Bitbucket 中断历史

1. 2026年7月31日 UTC 13:09monitoring

   一些客户在访问Bitbucket Cloud时遭遇了间歇性错误,包括加载站点失败和被相关影响接通管道. 我们得以运用这一办法来缓解这些问题,我们正看到复苏。 我们继续监测局势,并应尽快完全恢复。 我们应该能够在下一个小时或更早时提供更多的最新情况.

2. 2026年7月31日 UTC 14:28monitoring

   一项固定措施已经实施,所有受影响客户的服务都在正常运行。 我们正在继续监测以确认稳定。 我们将在60分钟内提供进一步的最新情况.

3. 2026年7月31日 UTC 15:38resolved

   2026年7月31日,一些客户受到影响的Bitbucket Cloud用户可能遭遇了将站点加载到相关管线上的故障并受到影响. 这个问题现已解决,这项服务对所有受影响的客户正常运行.

自动翻译自官方事件更新。

1. 2026年6月11日 UTC 22:48investigating

   We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting Bitbucket OAuth login. We will share updates here as more information is available.

2. 2026年6月11日 UTC 23:21identified

   We have identified the likely cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on a mitigation. Affected users may experience OAuth login issues in Bitbucket. We will continue to share additional updates here as more information is available.

3. 2026年6月11日 UTC 23:58monitoring

   The performance degradation of Bitbucket has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 2026年6月12日 UTC 00:14resolved

   On June 11, 2026, Bitbucket users may have experienced performance degradation affecting Bitbucket OAuth login. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:03investigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

2. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:11identified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

3. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:24identified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

4. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:34identified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

5. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:43monitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

6. 2026年5月14日 UTC 06:40monitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

7. 2026年5月14日 UTC 06:41monitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

8. 2026年5月14日 UTC 06:48resolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

9. 2026年5月19日 UTC 19:07postmortem

   ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 2026年5月8日 UTC 01:31investigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 2026年5月8日 UTC 04:10identified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 2026年5月8日 UTC 04:10identified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 2026年5月8日 UTC 04:10identified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 2026年5月8日 UTC 05:53monitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 2026年5月8日 UTC 08:03monitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 2026年5月8日 UTC 11:12monitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 2026年5月8日 UTC 19:45resolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 2026年5月20日 UTC 06:56postmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 2026年4月16日 UTC 20:44monitoring

   We are investigating cases of degraded performance for Atlassian Bitbucket Pipelines customers. We mitigated an issue preventing new pipelines from starting, and have scaled up services are processing a backlog. Customers should see recovery shortly.

2. 2026年4月16日 UTC 20:44resolved

   On April 16 at 8:00PM UTC Bitbucket Pipelines users may have experienced performance degradation running new pipelines. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年4月13日 UTC 07:29monitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 2026年4月13日 UTC 08:33monitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 2026年4月13日 UTC 10:17resolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 2026年4月21日 UTC 02:32postmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年3月12日 UTC 08:48investigating

   We are actively investigating a service disruption impacting Bitbucket for some customers. We'll share updates here as more information is available.

2. 2026年3月12日 UTC 09:40investigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting Bitbucket Cloud. We'll share updates here within the next hour or as more information is available.

3. 2026年3月12日 UTC 10:52investigating

   Our engineers are actively working to resolve the Bitbucket Cloud disruption. No new updates at this moment. We will share more details within the next hour or as soon as we more information is available.

4. 2026年3月12日 UTC 12:05investigating

   Our engineers continue to work actively to identify the root cause. Meanwhile, the affected service is now stable and the error rate has decreased. We will share more details within the next hour, or sooner if more information becomes available.

5. 2026年3月12日 UTC 12:33resolved

   We have successfully mitigated the incident, and the affected service is now fully operational. Our teams have verified that normal functionality has been restored and the service is performing as expected.

1. 2026年3月6日 UTC 02:44investigating

   We are actively investigating a service disruption impacting Bitbucket for some customers. We'll share updates here as more information is available.

2. 2026年3月6日 UTC 03:10identified

   We have identified the cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on a mitigation. Affected users will experience Bitbucket being unavailable. We'll continue to share additional updates here as more information is available, with our next update to be posted within 1 hour.

3. 2026年3月6日 UTC 04:04identified

   As restoration activities continue, we are now starting to see services recover for customers for Bitbucket Web and for Git HTTPS. We are continuing to work on mitigation across all remaining Bitbucket services. Our next update will be provided within one hour or if full recovery is seen prior to that time.

4. 2026年3月6日 UTC 05:00identified

   Our team has now put mitigations in place across the majority of Bitbucket services and all are now actively recovering except for Pipelines, which is still being actively investigated. We are continuing to monitor these services and we will provide further update within 1 hour or when services have fully recovered.

5. 2026年3月6日 UTC 05:11resolved

   On 06 March 2026 UTC, Bitbucket experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

6. 2026年3月26日 UTC 17:09postmortem

   ### Summary On March 6, 2026, between 02:19 UTC and 04:00 UTC, Bitbucket Cloud experienced an incident impacting the web app, API, CLI, and Pipelines operations. This was caused by the Bitbucket application hitting a regional provisioning API rate limit with our hosting provider, preventing application workers from handling website traffic. The incident was detected within 1 minute by automated monitoring and mitigated by scaling systems down and then back up to full capacity which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. ### **IMPACT** The incident resulted in a Bitbucket Cloud services being unavailable for 1 hour and 6 minutes on March 6, 2026 between 02:19 UTC and 03:25 UTC, followed by degraded website performance until 04:00 UTC. During this time, customers were unable to access Bitbucket services including the web app, Git operations \(clone, push, pull over HTTPS and SSH\), API, and running builds in Pipelines. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The issue stemmed from a change to an internal deployment system that increased use of a platform credential service, hitting a quota with our hosting provider. This blocked Bitbucket services from deploying additional capacity because new application nodes request the credential service on startup and were rate limited. This caused degradation of Bitbucket experiences and more failed requests to Bitbucket Cloud’s website and public APIs. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** The incident response team manually scaled down Bitbucket services, then gradually scaled them back up while closely monitoring our quota. We simultaneously engaged with our hosting provider to temporarily increasing this limit to unblock bringing more Bitbucket service capacity online. We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, Bitbucket services lacked necessary boundaries to be resilient to upstream platform system changes. To help minimise the impact of breaking changes to our environments, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Improve monitoring of shared Atlassian platform resources. * Update Bitbucket application bootstrapping to prevent new capacity from failing during resource contention of shared platform services. * Reduce Bitbucket’s dependency on shared hosting provider services. * Deploy Bitbucket services across multiple regions to reduce single-region failure risk. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年1月28日 UTC 16:49monitoring

   We received reports of a partial service disruption affecting Bitbucket in eu-west-1 for some customers. We have identified the cause of the issue and our teams have applied mitigations and we are seeing signs of recovery. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

2. 2026年1月28日 UTC 20:00resolved

   On January 28, 2026, affected Bitbucket Cloud users in eu-west-1 may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年1月7日 UTC 16:23investigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Bitbucket Cloud for some customers. We'll share updates here within the next hour or as more information is available.

2. 2026年1月7日 UTC 16:38investigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting Bitbucket Cloud. We'll share updates here within the next hour or as more information is available.

3. 2026年1月7日 UTC 17:49monitoring

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

4. 2026年1月7日 UTC 18:53resolved

   On Wednesday, January 7, 2026, Bitbucket Cloud experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 2026年1月30日 UTC 16:02postmortem

   ### Summary On Jan 7, 2026, between 15:28 UTC and 17:04 UTC, Atlassian customers using Bitbucket Cloud could not load the dashboard landing page. Users also faced degraded performance and intermittent failures navigating other parts of the application or using public REST APIs. The event was caused by an unexpected load on a public API, causing long-running queries on a database which resulted in failed web and api requests. The incident was detected within three minutes by automated monitoring systems and mitigated by introducing stricter limits on the API for certain traffic, while taking manual actions on the impacted database, restoring Bitbucket to a healthy state. ### **IMPACT** Occurring on Bitbucket Cloud on Jan 7, 2026, between 15:28 UTC and 17:04 UTC, the incident caused degraded performance and intermittent failures to a subset of customers interacting with the Bitbucket web application and public APIs. Git operations over SSH and HTTPS were not impacted. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The event was caused by an unexpected load on a public API. The request volume during this period resulted in high resource utilization our central database’s read replicas, impacting website and our API performance and reliability. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages reduce your productivity. Although we have several testing and prevention processes, this issue went undetected because a specific request pattern on a public API was not tested against the traffic volume seen during the incident. We prioritized the following actions to prevent repeating this type of incident: * Improve rate limiting and caching capabilities at multiple points in our networking and application layers. * Apply stricter rate limits for specific public APIs to protect infrastructure health and shared application resources. * Optimize performance of specific queries and codepaths on these APIs to handle high request loads. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年1月7日 UTC 06:05identified

   Users of Bitbucket Cloud currently face difficulties when trying to invite new users to their workspaces. This issue is resulting in a '400 Client Error: Bad Request' message, which stems from a recent change in the invitation flow. The team is actively working on a resolution and is deploying a hotfix. We will provide an update within the next hour.

2. 2026年1月7日 UTC 06:40resolved

   We have successfully mitigated the incident and the affected service is now fully operational. Our teams have verified that normal functionality has been restored. Thank you for your patience and understanding while we worked to resolve this issue.

1. 2025年12月27日 UTC 04:42monitoring

   We have taken steps to mitigate the issue and are seeing recovery in the affected services. Our teams will continue to closely monitor the situation and are actively working to confirm that all services are fully restored. We will provide further updates as we make additional progress.

2. 2025年12月27日 UTC 05:20resolved

   We have successfully mitigated the incident and all affected services are now fully operational. Our teams have verified that normal functionality has been restored across all areas. Thank you for your patience and understanding while we worked to resolve this issue.

3. 2026年1月30日 UTC 04:08postmortem

   ### Summary On **December 27, 2025**, between **02:48 UTC and 05:20 UTC**, some Atlassian cloud customers experienced failures in sending and receiving emails and mobile notifications. Core Jira and Confluence functionality remained available. The issue was triggered when **TLS certificates used by Atlassian’s monitoring infrastructure expired**, causing parts of our metrics pipeline to stop accepting traffic. Services responsible for email and mobile notifications had a critical path dependency on monitoring path leading to service disruptions. All impacted services were fully restored by **05:20 UTC**, around **2.5 hours** after customer impact began. ### IMPACT During the impact window, customers experienced: * **Outbound product email failures** \(notifications and other product emails did not send\). * **Identity and account flow failures** where emails were required \(e.g. sign‑ups, password resets, one‑time‑password / step‑up challenges\). * **Jira and Confluence mobile push notifications** * **Customer site activations and some admin policy changes** failing and requiring later reprocessing. ### ROOT CAUSE The incident was caused by: 1. **Expired TLS certificates** on domains used by our monitoring and metrics infrastructure caused by **misconfigured DNS authorization record** which prevented automatic renewal. 2. **Tight coupling of services to metrics publishing**, which caused them to fail when monitoring endpoints became unavailable, instead of degrading gracefully. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS We recognize that outages like this have a direct impact on customers’ ability to receive important notifications, complete account tasks, and operate their sites. We are prioritizing the following actions to improve our existing testing, monitoring and certificate management processes: * **Hardening monitoring and certificate infrastructure** * We are refining DNS and certificate configuration across our monitoring domains and strengthening proactive checks to detect and address failed renewals and certificate issues well before expiry. * We are also improving alerting on our monitoring and metrics pipeline. * **Decoupling monitoring from critical customer flows** We are updating services such as outbound email, identity, mobile push, provisioning, and admin policy changes so they no longer depend on metrics publishing to operate. If monitoring becomes unavailable, these services will continue to run and degrade gracefully by dropping or buffering metrics instead of failing customer operations. We apologize to customers impacted during this incident. We are implementing the improvements above to help ensure that similar issues are avoided. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2025年11月11日 UTC 16:59investigating

   We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting Bitbucket Cloud and git services. We'll share updates here as more information is available.

2. 2025年11月11日 UTC 17:55investigating

   We are continuing to investigate a service disruption affecting Bitbucket Cloud. We'll share updates in 60 minutes, or sooner as things progress.

3. 2025年11月11日 UTC 19:01investigating

   Our teams are continuing to address a service disruption affecting Bitbucket Cloud. We are now seeing signs of recovery, however, affected users may experience intermittent performance degradation. We'll share additional updates here in 60 minutes, or sooner as as more information is available.

4. 2025年11月11日 UTC 19:35monitoring

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 2025年11月11日 UTC 21:10resolved

   On November 11th, 2025, Bitbucket Cloud experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers. We are committed to transparency and will publish our public post mortem on our Statuspage once this investigation is complete. We expect to publish this within the next 30 days.

6. 2025年12月5日 UTC 17:36postmortem

   ## Summary On November 11, 2025, between 16:25 and 19:13 UTC, Atlassian customers were unable to access Bitbucket Cloud services. Customers experienced a period of 1 hour and 16 minutes where performance was degraded and a period of 1 hour and 32 minutes where the Bitbucket Cloud website, APIs, and Git hosting were unavailable. The event was triggered by a code change that unintentionally impacted how we evaluate feature flags, impacting all customers. The incident was detected within 5 minutes by automated monitoring systems and mitigated by scaling multiple services and deploying a fix which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. The total time to full resolution was about 2 hours and 48 minutes. ### **IMPACT** The overall impact was between November 11, 2025, 16:25 UTC and November 11, 2025, 19:13 UTC on Bitbucket Cloud. Between 16:25 UTC and 16:50 UTC, users were seeing degraded experiences with both Git services and pull request experiences within the Bitbucket Cloud site. Starting at 16:50 UTC, users were unable to access Bitbucket Cloud and associated services entirely. ### **ROOT CAUSE** During a routine deployment, a code change had a negative impact on a component used for feature flag evaluation. To mitigate this issue the Bitbucket engineering team manually scaled up Git services. This inadvertently resulted in hitting a regional limit with our hosting provider, causing new Git service instances to fail. This ultimately led to degradation of multiple dependent services and an increased number of failed requests via Bitbucket Cloud’s website and public APIs. ### **ACTIONS TAKEN** Our team immediately began investigating the issue and testing various mitigations, including scaling the impacted services, in an effort to reduce the effects of the change. However, these efforts were unsuccessful due to an unexpected scaling limit imposed by our underlying hosting platform. Attempts to roll back the code change were also unsuccessful, as the platform’s scaling limit prevented new infrastructure from being provisioned during the rollback process. In particular, any attempts to provision new infrastructure caused a high volume of calls to occur in a short period, leading to failures, retries, and a feedback loop that worsened the situation. To address this, the team scaled down certain services to reduce load on the platform, which allowed for the successful deployment of a fix and restoration of service. Once the fix was in place, healthy services were scaled back up to meet customer demand. ### **REMEDIATION AND NEXT STEPS** We recognize the significant impact outages have on our customers’ productivity. Despite our robust testing and preventative measures, this particular issue related to feature flag evaluation was not detected in other environments and only became apparent under high load conditions that had not previously occurred. The incident has provided valuable information about our hosting platform’s scaling limits, and we are actively applying these learnings to enhance our resilience and response times. To help prevent similar incidents in the future, we have taken the following actions: * Enhanced the resiliency of the affected feature gate component to to prevent future changes from resulting in widespread service impact. * Updated application logic to prevent services from hitting these platform scaling limits. * Implemented additional safeguards to detect and handle platform-imposed limits proactively during deployment and rollback scenarios. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2025年10月20日 UTC 07:56investigating

   We have noticed that Atlassian Cloud services are impacted and our teams are actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress every hour.

2. 2025年10月20日 UTC 08:24investigating

   Atlassian Cloud services are impacted and we are aware that our customers might not be able to create support tickets. Our teams are actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress every hour.

3. 2025年10月20日 UTC 09:25investigating

   We are experiencing an outage due to some issue at the end of our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to get this resolved or mitigated as quickly as possible. ETA of the same is not know at the moment. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

4. 2025年10月20日 UTC 09:58identified

   We understand that our public cloud provider has identified the cause of the issue. We are starting to see some recovery and is working towards mitigation. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

5. 2025年10月20日 UTC 11:07identified

   We continue to work with our public cloud provider towards mitigating the issue at the earliest. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

6. 2025年10月20日 UTC 12:06identified

   Atlassian team is actively engaged and continues to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue at the earliest. We are starting to see partial operations succeed. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

7. 2025年10月20日 UTC 13:58identified

   Our public cloud provider is working to mitigate this issue quickly. We are seeing some early positive indicators and are continuing to monitor. We appreciate your patience and will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner.

8. 2025年10月20日 UTC 14:02identified

   We understand your pain and mitigating or fixing this issue is of utmost importance. Our public cloud provider is actively working to mitigate this issue on priority. We have been seeing partial operational success. We appreciate your patience and will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner.

9. 2025年10月20日 UTC 16:36identified

   Update - Thank you for your continued patience. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority. Our public cloud provider is still actively working to mitigate this issue with urgency and while we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will be providing hourly updates on this issue.

10. 2025年10月20日 UTC 17:27identified

    Update - We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority. Our public cloud provider is actively working to mitigate this issue with urgency. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner as new information becomes available.

11. 2025年10月20日 UTC 17:43identified

    We are currently aware of an ongoing incident impacting Atlassian Cloud services due to an outage with our public cloud provider, AWS. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority and we are closely monitoring the health of AWS services. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner as new information becomes available.

12. 2025年10月20日 UTC 18:38monitoring

    There have been no changes since our last update. We will provide our next updated by 9:00PM UTC or sooner as new information becomes available. We are currently aware of an ongoing incident impacting Atlassian Cloud services due to an outage with our public cloud provider, AWS. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority and we are closely monitoring the health of AWS services. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation.

13. 2025年10月20日 UTC 21:26monitoring

    Monitoring - We've started seeing continued product experience improvement. While we still have a backlog of event processing, we are seeing improvements in systems operational capabilities across all products. We estimate a significant improvement with the next few hours and will continue to monitor the health of AWS services and the effects on Atlassian customers. We appreciate your continued patience and remain committed to full resolution as we work through this situation. We will post our next update in two hours.

14. 2025年10月20日 UTC 22:58monitoring

    Our teams are continuing to monitor the recovery of systems across Atlassian products. This update is to inform that the Atlassian Support portal is fully operational at this time for customers that wish to contact support.

15. 2025年10月21日 UTC 00:03monitoring

    Our team is now seeing recovery across all impacted Atlassian products. We are continuing to monitor for individual products that may still be processing backlogged items now that services are restored. The Atlassian Support portal is currently still displaying a message directing customers to our temporary support channel. Please note that our support portal is currently fully functional for those attempting to raise requests. We are continuing to look into this alert to remove this message. We will provide further update on our recovery status in one hour.

16. 2025年10月21日 UTC 01:07monitoring

    We continue to see recovery progressing across all impacted products as backlogged items continue to be processed. The Atlassian Support portal is currently displaying a message directing customers to our temporary support channel. Please note that our support portal is currently fully functional for those attempting to raise requests. We are continuing to look into this alert to remove this message. We will provide further update on our recovery status in two hours.

17. 2025年10月21日 UTC 03:24monitoring

    The issue relating to the Atlassian Support portal displaying a message to customers to use our temporary support channel has now been resolved. The Atlassian Support portal is fully functional for any ongoing support issues. With regards to other Atlassian products, we continue to see recovery continuing across all impacted products and our teams are continuing to monitor as the recovery continues. We will provide further update on our recovery status within two hours.

18. 2025年10月21日 UTC 05:24resolved

    Our team is now able to see full recovery across the vast majority of Atlassian products. We are aware of some ongoing issues with specific components such as migrations and JSM virtual service agents, and our team is continuing to investigate with urgency. We apologise for the inconvenience that this incident has caused and we will provide further information when the Post Incident Investigation has been completed.

19. 2025年10月24日 UTC 17:44postmortem

    ### Postmortem publish date: Nov 19th, 2025 ### Summary All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. Customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 04:05. The service disruptions were triggered due to an [AWS DynamoDB outage](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=1%3A50%20PM.-,DynamoDB,-Between%2011%3A48) and further affected by subsequent failures in [AWS EC2](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) and [AWS Network Load Balancer](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) within the us-east-1 region. The incident started at Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and was detected within six minutes by our automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore all core services by Oct 21, 2025 04:05. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues was completed on Oct 22, 2025. We recognize the critical role our products play in your daily operations, and we offer our sincere apologies for any impact this incident had on your teams. We are taking immediate steps to enhance the reliability and performance of our services, so that you continue to receive the standard of service you have come to trust. ### IMPACT Before examining product-level impacts, it's helpful to understand Atlassian's service topology and internal dependencies. Products such as Jira and Confluence are deployed across multiple AWS regions. The data for each tenant is stored and processed exclusively within its designated host region. This design is intentional and represents the desired operational state, as it limits the impact of any regional outage strictly to tenants in-region, in this case us-east-1. While in-scope application data is pinned to the region selected by the customer, there are times when systems need to call other internal services that may be based in a different region. If a problem occurs in the main region where these services operate, systems are designed to automatically fail over to a backup region, usually within three minutes. However, if unexpected issues arise during this failover, it can take longer to restore services. In rare cases, this could affect customers in more than one region. It’s important to note that all in-scope application data for supported products is pinned according to a customer’s chosen region. **Jira** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 20:00, customers with tenants hosted in the us-east-1 region experienced increased error rates when accessing core entities such as Issues, Boards, and Backlogs. This disruption was caused by AWS's inability to allocate AWS EC2 instances and elevated errors in AWS Network Load Balancer \(NLB\). During this window, users may also have observed intermittent timeouts, slow page loads, and failures when performing operations like creating or updating issues, loading board views, and executing workflow transitions. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced elevated failure rates when attempting to load Jira pages. This disruption was caused by the regional frontend service entering an unhealthy state during this specific time interval. Normally, the frontend service connects to the primary AWS DynamoDB instance located in the us-east-1 to retrieve the most recent configuration data necessary for proper operation. Additionally, the service is designed with a fallback mechanism that references static configuration data in the event that the primary database becomes inaccessible. Unfortunately, a latent bug existed in the local fallback path. When the frontend service nodes restarted, they were unable to load critical operational configuration data from primary or fallback sources, leading to the observed failures experienced by customers. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 06:30, customers experienced significant delays and missing Jira in-app notifications across all regions. The notification ingestion service, which is hosted exclusively in us-east-1, exhibited an increased failure rate when processing notification messages due to AWS EC2 and NLB issues. This issue resulted in notifications being delayed - and in some cases, not delivered at all - to users worldwide. **Jira Service Management \(JSM\)** JSM was impacted similarly to Jira above, with the same timeframes and for the same reasons. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced significantly elevated failure rates when attempting to load JSM pages. This affected all JSM experiences including the Help Centre, Portal, Queues, Work Items, Operations, and Alerts. **Confluence** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 02:45, customers using Confluence in the us-east-1 region experienced elevated failure rates when performing common operations such as editing pages or adding comments. The primary cause of this service degradation was the system's inability to auto-scale due to AWS EC2 issues to manage peak traffic load effectively. Though the AWS outage ended at Oct 20, 21:09, a subset of customers continued to experience failures as some Confluence web server nodes across multiple clusters remained in an unhealthy state. This was ultimately mitigated by recycling the affected nodes. To protect our systems while AWS recovered, we made a deliberate decision to enable node termination protection. This action successfully preserved our server capacity but, as a trade-off, it extended the time required for a full recovery once AWS services were restored. **Automation** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 23:59, automation customers whose rules are processed in us-east-1 experienced delays of up to 23 hours in rule execution. During this window, some events triggering rule executions were processed out of order because they arrived later during backlog processing. This caused potential inconsistencies in workflow executions, as rules were run in the order events were received, not when the action causing the event occurred. Additionally, some rule actions failed because they depend on first-party and third-party systems, which were also affected by the AWS outage. Customers can see most of these failures in their audit logs; however, a few updates were not logged due to the nature of the outage. By Oct 21, 2025 5:30, the backlog of rule runs in us-east-1 was cleared. Although most of these delayed rules were successfully handled, there were some additional replays of events to ensure completeness. Our investigation confirmed that a few events may never have triggered their associated rules due to the outage. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 11:20, all non-us-east-1 regional automation services experienced delays of up to 4 hours in rule execution. This was caused by an upstream service that was unable to deliver events as expected. The delivery service encountered a failure due to a cross-region dependency call to a service hosted in the us-east-1 region. Because of this dependency issue, the delivery service was unable to successfully deliver events throughout this time frame, resulting in customer-defined rules not being executed in a timely manner. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:33, Bitbucket experienced intermittent unavailability across core services. During this period, users faced increased error rates and latency when signing in, navigating repositories, and performing essential actions such as creating, updating, or approving pull requests. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage that impacted downstream services. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 22:46, numerous Bitbucket Pipeline steps failed to start, stalled mid-execution, or experienced significant queueing delays. Impact varied, with partial recoveries followed by degradation as downstream components re-synchronized. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage, compounded by instability in AWS EC2 instance availability and AWS Network Load Balancers. Furthermore, Bitbucket Pipelines continued to experience a low but persistent rate of step timeouts and scheduling errors due to AWS bare-metal capacity shortages in select availability zones. Atlassian coordinated with AWS to provision additional bare-metal hosts and addressed a significant backlog of pending pods, successfully restoring services by 01:30 on Oct 21, 2025. **Trello** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 15:25, users of Trello experienced widespread service degradation and intermittent failures due to upstream AWS issues affecting multiple components, including AWS DynamoDB and subsequent AWS EC2 capacity constraints. During this period, customers reported elevated error rates when loading boards, opening cards, adding comments or attachments. **Login** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, a small subset of users experienced failures when attempting to initiate new login sessions using SAML tokens. This resulted in an inability for those users to access Atlassian products during that time period. However, users who already had valid active sessions were not affected by this issue and continued to have uninterrupted access. The issue impacted all regions globally because regional identity services relied on a write replica located in the us-east-1 region to synchronize profile data. When the primary region became unavailable, the failover to a secondary database in another region failed, which delayed recovery. This failover defect has since been addressed. **Statuspage** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, Statuspage customers who were not already logged in to the management portal were unable to log in to create or update incident statuses. This impact was restricted only to users who were not already logged in at the time. The root cause was the same as described in the Login section above, and it was resolved by the same remediation steps. ### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS We have completed the following critical actions designed to help prevent cross-region impact from similar issues: * Resolved the code defect in the fallback option to ensure that Jira Frontend Services in other regions remain unaffected during a region-wide outage. * Fixed the issue that prevented timely failover of the identity service which impacted new login sessions. * Resolved the code defect so that delivery services in unaffected regions remain operational during region-wide outages. Additionally, we are prioritizing the following improvement actions: * Implement mitigation strategies to strengthen resilience against region-wide outages in the notification ingestion service. Although disruptions to our cloud services are sometimes unavoidable during outages of the underlying cloud provider, we continuously evaluate and improve test coverage to strengthen resilience of our cloud services against these issues. We recognize the critical importance of our products to your daily operations and overall productivity, and we extend our sincere apologies for any disruptions this incident may have caused your teams. If you were impacted and require additional details for internal post-incident reviews, please reach out to your Atlassian support representative with affected timeframes and tenant identifiers so we can correlate logs and provide guidance. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2025年9月16日 UTC 04:00investigating

   We are investigating cases of degraded performance for Atlassian Bitbucket Cloud Pipelines customers. We will provide more details within the next hour. We have mitigated the impact on self-hosted runners but cloud users are continuing to see delays on pipelines starting.

2. 2025年9月16日 UTC 04:13identified

   We continue to work on resolving the delayed Pipelines for Atlassian Bitbucket. We have identified the root cause and expect recovery shortly.

3. 2025年9月16日 UTC 04:19monitoring

   We have identified the root cause of the Pipelines delays and have mitigated the problem. We are now monitoring closely.

4. 2025年9月16日 UTC 04:30resolved

   Between 03:30 UTC to 03:50 UTC, we experienced delyas in running pipelines for Atlassian Bitbucket. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

1. 2025年8月26日 UTC 15:06investigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 2025年8月26日 UTC 15:07investigating

   Core daily job run id : scheduled__2025-08-24T04:00:00+00:00 has been running for over 30 hrs and all the downstream jobs have failed core daily Aug 25th run has not started yet.

3. 2025年8月27日 UTC 15:25resolved

   issue resloved pipeline is completed.

1. 2025年8月20日 UTC 11:28investigating

   - Bitbucket Cloud is investigating an incident affecting Git clone reliability. - The team is investigating the root cause and will update as soon as possible.

2. 2025年8月20日 UTC 13:24monitoring

   A root cause has been identified and a mitigation has been implemented; we're monitoring the situation.

3. 2025年8月20日 UTC 15:16resolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 2025年8月19日 UTC 14:27investigating

   We are currently investigating the issue further.

2. 2025年8月19日 UTC 14:41monitoring

   Website functionality has recovered and we are monitoring to ensure no further regressions

3. 2025年8月19日 UTC 15:22resolved

   Bitbucket Cloud is fully recovered.

1. 2025年8月5日 UTC 15:03resolved

   Today, between 13:55 and 14:35 UTC, we experienced a degradation on Bitbucket cloud, which impacted access to the website. This issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will monitor it closely to ensure stability

1. 2025年8月1日 UTC 08:16investigating

   We are investigating reports of intermittent errors for some Atlassian Bitbucket Cloud customers. We will provide more details once we identify the root cause.

2. 2025年8月1日 UTC 09:22resolved

   Between 08:00UTC to 09:00UTC, we experienced degraded performance with push and clone operations for Atlassian Bitbucket. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.