Spreedly kesinti geçmişi

1. 2 Eylül 2026 15:11 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly, işlemsel API'ler üzerinde bozulan bir konu tespit etti. Sizi mümkün olduğunca çabuk uyarmak için erken bir bildirim sağlıyoruzken, gerçek kapsamı ve etkisini hala araştırıyoruz ve daha kısa sürede daha ayrıntılı olarak bir güncelleme sağlayacaktır. Sabrınız için teşekkür ederiz.

2. 2 Eylül 2026 15:57 UTCmonitoring

   Son veritabanı bakımı ile ilgili bazı ödeme işleme (özellikle satın alma, yakalama ve ödeme yöntemi oluşturma) etkileyen bir performans gecikmesini çözmek için çalışıyoruz. Bir düzeltme sürüyor ve ekibimiz sistemi aktif olarak izliyor. Lütfen gerçek zamanlı güncellemeler için buraya geri kontrol edin.

3. 2 Eylül 2026 21:32 UTCresolved

   Bu olay çözüldü.

4. 9 Eylül 2026 21:50 UTCpostmortem

   # # # 9 Eylül 2026 - İşlem İşleme Etkileyen Hata Oranları ### Yüksek Seviye Özeti 2 Eylül 2026, 14:35 ve 15:19 UTC arasında, Spreedly, son noktalarda bir alt işlem talebi etkileyen yüksek hata oranlarının bir dönemini yaşadı. Sorun yaklaşık 44 dakika sürdü ve veritabanı platformumuzla bir altyapı seviyesindeki bir sorundan kaynaklandı. Ekibimiz aynı gün sorunu tespit etti ve çözdü. ### What Happened Rutin bir şema güncellemesi sırasında, altta yatan veritabanı platformumuzdaki bir hata veritabanı düğümlerimizden birinin kullanılamaz hale gelmesine neden oldu. Bu, işlem verilerinin bir kısmı için geçici olarak, bazı talepleri her zaman dışarı ya da normal olarak işleme yerine bir sistem hatası yanıtını almak için redundancy azalttı. Ekibimiz, etkilenen altyapının tam iyileşmesini tanımlamak için doğrudan veritabanı satıcımızla çalıştı. ### Next Steps Veritabanı satıcımızın yazılımında bilinen bir sorun olarak alt yatan nedeni tespit ettik. Normal planlanan bakım sırasında satıcı tarafından yapılan bir düzeltme yapılır. Paralel olarak, bu konuyu daha önce tespit etmek için daha fazla izleme ekliyoruz ve veritabanı bakım çalışmaları hakkındaki iç prosedürlerimizi ileriye dönük bir olayın riskini daha da azaltıyoruz. - Spreedly Team

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1. 14 Ağustos 2026 16:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an increase in 5xx errors on the Core Transactional API. Some transactions may be failing or returning unexpected error responses during this time. We will provide an update as soon as we have more information.

2. 14 Ağustos 2026 16:34 UTCresolved

   A fix has been implemented and error rates have returned to normal. Some transactions may have failed or returned errors during the affected window. We're continuing to monitor and will follow up with a more detailed post-incident summary.

3. 3 Eylül 2026 20:55 UTCpostmortem

   ### Service Disruption on Transaction Endpoints ### ‌High Level Summary On August 14, 2026, Spreedly experienced a brief service disruption affecting some transaction-related API endpoints for approximately 20 minutes \(4:06 PM – 4:26 PM ET\). During this window, some requests to endpoints involving transaction lookups, captures, voids, credits, and payment method operations may have received error responses. The issue was identified and resolved quickly by our engineering team. ### What Happened A routine database schema update caused a subset of existing database connections to reference outdated schema information, resulting in intermittent errors on affected requests. Once identified, our team refreshed the affected database connections, which fully resolved the issue. ### Next Steps We are reviewing our schema migration process to add additional safeguards that will prevent this class of issue from recurring, and are improving automated testing coverage for this scenario. We have added auto-retry and recovery mechanisms so that if a connection does reference an outdated schema it will not affect transactions going forward.

1. 27 Temmuz 2026 13:50 UTCinvestigating

   Şu anda bu konuyu araştırıyoruz.

2. 27 Temmuz 2026 14:00 UTCidentified

   Sorun tespit edildi ve bir düzeltme uygulanır.

3. 27 Temmuz 2026 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Spreedly, temel işlem performansını etkileyebilecek bir sorunu tespit etti. Sorun şu anda çözülüyor olsa da, ekibimiz devam eden istikrarı sağlamak için aktif olarak izleme sistemleridir. Araştırmamızın tam kapsamına ve etkisine son bir güncelleme sağlayacağız. Lütfen en son güncelleme için StatusPage'imizi takip etmeye devam edin.

4. 27 Temmuz 2026 21:41 UTCresolved

   Daha yakından takip ettik ve tüm sistemlerin kararlı olduğunu ve beklendiği gibi çalıştığını doğruladıktan sonra, bu olay çözülebilir. Daha fazla müşteri etkisi bekleniyor. Olayın nedenleri ve herhangi bir oturma etkisi hakkındaki soruşturmamızı tamamlıyoruz. Herhangi bir rahatsızlık veya rahatsızlıktan özür dileriz.

5. 3 Eylül 2026 20:57 UTCpostmortem

   ### Yüksek Seviye Özeti 27 Temmuz 2026'da Spreedly, satın alımlar, izinler ve webhookslar dahil olmak üzere bir alt işlem talepleri üzerinde kesintiye uğradı. ### What Happened Bir veritabanı göçü, depolanan ödeme yöntemlerini yöneten içsel bir hizmetin şemasını güncelledi. Bu, mevcut bağlantıların hatalarının bir merdiven önbelleği ifade etmesine neden oldu. Bu bağlantıları geri aldık, sorunu tamamen çözdük. ### Next Steps Bu konuyu tekrardan önleyecek ek korumalar eklemek için şema geçiş sürecimizi gözden geçiriyoruz ve bu senaryo için otomatik test kapsamı geliştiriyoruz. Oto-retry ve kurtarma mekanizmaları ekledik, böylece bir bağlantı eski bir şemaya atıfta bulunursa, işlemleri ileriye dönük etkilemez.

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1. 11 Temmuz 2026 14:33 UTCinvestigating

   Belirli API taleplerini etkileyen yüksek hata oranları araştırıyoruz. Bazı liste ve retrieval endpoints kök nedenini tanımlamak için çalışırken yaklaşık 500 yanıt geri dönebilir.

2. 11 Temmuz 2026 15:38 UTCresolved

   Sorunu belirli liste ve retrieval endpoints üzerinde intermittent 500 yanıta neden belirledik ve çözdük. Bir yapılandırma güncellemesi, talepleri erken sona ermesini engellemek için kullanılmıştır ve hizmeti izlemeye devam ediyoruz.

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1. 8 Temmuz 2026 15:22 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly, Cybersource Kredi işlemlerinde bozulan bir konu tespit etti. Bu erken bildirimi mümkün olduğunca çabuk uyarmaya çalışırken, gerçek kapsamı ve etkisini hala araştırıyoruz. Daha kısa sürede daha ayrıntılı olarak bir güncelleme sağlayacağız.

2. 8 Temmuz 2026 16:08 UTCidentified

   Saat 15:00 ve 15:05 UTC arasında gerçekleşen geçici iç DNS çözünürlüğü hatasını tespit ettik ve Spreedly hizmetleri arasında 500 hata seçmemize neden oldu. Tam etkisini araştırmaya devam ediyoruz ve mevcut olduğu gibi ek bilgi sağlayacaktır.

3. 8 Temmuz 2026 16:54 UTCresolved

   Daha yakından takip ettik ve tüm sistemlerin kararlı olduğunu ve beklendiği gibi çalıştığını doğruladıktan sonra, bu olay çözülebilir. Daha fazla müşteri etkisi bekleniyor. Olayın nedenleri ve herhangi bir oturma etkisi hakkındaki soruşturmamızı tamamlıyoruz. Herhangi bir rahatsızlık veya rahatsızlıktan özür dileriz.

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1. 17 Haziran 2026 14:55 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly potansiyel olarak bir konu tespit etti, bir degrated performance with asynchronous transactions. Sizi mümkün olduğunca çabuk uyarmak için erken bir bildirim sağlıyoruzken, gerçek kapsamı ve etkisini hala araştırıyoruz ve daha kısa sürede daha ayrıntılı olarak bir güncelleme sağlayacaktır. Sabrınız için teşekkür ederiz.

2. 17 Haziran 2026 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Bir düzeltme uyguladık ve asynchronous işlemleri stabilize ettik. Ekibimiz durumu yakından takip ediyor, ek etkiler olmadığından emin olmak için. Lütfen en son güncelleme için StatusPage'imizi takip etmeye devam edin.

3. 17 Haziran 2026 16:03 UTCmonitoring

   Daha fazla sorun veya ek etkiler için yakından takip ediyoruz. Lütfen en son güncellemeler için StatPage'imizi takip etmeye devam edin.

4. 17 Haziran 2026 21:42 UTCresolved

   İzleme sürecinden sonra, konunun çözülebildiğini ve sistemlerin normalde çalıştığını doğruladık. Herhangi bir sorunu yaşamaya devam ederseniz lütfen Destek'e geçin.

5. 24 Haziran 2026 20:10 UTCpostmortem

   24 Haziran 2026 - Asynchronous Transaction Processing Disruption **Yüksek Seviye Özeti** 17 Haziran'da yaklaşık 10:02 AM'den 10:41 AM UTC, Spreedly asynchronous geçit işlemleri ve 3DS doğrulama akışlarını etkileyen bir kesinti yaşadı. 39 dakikalık pencerede, bu dönemde toplam işlem hacminin% 1'inden daha azını temsil eden bir durumda yaklaşık 1634 işlem kaldı. ** What Happened** Bir kod dağıtım, yeni kullanılan ve daha önce çalışan uygulama örnekleri arasında bir uyumluluk sorunu tanıttı. Bir rollback sürecinde, bazı istekler karışık kod versiyonlarında yollandı, asynchronous işlem durumu güncellemelerinde başarısızlıklara neden oldu. Etkilenen işlem türleri, asynchronous geçit işlemleri \ (özel 3DS ve diğer asyncronous doğrulamalar, yetkiler ve satın alımlar) ve 3DS Global kimlik doğrulama içerir. Bu pencere sırasında etkilenen akışa giren işlemler, geçici bir sonucu yansıtabilir, ağ geçidinizdeki işlem durumu Spreedly raporlarından farklı olabilir. **Next Steps ** Beklemek durumunda kalan 17 Haziran'da 10:02-10:41 AM UTC penceresinden işlemleri incelemeyi tavsiye ediyoruz: Doğrulamalar güvenle tekrarlanabilir. Yazarlar yeniden denemeden önce ağ geçidinde boşluk olmalıdır. Satın almalar bir çoğaltma riski taşır, yeniden denemeden önce geri ödeme tavsiye ederiz. Lütfen etkilenen işlemleri tanımlamanız veya uygun remediasyon yolunu belirlemeniz için Spreedly desteğe ulaşırsınız. Bu sorunu gelişmiş dağıtım korumaları ve otomatik geri dönüş algılaması yoluyla önlemek için aktif olarak çalışıyoruz. - Spreedly Team

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1. 8 Mayıs 2026 18:00 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring results.

2. 8 Mayıs 2026 18:05 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19 Mart 2026 15:13 UTCidentified

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 19 Mart 2026 15:30 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with delayed processing of requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 19 Mart 2026 15:55 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. We are continuing to monitor

4. 19 Mart 2026 16:07 UTCmonitoring

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

5. 19 Mart 2026 16:09 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 16 Mart 2026 17:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating elevated errors on API endpoints

2. 16 Mart 2026 17:51 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring to ensure services are operating correctly

3. 16 Mart 2026 18:07 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 19 Mart 2026 19:07 UTCpostmortem

   ### Mar 18th 2026 — _Decryption Errors on API endpoints_ ### Summary Between 5:40 PM and 5:43 PM UTC on March 16, 2026, we experienced a brief issue during a key rotation that caused a small subset of API requests to fail due to decryption errors. These errors occurred within our system before any external processing took place. The issue was quickly identified, and traffic was immediately redirected to a stable environment, restoring normal service. ### What Happened At 5:36 PM UTC, we routed traffic to a newly deployed cluster of our encryption service running with the latest security keys. Shortly after, we observed decryption errors affecting a small subset of records, which resulted in some requests returning 500 error responses. We promptly redirected traffic back to the existing cluster, restoring normal operation. Further investigation determined that these records were still associated with a key in the process of rotation, and we updated them as a follow-up action to prevent the issue from recurring. ### Next Steps We have enhanced our process to ensure that a key’s usage is fully verified before it is removed from the encryption service. -The Spreedly Team

1. 26 Şubat 2026 16:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting customers using Dodgeball. The production database backing Dodgeball has reached critically low available storage, which is expected to result in elevated error rates. Customers may begin experiencing errors within the next 10 minutes as the system’s ability to process requests degrades. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working to restore normal capacity as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

2. 26 Şubat 2026 16:59 UTCmonitoring

   The engineering team has successfully resolved the storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production PostgreSQL instance. Capacity has been restored and the system is now operating normally. At this time, we are not observing any elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. We will continue to monitor the system closely to ensure stability. Further updates will be provided if necessary.

3. 26 Şubat 2026 18:44 UTCresolved

   The storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production instance has been fully resolved. Capacity has been restored and systems are operating normally. We are no longer observing elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. Thank you for your patience while we worked to resolve this issue.

1. 25 Şubat 2026 19:18 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 25 Şubat 2026 19:48 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with processing of Checkpoints that is causing latency and errors for requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 25 Şubat 2026 20:35 UTCmonitoring

   Service has resumed and we are monitoring for further impact. We apologize for any inconvenience this has caused

4. 25 Şubat 2026 21:52 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 5 Şubat 2026 15:56 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions are failing in production. Some customers may see errors when attempting to issue credits against Capture transactions. Capture transactions themselves are processing successfully. Our engineering team is actively investigating this behavior to determine the cause and confirm whether this is a regression or an unintended change. We will provide updates as soon as more information is available.

2. 5 Şubat 2026 16:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve deployed a revert to address the issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions were failing. We’re actively monitoring to ensure credit requests referencing Captures are processing as expected. At this time, we’re not seeing further errors related to this behavior.

3. 5 Şubat 2026 17:01 UTCresolved

   After monitoring the system post-deploy, we’re no longer seeing errors related to credits referencing Capture transactions, and processing has returned to normal. Thank you for your patience.

4. 10 Şubat 2026 17:22 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 10, 2026 — Credits Referencing Capture Transactions Failing ### ‌High Level Summary Between approximately 1:56 PM UTC and 4:15 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, credit transactions where the reference transaction was a capture failed with the error "The specified `reference_token` corresponds to a transaction which cannot be used as a reference." ### What Happened At approximately 1:56 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, Spreedly rolled out a change to support credits on the CyberSource Rest gateway. This included a change in the way we validated reference transaction types used in credits. Specifically, there was an unintended side-effect which caused captures to no longer be treated as a valid reference type for credits on gateways other than CyberSource Rest. Once this was discovered, the code was reverted at 4:01PM UTC. By 4:15 PM UTC, credit requests against captures were fully functional. ### Next Steps * Any credit attempts that failed with this error are safe to retry * We are making improvements to our code review processes and regression test suite to ensure we catch similar errors before they make it into production * We have identified a gap in our observability surrounding validation errors that we will be prioritizing ‌ -The Spreedly Team

1. 4 Şubat 2026 18:15 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue that is affecting multiple customers using Payflow Pro where some transactions fail with the error: “Invalid Request. Malicious string found in XML document”. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 4 Şubat 2026 19:52 UTCmonitoring

   We are no longer seeing errors at this time, and the issue appears to have subsided. We are working with Payflow Pro to identify the root cause. Our team continues to monitor the situation closely to ensure stability. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest updates.

3. 4 Şubat 2026 19:56 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 27 Ocak 2026 19:59 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue related to a dodgeball component experiencing a partial outage. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27 Ocak 2026 20:12 UTCresolved

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 27 Ocak 2026 19:08 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue potentially resulting in a high number of pending 3DS2 Global transactions. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27 Ocak 2026 19:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the 3DS2 Global transactions. Our team is monitoring the situation closely to ensure there are no additional impacts. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest update.

3. 27 Ocak 2026 19:29 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 3 Şubat 2026 15:38 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 3rd, 2026 — 3DS2 Global Transactions Pending ‌ Between 5:40 pm UTC and 7:24 PM UTC on January 27, 2026 the latest version of the Spreedly iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) was configured to use version 1.180 which contained a bug related to the handling of device fingerprinting for `Sca::Authentications` in an end user's browser. As a result there was an elevated number of `Sca::Authentications` stuck in a pending flow with a `required_action` of `device_fingerprint`. These transactions were held in a pending state and never completed. Our team identified the issue and updated the version of iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) to utilize `1.179`. ### What Happened At 5:40 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 a new version of iFrame was released \(1.180\) and updated the version to be used in the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset to point to `1.180`. This change was meant to improve the error handling for the loading of 3rd party critical SDKs however it caused the SDK to enter a permanently error-ed state when attempting to perform device fingerprinting due to a race condition with loading the SDKs. At 7:20 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 the change was rolled back and by 7:24 pm UTC, 2026 the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset globally was pointing to version `1.179`. ### Next Steps We have identified a gap in our observability and alerting within the iFrame service related to the managing of 3DS lifecycle flows that we will be prioritizing. -The Spreedly Team

1. 9 Ocak 2026 18:46 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 9 Ocak 2026 18:52 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 9 Ocak 2026 19:07 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been deployed and we are seeing systems recover. We will continue to monitor to ensure stability and will provide further updates as needed.

4. 9 Ocak 2026 19:10 UTCresolved

   After a period of monitoring, we have confirmed that the issue has been resolved and systems are operating normally. If you continue to experience any issues, please reach out to Support.

1. 29 Aralık 2025 16:50 UTCresolved

   Between 7:00 PM EST on Saturday, December 27th, and 1:00 AM EST on Sunday, December 28th, we identified a period of higher-than-normal latency caused by a pre-planned customer event that resulted in a significant traffic spike. Although we did not observe any service failures or timeouts, our systems experienced degraded service due to the increased latency. Systems recovered quickly once peak traffic subsided and are now operating normally. We expect performance to remain stable moving forward.

1. 16 Aralık 2025 21:56 UTCresolved

   Between 3:59 and 4:03 EST, customers may have experienced degraded performance when processing transactions that required 3D Secure (3DS) authentication via our Global 3DS service. Performance has since returned to normal, and no further impact has been observed. If you have any questions about potential impact to your transactions during this time window, please reach out to Spreedly Support for assistance.

2. 18 Aralık 2025 21:26 UTCpostmortem

   # _December 18, 2025 — Delayed Processing of Some 3DS Global Transactions_ ‌ _A targeted update intended for Gateway-Specific 3DS processing impacted a subset of 3DS Global transactions. This caused a small number of transactions to remain in a "Pending" state rather than progressing to completion._ ### What Happened Between 08:59 PM and 09:03 PM UTC on December 16, 2025, a deployment intended to update Gateway-Specific 3DS logic inadvertently affected the processing of 3DS Global transactions. As a result, 52 transactions failed to reach a final state and remained "pending." During this 4-minute window, customers attempting a 3DS-authenticated operation would have encountered an interruption, preventing their transactions from completing. Our team identified the impact immediately and rolled back the change to restore normal service. ### Next Steps _We have successfully identified and corrected the underlying logic error within the change. We are also enhancing our automated deployment tests to better catch cross-module dependencies of this nature. We sincerely apologize for any disruption this caused to your operations._ ‌ — The Spreedly Team

1. 9 Aralık 2025 15:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where roughly 30–40% of transactions are not appearing in Spreedly reporting since 12/03. Primary datastores and secondary services show no data loss, indicating the issue lies within the reporting ingestion process. Please reach out to Spreedly Support if you need assistance.

2. 10 Aralık 2025 06:53 UTCinvestigating

   Our team continues to investigate the root cause of the missing transaction data appearing in Spreedly reporting. All primary datastores and transactional processing are functioning normally, and there is no indication of data loss at the source. The issue appears to be isolated to the reporting ingestion process.

3. 10 Aralık 2025 14:42 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified and fixed the issue that was causing some transaction data to be missing from Spreedly reporting. Our team is now working on backfilling the missing reporting data to ensure completeness and accuracy. All primary processing systems continue to operate normally, and there is no impact to transaction processing.

4. 10 Aralık 2025 20:04 UTCresolved

   Our team has completed the backfill process, and all missing transaction data has now been fully restored in Spreedly reporting. Transaction reporting is up to date and functioning as expected. All primary processing systems continued to operate normally throughout this incident, and no transaction processing impact occurred.

5. 2 Ocak 2026 21:44 UTCpostmortem

   ### _Postmortem: January 2, 2026_ — _Transaction Reporting Degraded_ ### ‌High Level Summary Select data related to transactions did not make it into our downstream systems, causing inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com) ### What Happened After completing system updates on December 3, 2025, approximately 30-40% of data related to transactions did not make it into our reporting tools due to a latent bug in one of our supporting applications. This caused inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com). This did not impact any primary system functionality and no data was lost. ### Next Steps * Our team has since identified and fixed the affected application. The missing data was backfilled and subsequent data continues to flow normally * We are adding additional monitoring in order to more quickly flag discrepancies * We are continuing to make updates to simplify our data pipeline that will prevent similar issues in the future -The Spreedly Team

1. 20 Ekim 2025 15:41 UTCidentified

   The major AWS outage on October 20, 2025, has been largely resolved for most affected services, though some residual issues may persist. Spreedly’s core platform remains stable and fully available. However, due to downstream impact from the AWS outage, some of Spreedly’s indexing endpoints and callback processing are experiencing delays. This is related to dependencies on third-party systems that were affected by the outage and are still undergoing recovery. As a result, you may continue to see intermittent latency or delayed responses for API requests involving these systems. We are actively monitoring the situation as AWS and its downstream services continue recovery efforts. For ongoing updates, please refer to the AWS status page here

2. 20 Ekim 2025 20:22 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected.

3. 23 Ekim 2025 18:27 UTCpostmortem

   ### Postmortem: October 24, 2025 — _AWS outage_ Monday's AWS outage had downstream impact on some 3rd-party systems utilized by Spreedly's platform. Namely, our indexing endpoints and callbacks lagged behind due to the outage and recovery steps. ### What Happened Spreedly's 3DS global service and legacy smart routing product both faced a period of failures due to 3rd-party systems relying on AWS. ### Next Steps Spreedly will improve its response to our alerts platform, and are actively working on multi-region support slated for 2026, which should mitigate the impact of similar events going forward. -The Spreedly Team