Asana 中断历史

1. 2026年9月2日 UTC 18:08investigating

   我们目前正在调查这一问题.

2. 2026年9月2日 UTC 18:13investigating

   我们正在继续调查这一问题.

3. 2026年9月2日 UTC 18:14investigating

   倒转似乎已经完全解决了错误. 我们正在密切监控,但用户应该能够再次访问Asana.

4. 2026年9月2日 UTC 18:14monitoring

   一项措施已经执行,我们正在监测结果.

5. 2026年9月2日 UTC 18:49resolved

   这一事件已经得到解决.

6. 2026年9月4日 UTC 19:52postmortem

   事件:一个负责在我们的一个计算集群中自动缩放后端服务器容量的内部系统停止了更换在例行维护中被循环淘汰的能力. 这导致现有能力在几个小时内逐渐减少。 随后的部署因能力不足而启动,导致计算组的所有新请求都失败。 为了减轻这种影响,我们恢复了先前的版本修订,该版本仍然有足够的能力。 影响:在大约30分钟的时间里,由这个计算组处理流量的客户看到完全停机;其他客户没有受到影响。 没有丢失客户数据。 前进:我们增加了额外的监测,以便更早地发现这种能力扩能故障,并增加了保障措施,以防止部署人员在证实有足够的健康能力之前转移交通。 我们的度量衡考虑的是每个数据中心用户经历的升起时间加权平均值. 显示故障时间的分数反映了这一加权平均值。

自动翻译自官方事件更新。

1. 2026年8月31日 UTC 15:14investigating

   我们正在调查慢性能和应用程序错误的警报.

2. 2026年8月31日 UTC 15:55investigating

   我们正在继续调查这一问题;我们已恢复了最近的变化,并正在努力查明出错的根源.

3. 2026年8月31日 UTC 16:24investigating

   我们进行了配置修改并看到部分恢复,但我们继续看到一些更高的错误.

4. 2026年8月31日 UTC 16:47monitoring

   我们应用了一个固定 正在看到恢复的迹象.

5. 2026年8月31日 UTC 17:18resolved

   用户化症状已恢复. 我们将继续监控,并将优先进行回溯,以了解和防止今后发生的类似事件.

6. 2026年9月2日 UTC 21:29postmortem

   我们一直在努力在更新的管道中增加一个缓冲层,仔细调整并逐步推出。 8月26日,星期三,我们允许它用于大多数案件,它起初表现良好。 8月31日星期一,不相关的基础设施变化和高峰流量组合将缓存推超了缩放限度. 一旦突破了这个阈值,缓存就变得无法使用,许多为Asana应用程序服务读取流量的出舱已经无法服务了. 我们通过恢复系统来使用先前的,无标记的代码路径来缓解事件. 恢复是成功的,但恢复的时间比我们预计的这一类问题要长。 目前正在进行更全面的分析。 我们将就根源、行动项目和改善采取后续行动,包括为什么恢复需要像恢复那样长的时间。 大约25%的用户被完全击倒, 持续了2小时15分钟.

自动翻译自官方事件更新。

1. 2026年8月6日 UTC 17:24resolved

   From 2026-08-04 15:25 UTC until 2026-08-06 03:51 UTC, Asana failed to send some events to registered webhooks and to return them in the event streams API. Apps which rely on this should refetch the underlying data from the Asana API. Existing webhooks and event streams will continue to function, but events from the incident window will not be sent. Most events with type `task` and action `changed` were dropped during this period. Other events are not affected. The root cause of the incident was traced to a code change which unintentionally dropped change events for most fields on the task type, and the change was reverted.

1. 2026年7月7日 UTC 18:49identified

   美国部分用户(约10%)在Asana Webapp上出现错误。 我们已经查明了根源,并正在努力找出解决办法.

2. 2026年7月7日 UTC 19:12monitoring

   我们实施了缓解措施并正在进行监测,以确保恢复.

3. 2026年7月7日 UTC 19:21monitoring

   我们正在继续监测任何其他问题.

4. 2026年7月7日 UTC 19:24resolved

   这一事件已经得到解决.

5. 2026年7月8日 UTC 21:28postmortem

   ** 事件**: 配置的改变无意中取消了我们一个服务部门需要的关键资源。 虽然现有基础设施继续正常运行,但新规模的基础设施无法准备就绪。 随着晨间交通量的增加,收到的请求与我们系统处理请求的能力之间的差距越来越大,导致服务退化. 我们通过人工恢复所缺资源并纠正导致其删除的配置变化来解决这个问题。 ‌ ** 影响**: 大约1.5小时以来,一个子集的客户经历了我们的网络应用程序和桌面应用程序的全面停用. 在此期间,受影响的用户无法访问Asana。 没有丢失客户数据。 ‌ ** 前进**: 我们正在我们的配置管理进程中实施更多的保障措施,以防止重要资源被无意取走。 我们还正在加强我们的监测系统,以更早地发现退化,以免影响客户的准入。 ‌ 我们的衡量尺度考虑每个数据中心用户的正常时间加权平均数。 显示的停机时间分钟数反映了这一加权平均数.

自动翻译自官方事件更新。

1. 2026年4月29日 UTC 23:19resolved

   Between April 21st and April 23rd, many rules triggered by date time triggers did not run. New rule triggers ran normally starting April 23rd, and the delayed triggers were processed by April 27th.

2. 2026年4月30日 UTC 00:43postmortem

   Starting on **April 20th, 2026 at 10:00 AM PDT**, a combination of scaled-up background action jobs in the EU and a recent change to how date time trigger volume is managed overloaded the system that processes resource intensive background action jobs. This caused multi-hour delays in email and inbox notifications in the EU and prevented date time triggers from executing in all regions. Engineers were first alerted on **April 21st** by our monitoring systems, but did not recognize the full scope of the incident until **April 23rd**. On April 23rd, the change to manage date time trigger volume was reverted and the problematic background action jobs were isolated. All delayed notifications were sent by **April 24th, 11:30 AM PDT**, and all delayed date time triggers were executed by **April 27th, 4:00 AM PDT**.

1. 2026年4月29日 UTC 23:09resolved

   Between April 20th and April 24th, 60% of email and inbox notifications were delayed by at least one hour in EU. Notifications were delayed up to 3 days. Other resource intensive background actions were also impacted at a lesser rate.

2. 2026年4月30日 UTC 00:34postmortem

   Starting on **April 20th, 2026 at 10:00 AM PDT**, a combination of scaled-up background action jobs in the EU and a recent change to how date time trigger volume is managed overloaded the system that processes resource intensive background action jobs. This caused multi-hour delays in email and inbox notifications in the EU and prevented date time triggers from executing in all regions. Engineers were first alerted on **April 21st** by our monitoring systems, but did not recognize the full scope of the incident until **April 23rd**. On April 23rd, the change to manage date time trigger volume was reverted and the problematic background action jobs were isolated. All delayed notifications were sent by **April 24th, 11:30 AM PDT**, and all delayed date time triggers were executed by **April 27th, 4:00 AM PDT**.

1. 2026年3月26日 UTC 15:03investigating

   We have received reports that some users are unable to load Asana, especially in and around New York/the East Coast of the US, and have observed intermittent errors. We are investigating this, and will provide an update within an hour.

2. 2026年3月26日 UTC 15:50monitoring

   We believe that this was related to http3, and have disabled http3 for the affected CloudFront distribution. We believe Asana should now load after a hard refresh.

3. 2026年3月26日 UTC 18:34resolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 2026年3月1日 UTC 20:31investigating

   Asana remains accessible to customers in the ME region, but we are seeing backends impacted by an AWS ME outage. If that isn't resolved soon, we expect to see some performance degradation and possible outages of the Asana application. This is only for the ME region; other regions are unaffected.

2. 2026年3月1日 UTC 21:03investigating

   We no longer see impact on our servers. We're monitoring, as the AWS incident has not resolved.

3. 2026年3月2日 UTC 09:02investigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

4. 2026年3月2日 UTC 09:05investigating

   We are seeing major impact in the ME region making Asana services unavailable to users whose data is stored in that region. We have taken steps to avoid additional loss of EC2 resources, but are continuing to see high error rates. This cause is AWS incidents affecting the infrastructure (az1 and az3) in the Middle East region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

5. 2026年3月2日 UTC 10:27investigating

   We are still seeing major impact in the ME region making Asana services unavailable to users whose data is stored in that region. We are continuing to monitor the situation. The cause is AWS incidents affecting the infrastructure in the Middle East region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

6. 2026年3月2日 UTC 12:03investigating

   We are still seeing major impact in the ME region making Asana services unavailable to users whose data is stored in that region. We are continuing to monitor the situation. The cause is widespread AWS incidents affecting the infrastructure in the Middle East region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

7. 2026年3月13日 UTC 18:44monitoring

   A small number of users were affected by the AWS outage in UAE (me-central-1); following AWS's recommendations, we have moved processing to other regions, and believe there is no user impact.

8. 2026年3月15日 UTC 05:58resolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 2026年2月5日 UTC 23:49monitoring

   Our primary monitoring is observing an outage for our API and mobile services, but secondary monitoring indicates that API and mobile traffic is operating as usual. Our engineers are reviewing our primary monitoring and will provide updates on the situation.

2. 2026年2月5日 UTC 23:58resolved

   Our engineers have rolled back recent changes to our primary monitoring systems, and our API and mobile systems are fully operational.

1. 2026年1月26日 UTC 03:01investigating

   We are investigating an elevated rate of API errors as well as delays reflecting changes for the App in EU.

2. 2026年1月26日 UTC 03:19monitoring

   We have identified certain expensive workloads and reduced background processing to mitigate this. We see recovery in user facing services and are investigating the expensive workloads; user traffic is now working normally.

3. 2026年1月26日 UTC 03:20monitoring

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

4. 2026年1月26日 UTC 03:29resolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 2026年1月22日 UTC 17:48investigating

   We're investigating an outage, it looks like no one is able to reach the Asana webapp.

2. 2026年1月22日 UTC 17:51investigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 2026年1月22日 UTC 17:59investigating

   We've identified the cause and have rolled back. Based on our monitoring, we should be recovered for some users.

4. 2026年1月22日 UTC 18:04investigating

   Error rates have dropped significantly, to about 2%. It's possible some users continue to see errors, but we expect most users to be able to use Asana.

5. 2026年1月22日 UTC 18:38investigating

   Our error rates are back to normal baseline, and we don't expect an immediate recurrence. We'll create a post-mortem in the next few days with more details, including what happened and how we plan to prevent this going forward.

6. 2026年1月22日 UTC 19:00resolved

   This incident has been resolved.

7. 2026年1月27日 UTC 07:53postmortem

   Incident: On 2026-01-22 the Asana App and all associated services had a service disruption due to dependency on a shared database used for storing metadata. This was triggered by a code path which caused overload for that database, followed by request queuing, timeouts, and errors. Impact: From 17:33 - 17:57 UTC the Asana App and all associated services were unavailable. There was a further 14 minutes of partial downtime from 18:45 - 18:59 UTC affecting 10-20% of users, also triggered by dependency on this shared database. Moving forward: We immediately rolled back our application code and added resources for this database. Going forward we will continue to reduce dependency on this shared database for common paths to reduce risk, and monitor for unexpected resource usage. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

1. 2026年1月6日 UTC 14:17resolved

   On January 6th, 2026 at UTC 12:00, we experienced an approximately 50-minute service disruption affecting customers in non-US regions. During this time, some requests may have failed or timed out. What Happened: During routine maintenance, we upgraded a core infrastructure component. While the upgrade itself completed as expected, some services did not successfully reconnect to the updated infrastructure. This led to temporary communication issues and degraded service in the affected regions. We apologize for the inconvenience and want to assure you that we are taking steps to help prevent similar issues in the future.

1. 2026年1月5日 UTC 21:17investigating

   Users are currently unable to begin new sessions in the Asana web app. Our engineers are working to investigate and mitigate this issue as soon as possible. Existing web sessions are unaffected, along with mobile and API traffic.

2. 2026年1月5日 UTC 21:29monitoring

   Our engineers have identified and reverted the change preventing users from starting new Asana web app sessions. We're monitoring the situation to ensure recovery. The Asana web app is operational, and other services (mobile, API) are unaffected.

3. 2026年1月5日 UTC 21:50resolved

   Thank you for your patience. Service is fully restored, and the Asana web app is back to normal functionality.

1. 2025年11月24日 UTC 20:28resolved

   Resolved - We have fully resolved an incident related to a product permissions bug that briefly impacted some of our customers between November 18 and November 19. This issue was contained entirely within customer domains and did not expose any data externally.

1. 2025年11月18日 UTC 22:14resolved

   Asana's MCP server experienced partial unavailability for three hours due to an upstream provider outage. No data loss or security issues occurred during this outage. This resulted in an increased rate of errors from 3:20 - 5:00 AM PT and some failed requests from 5:04 - 6:26 AM PT. The service fully recovered after the upstream provider resolved the issue.

2. 2025年11月21日 UTC 00:29postmortem

   Incident: [Cloudflare experienced an outage](https://blog.cloudflare.com/18-november-2025-outage/) that impacted the Workers KV service, a storage infrastructure service our MCP server relies on. This resulted in increased error rates and failed requests for a portion of our MCP traffic over the span of 3 hours. ‌ Impact:  Approximately 100 users making requests to the MCP server received error responses or were unable to reach the server from 2025-11-18 11:20 UTC through 14:20 UTC. ‌ Moving forward: We are investing in our MCP Server to improve its resilience to KV store outages, and are investigating ways to reduce the overall impact of Cloudflare outages. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

1. 2025年11月7日 UTC 21:22identified

   We're currently experiencing a high volume of crashes for the Asana app. We've identified the cause and are actively working to resolve the issue. Thank you for your patience!

2. 2025年11月7日 UTC 21:24identified

   We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

3. 2025年11月7日 UTC 21:39identified

   The root cause has been addressed, and some sessions are starting to see recovery. We are taking action to speed up recovery across all regions.

4. 2025年11月7日 UTC 21:56monitoring

   Functionality to the Asana webapp is now restored. We are still experiencing errors in the API, and are working to resolve them.

5. 2025年11月7日 UTC 22:03monitoring

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

6. 2025年11月7日 UTC 22:08resolved

   The incident is now resolved.

7. 2025年11月12日 UTC 17:15postmortem

   We had approximately 1 hour of full downtime, where the Asana application was unavailable for most of our users. There was no data loss or security vulnerability. ‌ A routine configuration change affected the Asana application globally. While refactoring the configuration consumption, we missed an unintended side effect, causing the app to fail loading in all regions. We reverted the change and restarted servers for full recovery.

1. 2025年10月31日 UTC 16:17investigating

   We are currently investigating the issue.

2. 2025年10月31日 UTC 16:28identified

   We’re currently experiencing increased system load. Our team has identified the source and is actively working to mitigate the impact. Thank you for your patience.

3. 2025年10月31日 UTC 17:05monitoring

   We have identified the source of load and addressed it, and are monitoring recovery.

4. 2025年10月31日 UTC 17:18resolved

   This incident has been resolved. During the incident, users in EU experienced slow application performance, and automations, webhooks, and background actions were delayed.

1. 2025年10月20日 UTC 14:28identified

   We are currently investigating an issue which affects about 10% of our users, this is a continuation of the AWS outage that happened earlier today

2. 2025年10月20日 UTC 15:07identified

   We are still working on fixing the issue, this is affecting most of our users

3. 2025年10月20日 UTC 16:55identified

   We are continuing to work on resolving the issue impacting access to Asana. This outage is related to the ongoing AWS service disruption, which is affecting many applications and customers globally (https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status). Our team is closely monitoring AWS recovery efforts and will restore full functionality as soon as possible.

4. 2025年10月20日 UTC 18:43identified

   We are continuing to work on restoring access to Asana. This outage is related to the ongoing AWS service disruption, which is affecting many applications and customers globally (https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status). Our engineers are actively deploying mitigation strategies to restore Asana functionality and reduce our reliance on affected services. We're observing some recovery in foundational infrastructure, and are working towards restoring core app functionality.

5. 2025年10月20日 UTC 19:54monitoring

   Asana is functional again. We’ve begun re-enabling API traffic and are gradually allowing traffic from all clients. Most functionality is coming back online, though some users may still experience intermittent errors or slower performance while systems stabilise.

6. 2025年10月20日 UTC 20:34resolved

   Asana is now fully operational, and all services are performing normally. API traffic and client access have been fully restored, and we’re no longer seeing elevated error rates or latency. This incident was related to an earlier AWS service disruption. We’ll continue to monitor performance closely, but Asana is back to normal.

7. 2025年10月23日 UTC 16:07postmortem

   **Incident:** AWS infrastructure had [an outage affecting core services](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/), which our application depends on, in the Virginia \(us-east-1\) region. The initial impact to our services is covered by [https://status.asana.com/incidents/zfdtyvckl5k2](https://status.asana.com/incidents/zfdtyvckl5k2); this covers the second major impact to our services. **Impact:** Starting at 2025-10-20 14:58 UTC, our application was down for approximately 10% of our users. By 15:08 UTC the application was completely down for all users We saw some improvement in internal error rates around 17:06 UTC resulting in intermittent availability. We did not see full infrastructure recovery until approximately 19:50 UTC and our traffic fully recovered by 20:29 UTC. This affected all regions because we store some global state and shared application configuration in the Virginia region. **Moving forward:** We are working on ways to reduce the impact of single region outages, including for this region, to limit the impact and improve options for recovery. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

1. 2025年10月20日 UTC 07:10investigating

   We are currently investigating an issue which affects all services.

2. 2025年10月20日 UTC 07:15investigating

   AWS is investigating errors in Virginia, per https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status . We are continuing to investigate and will provide an update in 15 minutes.

3. 2025年10月20日 UTC 07:30investigating

   We are still seeing full downtime, and are continuing investigation.

4. 2025年10月20日 UTC 07:43investigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue from our side, and waiting for an update from AWS.

5. 2025年10月20日 UTC 07:59investigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

6. 2025年10月20日 UTC 08:19investigating

   We are continuing to work on this issue. AWS DynamoDB is disrupted, and this impacts our production services.

7. 2025年10月20日 UTC 08:32investigating

   We are continuing to work on this issue, and will update once we have an ETA for resolution. Also see https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status for status on resolution for infrastructure issues.

8. 2025年10月20日 UTC 09:18investigating

   We are working to prepare our systems to recover once AWS resolves DynamoDB issues in us-east-1.

9. 2025年10月20日 UTC 09:32monitoring

   A fix has been implemented, and we are monitoring recovery.

10. 2025年10月20日 UTC 10:08monitoring

    The root cause has been fixed, and we are monitoring recovery; we still see somehow degraded performance in the US region, and are adjusting configuration to address this.

11. 2025年10月20日 UTC 10:23resolved

    This incident has been resolved; error rates and latency have gone down and we've caught up on existing traffic. We will publish a postmortem here within 72 hours.

12. 2025年10月23日 UTC 16:05postmortem

    **Incident:** AWS infrastructure had [an outage affecting core services](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/), which our application depends on, in the Virginia \(us-east-1\) region. After partial recovery within AWS, we made configuration changes and saw recovery for our traffic. We continued to observe while AWS worked through the incident on their side. The remaining impact on Asana's side is covered in [https://status.asana.com/incidents/lvtt14d4d80g](https://status.asana.com/incidents/lvtt14d4d80g) . **Impact:** We saw global downtime from 2025-10-20 06:52 UTC through 09:27 UTC, 2 hours and 35 minutes. This affected all regions because we store some global state and shared application configuration in the Virginia region. **Moving forward:** We are working on ways to reduce the impact of single region outages, including for this region, to limit the impact and improve options for recovery. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

1. 2025年10月13日 UTC 20:56resolved

   From 15:44 - 16:33 UTC, Asana users may have seen stale data in the web app. In some cases, users may have experienced crashes and failed API requests.