet nedeniyle tamamlanmadı. Durumu izlemeye devam ediyoruz ve bir sonraki saat içinde tam kurtarma bekliyoruz. Önümüzdeki bir saat veya daha erken ek güncellemeler sağlayacağız.

3. 6 Temmuz 2026 11:46 UTCinvestigating

   Biz hala kullanıcı arama, kullanıcı seçme ve mallarla AB-Region ile bazı sorunları görüyoruz. Durumu araştırmaya devam ediyoruz ve bir saat veya daha erken bir zamanda ek güncelleştirmeler sağlayacaktır.

4. 6 Temmuz 2026 12:25 UTCmonitoring

   Sorunu azaltmak için düzeltmeyi uyguladık ve kurtarma görüyoruz. Durumu izlemeye devam ediyoruz ve yakında tamamen iyileşmeliyiz. Önümüzdeki bir saat veya daha önce daha fazla güncelleme sağlamalıyız.

5. 6 Temmuz 2026 13:04 UTCresolved

   6 Temmuz 2026'da, 06:51 UTC ile 09:39 UTC arasında bazı kullanıcılar Otomasyon ile ilgili sorunlar yaşayabilir ve 08:10 UTC ile 11:50 UTC arasında bazı kullanıcılar, AB'deki kullanıcı arama, kullanıcı seçme ve varlıklarla ilgili deneyimli sorunlar yaşayabilir. Sorunlar şimdi çözüldü ve hizmetler normalde tüm müşteriler için çalışıyor.

6. 17 Temmuz 2026 16:59 UTCpostmortem

   # # # Özet 6 Temmuz 2026'da, 06:51 ve 20:17 UTC arasında, Atlassian müşterileri Avrupa'daki bulut ürünlerini kullanıyor (EU) bölgeler otomasyon kuralı yürütmesini etkileyen hizmet kesintilerini deneyimledi, kullanıcı arama, kullanıcı seçici ve ilgili iş akışlarını. Olay, temel bir kimlik servisinin AB bölgelerinde deneyimli bir veritabanı saturasyon olduğunda başladı, gecikme ve hata oranları arttı. Cevaplayıcılar kapasiteyi geri yüklemek için çalışırken, kimlik uç noktasına erişmekten otomasyon kurallarını bloke eden bir acil işlem uygulandı. Paralel olarak, yüksek kimlik gecikmişliği düşük bir kullanıcı arama servisinde bir kesintiye neden oldu, birden fazla ürünle kullanıcı arama ve kullanıcı seçici deneyimleri. Servis, ek veritabanı okuma kapasitesi eklendikten sonra ilerici olarak restore edildi, acil blok kaldırıldı ve kullanıcı arama hizmeti manuel olarak ölçeklendi. ## Effects Olay, AB bölgelerindeki birçok Atlassian ürünü ile 06:51 ve 20:17 UTC arasında etkilenen müşteriler etkiledi. **Core Identity servisi bozulması: ** AB bölgelerindeki ürünlerde yüksek aralıklı erişim inkar oranları gözlemlendi. **Automation rule execution failures: ** Varsayılan kullanıcı (Jira için otomatikleştirme) Jira, Jira Service Management ve Jira Ürün Discovery in EU regions failed with a permissions error. ** Kullanıcı arama ve kullanıcı seçici başarısızlıkları: ** kullanıcı arama başarı oranları AB bölgelerinde önemli ölçüde azaldı, kullanıcı seçici yetenekleri büyük ölçüde ürünlerde mevcut değildi. # # # Root Cause Olay, önbellek ömrünü temel bir kimlik hizmeti için azaltan son bir yapılandırma değişikliğinden kaynaklanmıştır. EU iş günü trafiği 6 Temmuz 2026'da yükseldikçe, daha büyük bir istek paylaşımı önbellekten servis edilmek yerine doğrudan arka veritabanına ulaşmaya başladı. AB veritabanları, artan yükü absorbe etmek için yeterli bölgesel kapasiteye sahip değildi ve veritabanı CPU saturasyona ulaştı, yüksek aralıklı erişim inkar oranlarına neden oldu. mitigation'in bir parçası olarak, doygun kimlik servis veritabanına yük düşürmek ve temel kimlik hizmeti geri yüklemeye öncelik vermek için acil bir blok uygulandı. Bu uygunsuz bir şekilde otomasyon kurallarını önyükleme izni kontrollerini geçmelerini engelledi, başarısız olmalarına neden oldu. genişletilmiş süre öncelikle işlem limiti throttling tarafından kaynaklanan ikincil bir otomasyon kuralı başarısızlıklarından kaynaklanıyordu. Paralel olarak, devam eden bozulma, bu çeklere bağlı olan ürünlerdeki gecikme ve kesintiye neden oldu ve alt kullanıcı arama servisinde bir hataya katkıda bulundu. Sonuç olarak, kullanıcı arama ve kullanıcı seçici deneyimleri, kurtarılan izinlere kadar AB bölgelerinde büyük ölçüde mevcut değildi ve kullanıcı arama hizmeti kapasiteyi geri yüklemek için ölçeklendi. ## Remedial Actions Plan & Next Steps Müşterilerimizin verimliliğini etkilediğini biliyoruz. Atlassian, gelecekte benzer olayların önlenmesine yardımcı olmak için aşağıdaki eylemlere öncelik veriyor: ** Yüksek acil durumlar için koruyucular:** Harden operasyonel aracı, müşteri odaklı iş akışlarını devre dışı bırakabilecek adımlar ek bir inceleme gerektirir. **Strengthen kimlik altyapı kapasitesi ve güvenlik:** Bölgesel veri tabanı büyük trafik dönemleri sırasında tatmin etme riskini azaltmak ve üretim rollout öncesinde değerlendirme sürecini geliştirmek. **Strengthen dayanıklılığı, yüksek çözünürlükteki başarısızlıklara karşı dayanıklılık:** Kontrol arka baskı işlemleri, devre kesici konfigürasyonu ve hizmetlerde otoskaling davranışları, bu yüzden bu upstream bozulması kullanıcı arama, kullanıcı seçici ve ilgili deneyimlerle daha geniş ürün etkisine neden olmaz. - **Harden Otomasyon kuralı başarısızlıkları için yeniden oyun mekanizmaları:** Güvenilirliklerde meydana gelen olaylarla ilgili etkileri azaltmak için otomasyon kurallarının dayanıklılığını artırmak. Müşterilerimiz için kritik güvenilir ürün akışlarının ne kadar kritik olduğunu biliyoruz ve bu olay tarafından etkilenen müşterilere özür dileriz. Teşekkürler, Atlassian Müşteri Desteği

Resmî olay güncellemesinden otomatik olarak çevrilmiştir.

1. 16 Haziran 2026 13:46 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating degraded performance affecting your service. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

2. 16 Haziran 2026 14:28 UTCidentified

   We have identified the source of degraded performance affecting some Confluence Cloud users. A subset of users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or editing pages. Our team has initiated a remediation and is actively monitoring recovery. We will provide another update within one hour or once the issue is fully resolved.

3. 16 Haziran 2026 14:53 UTCmonitoring

   We have been able to apply the fix to mitigate the issue and we are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

4. 16 Haziran 2026 15:56 UTCresolved

   On June 16, 2026, Confluence Cloud users for some customers may have experienced performance degradation of view and edit page experiences. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23 Haziran 2026 18:25 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary ### On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT ### The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ### ROOT CAUSE ### 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. We have already deployed the following fix: - Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: - Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. - Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 Haziran 2026 07:39 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing experiencing degraded performance in Confluence Cloud affecting view page and edit page functionality. Our teams are actively investigating and will be sharing more updates in next 1 hour or sooner.

2. 12 Haziran 2026 08:45 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing degraded performance with view content, create and edit functionality on Confluence Cloud primarily in the EU region. Our teams are actively working to identify the root cause of the issue. We will share additional updates in next 2 hours or sooner as more information is available.

3. 12 Haziran 2026 10:29 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause of this issue and implemented a fix. We are beginning to observe signs of recovery, with some affected users regaining access to view, create, and edit content on Confluence Cloud. We will provide a further update within one hour, or sooner if we confirm full recovery for all affected customers.

4. 12 Haziran 2026 11:15 UTCresolved

   On June 12th 2026, between 07:04 to 11:06 UTC, some Confluence users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23 Haziran 2026 18:28 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ‌ ### ROOT CAUSE ‌ 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ‌ ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ‌ We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. ‌ We have already deployed the following fix: * Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. * Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ ‌ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 10 Haziran 2026 06:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating reports of extended delays being experienced across tasks such as processing of Incoming Emails, Notifications relating to changes or creation of Work Items, in addition to delays in processing Scheduled Triggers from Marketplace apps. Our team is looking into this with urgency and we will provide further update within one hour as our investigation continues.

2. 10 Haziran 2026 06:14 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause for this issue and has now deployed a fix that is rolling out across impacted products. At this time we are monitoring for the recovery of these events across Jira Service Management, Jira Cloud and Ecosystem app Scheduled Triggers. We will provide further update within one hour or when we have seen a full recovery of all task processing across these products.

3. 10 Haziran 2026 06:14 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has now determined that performance has returned to expected levels for those impacted by this incident. Additional products that are now known to have been impacted by this incident are Confluence, Customer Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery. These products would have seen similar impact where email notifications or processing of events may have been delayed while this incident was underway. We are now monitoring for the full recovery of performance across all products and will update when we are confident this issue is fully resolved, or within one hour, whichever is sooner.

4. 10 Haziran 2026 06:31 UTCresolved

   We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 27 Mayıs 2026 06:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where customers attempting to view Calendars receive an error message on Confluence Cloud pages. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 27 Mayıs 2026 07:06 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause and are in process of deploying a fix. We will share further updates in next 1 hours, or sooner if we have any meaningful developments to report.

3. 27 Mayıs 2026 07:48 UTCresolved

   Between 00:50 UTC and 07:30 UTC on 27 May 2026, some users were facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and this incident has been fully restored.

1. 26 Mayıs 2026 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where some custom extensions may fail to load when editing Confluence Cloud pages. Affected users may see 'Error loading the extension!' messages or notice that certain macros are missing from the editor's extension selection menu. Viewing published pages is not affected. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 26 Mayıs 2026 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating an issue affecting the editing macros in Confluence Cloud editor. Our team is working to identify the root cause. We will provide an update within approximately one hour.

3. 26 Mayıs 2026 13:55 UTCresolved

   Between 08:30 UTC and 13:51 UTC on 26 May 2026, some users were unable to load or edit certain macros in the Confluence Cloud page editor. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and macro functionality has been fully restored.

1. 14 Mayıs 2026 04:54 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue with multiple Atlassian products that is impacting a large number of Confluence and Jira Cloud customers. We are continuing to investigate and will add further details about additional impact as our investigation continues. We will provide more details within the next hour or sooner if further information becomes available

2. 14 Mayıs 2026 05:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

3. 14 Mayıs 2026 05:11 UTCidentified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

4. 14 Mayıs 2026 05:24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

5. 14 Mayıs 2026 05:34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

6. 14 Mayıs 2026 05:43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

7. 14 Mayıs 2026 06:40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

8. 14 Mayıs 2026 06:41 UTCmonitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

9. 14 Mayıs 2026 06:48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

10. 19 Mayıs 2026 19:04 UTCpostmortem

    ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 8 Mayıs 2026 01:31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 8 Mayıs 2026 04:10 UTCidentified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 8 Mayıs 2026 04:10 UTCidentified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 8 Mayıs 2026 04:10 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 8 Mayıs 2026 05:53 UTCmonitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 8 Mayıs 2026 08:03 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 8 Mayıs 2026 11:12 UTCmonitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 8 Mayıs 2026 19:45 UTCresolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 20 Mayıs 2026 06:55 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 14 Nisan 2026 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Rovo, specifically for customers using automation rules that invoke Rovo agents. Some customers may find that these automations are not completing as expected. We'll share updates here as more information becomes available.

2. 14 Nisan 2026 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified that this incident also affects automation rules in Confluence that use Rovo agents. We are investigating and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. 14 Nisan 2026 14:11 UTCidentified

   We have identified the issue, and our teams are working to resolve it and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as they become available.

4. 14 Nisan 2026 15:46 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 14 Nisan 2026 16:11 UTCresolved

   On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 13 Nisan 2026 07:29 UTCmonitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 13 Nisan 2026 08:33 UTCmonitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 13 Nisan 2026 10:17 UTCresolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 21 Nisan 2026 02:33 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 8 Nisan 2026 06:01 UTCinvestigating

   The impact of this incident is now understood to also be impacting search in Jira and Confluence, as well as additional downstream impacts to Rovo Chat, User Management, Administration and Guard. Our team is continuing to investigate with urgency and we will provide further update within 1 hour.

2. 8 Nisan 2026 06:25 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is aware that users are currently experiencing errors while attempting to search in Confluence and Jira. Our team is investigating with urgency and will be providing an update within 1 hour.

3. 8 Nisan 2026 07:40 UTCidentified

   Confluence and Jira search reliability is improving, and we expect full recovery shortly; we will continue to closely monitor the services to ensure they remain stable.

4. 8 Nisan 2026 08:33 UTCidentified

   We have restored core search functionality and services are operating again, but some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour while new data continues to be indexed. We are actively working to complete reindexing and will update this page as performance fully recovers.

5. 8 Nisan 2026 09:03 UTCidentified

   We are also aware of impact as a result of these search failures to Customer Service Management, Asset Reports, Jira Service Management and dashboards within Focus. Our team have identified the potential root cause of the issue and our teams are working with urgency on a resolution. We will provide further update within 1 hour.

6. 8 Nisan 2026 09:03 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally. Some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour, while new data continues to be indexed. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

7. 8 Nisan 2026 11:43 UTCresolved

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

8. 17 Nisan 2026 16:24 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 Mart 2026 13:38 UTCinvestigating

   Confluence Cloud users may experience errors when accessing certain Marketplace macros. Affected customers are seeing the message Error rendering macro 'static-macro': Page loading failed. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner.

2. 12 Mart 2026 13:38 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the cause of this issue, and a fix is currently being deployed. We are monitoring the deployment, and we will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner if needed.

3. 13 Mart 2026 00:26 UTCresolved

   On March 12, 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 10 Mart 2026 00:15 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of customers experiencing delays with their automations within Jira, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Jira Product Discovery and Confluence. Our team is investigating with urgency and we will provide an update within one hour.

2. 10 Mart 2026 00:15 UTCidentified

   Our team has now identified the cause of this issue relating to delayed automation events and has put a hotfix in place to help restore automation performance. We will continue to monitor performance as the backlog of issues is now being processed.

3. 10 Mart 2026 00:51 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of automations has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 10 Mart 2026 00:59 UTCresolved

   On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 20 Şubat 2026 04:14 UTCidentified

   Customers using Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours as we continue our investigation.

2. 20 Şubat 2026 12:26 UTCidentified

   We understand that customers using Customer Service Management, Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours or sooner based on significant progress.

3. 20 Şubat 2026 12:26 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.