58 Cloudamqp incidents · 2024年12月 — official updates, affected components, duration and resolution details.
We're investigating connectivity issues affecting some servers in Azure West Europe. We'll post an update as soon as we know more.
Connectivity to servers in southeast Asia has been restored.
我们正在调查影响Google Europe-west2的一些服务器的连接问题。 我们一知道更多情况就发布最新消息.
我们正在继续调查这一问题.
事件仅限于欧洲西部的服务器2-b
GCE仍在报告问题,但我们看到一些API的电话成功.
GCE证实,欧洲-西-2-b的停电造成中断. 电力问题已经得到缓解,受影响工作量初步预计在协调世界时今天下午1:00前全面恢复。 我们继续监测复苏情况.
我们正在继续监测任何其他问题.
这一事件已经得到解决.
自动翻译自官方事件更新。
我们正在调查影响 Azure 西欧一些服务器的连接问题。 我们一知道更多情况就发布最新消息.
阿祖尔意识到这个问题,并正在积极调查. 一旦我们知道更多情况,我们会发布另一个最新消息.
阿祖尔已经确定了这个问题. 它们将这一问题缩小到对该区域有影响的储存无障碍。 他们的小组正在积极对受影响的基础设施采取恢复行动,同时继续调查其根本原因。 我们正在监测恢复进展情况并努力恢复受影响的资源.
我们得以与阿苏雷西欧的事例建立联系。 大部分案例已经恢复和运行。 阿苏尔还有一些VMs要解决.
所有CloudAMQP案例都在Azure西欧展开.
** 概要** CloudAMQP于10月9日在Azure西欧可用区2失去了与一组集群的连接. AZ2的单一节点集群受事件影响最大. ** 影响** 客户无法获取数据,或在事故中受到影响。 阿祖尔事件时间线. * UTC2026年10月9日12:25 - 我们通过内部服务监测警报确定了这一问题。 * UTC2026年10月9日12:29 – 客户撞击开始,受影响的西欧存储比例单位检测出VM磁盘故障. * 世界协调时2026年10月9日2:30 – 调查发现多个存储节点和断层域间心跳丧失,导致存储比例单位进入遇险模式. * UTC2026年10月9日15:32 - 我们把存储比例单位从求救模式中取出,隔离了被撞击的存储服务器上的磁盘,以便能够取回剩余的磁盘. 在这一阶段,大多数受影响的客户开始看到复苏。 * UTC2026年10月9日21:00 - 数据中心和存储工程师继续执行多个存储节点的恢复计划. * 协调世界时2026年10月9日23:27 – 恢复受影响的存储节点的努力成功,恢复虚拟磁盘的工作继续进行. 随后的恢复行动包括节点一级恢复和恢复受影响的储存资源。 *03:00 UTC2026年10月10日 – 服务功能恢复,客户影响被减轻. ** 循环原因** Azure经历了一个平台问题,对西欧地区AZ 2. Azure Virtual Machines存储磁盘产生了影响. 受到影响的客户可能经历了连接失败,意外重启,或者虚拟机进入了该地区的一个失败状态. ** 决议** 机器接入在大约3小时后被阿祖尔恢复. CloudAMQP能够恢复与被影响的节点的通信. 我们继续监测来自Azure的最新信息,以确保节点不再受到影响.
自动翻译自官方事件更新。
我们看到一些非Azure网络和Azure UAE North(azure-arm::uaenorth)之间的网络连通性已退化,这是上游过境供应商的路线问题所造成。 该区域所有服务器都上线和处理信息,监测、计量和日志正常运行。 客户从受这一线路问题影响的网络连接的客户也可能看到连接超时. 我们已经向供应商报告了这个问题,并且正在我们自己的管理流量绕过它.
道行已还常.
这一事件已经得到解决.
自动翻译自官方事件更新。
我们目前正在调查这一问题.
这一问题已经确定,一个解决办法正在实施之中.
一项措施已经执行,我们正在监测结果.
这一事件已经得到解决.
自动翻译自官方事件更新。
DigitalOcean的API和控制面板目前出现问题,在问题持续存在时,您可能会遇到出错和更长时间的问题
这一事件已经得到解决.
自动翻译自官方事件更新。
我们收到各种警报 通知我们部署在Azure West US上的几台服务器 无法到达 显然,这似乎与这个区域有关,影响到25%的服务器.
微软Azure证实他们在美国西部地区有网络问题。 目前,大多数服务器已投入使用。 我们将持续监控 接下来的几个小时.
这一事件已经得到解决.
自动翻译自官方事件更新。
We are currently investigating this issue.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
**Summary** Between June 25 and June 26, our monitoring system incorrectly reported some dedicated servers as unreachable and sent "server down" notifications for servers that were in fact operating normally. This was a monitoring-side issue only — no customer servers or services were actually down, and no data or message delivery was affected. **Impact** Affected customers received one or more alerts indicating their dedicated server was down. These alerts were false positives. The servers themselves remained healthy and fully available throughout the incident. **Root cause** Before connecting to a server, our monitoring system performs a network authorization step. A defect in how one component handled a transient network hiccup could leave a monitoring process unable to complete that step, after which it failed to connect to the servers it was responsible for checking. The servers themselves stayed healthy and available throughout — the monitoring process had simply lost its ability to reach them, and reported them as down. **Resolution** We identified the affected monitoring processes, confirmed the root cause in production, and deployed a fix that makes this authorization step resilient to such transient failures and able to recover automatically. After deploying, we monitored the system to confirm that notifications returned to normal. We apologize for the confusion these false notifications may have caused.
Between 17:30 and 20:00 UTC on 2026-05-30, our server monitoring system generated a large number of false "server_unreachable" alerts. Clusters were operational and healthy throughout this period — no customer data or message delivery was affected. The alerts were caused by a rolling restart of our monitoring service, during which individual monitoring workers went offline mid-cycle and lost state. This caused the workers to report connection timeouts for servers they could no longer reach — even though those servers were fully healthy. We apologize for any concern this may have caused.
This incident has been resolved.
We are investigating connectivity issues affecting some CloudAMQP instances in Azure West Europe. Affected instances may see connection failures or unexpected restarts. The root cause is an ongoing Microsoft Azure platform incident in the West Europe region (started 14:31 UTC, 23 May 2026). Microsoft is investigating.
Resolved — Microsoft has confirmed that the Azure West Europe Virtual Machines incident is resolved. The impact window was 14:09–14:13 UTC on 23 May 2026, during which a limited number of customers may have experienced connection failures or unexpected Virtual Machine restarts. The Azure environment self-healed and the service has been confirmed restored. Affected CloudAMQP instances should now be operating normally.
Since around 8pm UTC last night, some metrics are not being forwarded to legacy integration. Prometheus integrations not affected. We are investingating.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
# Legacy host metrics integrations degraded Incident window: 2026-05-21 18:37 UTC – 2026-05-22 04:05 UTC \(9h 28m\) Affected service: Legacy metric integrations \(CloudWatch, Datadog, Librato, New Relic, Splunk, Stackdriver\). Host metrics affected, not broker metrics, nor was internal monitoring or console graphs. ## Summary For ~9.5 hours, the service that collects host-level metrics \(CPU, memory, disk, network\) for legacy third-party integrations entered a crash loop and stopped shipping data. ## Root Cause An internal credential-signing service was migrated to a new container runtime the afternoon before. Due to a bug with environment variables the collector could not renew it's credentials. The collector's existing credential remained valid for several hours, so the failure only surfaced when it tried to renew. ## Resolution On-call staff detected the failure early morning, developers helped restore the service and collector recovered at 04:05 UTC. ## Prevention * All services, both signing and collector report failed authentication attempts earlier and with higher severity * Metrics pipeline alarm thresholds was tightened so a similar drop in data triggers alarms faster.
We are currently experiencing issues with our backend services handling account and server creation. This does not affect any running customer servers but might delay provisioning new servers.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently experiencing issues with our backend services handling account and server creation. This does not affect any running customer servers but might delay provisioning new servers.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
Still seeing slow requests, doing another investigation.
Looks like we're back at full performance now.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating this issue.
Servers in Azure West Europe can experience connection issues due to underlying issues at provider. Latest update from Azure "Current Status: We continue to investigate an availability issue caused by a subset of unhealthy backend storage infrastructure supporting Azure Virtual Machines and Azure Direct Drive in West Europe."
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently experiencing issues with our backend services handling account and server creation. This does not affect any running customer servers but might delay provisioning new servers.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
We had an abnormal increase in traffic causing timeouts and slow responses for customer.cloudamqp.com, we increased capacity and are back to normal. This did not affect any running clusters, just provisioning and configuration updates.
We are getting indications of instances being down in Azure region westus. We are investigating the issue.
This incident has been resolved.
Servers in Azure West US 3 can experience connection issues due to underlying issues at provider. We monitor and will update when we know more.
This incident has been resolved.
There appears to be an issue regarding sending metrics to all Legacy metrics integrations. Alarms based on broker metrics also got affected. We are currently investigating the issue Prometheus based metrics (Datadog v3 etc) not affected.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
Broker metrics and metrics integrations degradation Window: 2026-04-23 03:25 – 05:35 UTC \(2h 10m\) ## Impact Broker metrics \(connections, channels, queues, consumers, message rates, node and netsplit state\) were degraded, progressively dropping until recovery at 05:35 UTC. Downstream effects: * Queue, Consumer, Connection, Channel, Connection flow, and Netsplit alarms: threshold breaches during the window may not have triggered, or triggered late. Alarms already tripped before 03:25 UTC kept their state. * Metrics Integrations \(Datadog, CloudWatch, New Relic, Splunk, Dynatrace, etc.\): delivery of broker metrics was reduced for the duration of the window. Alarms configured on the receiving side may likewise have missed or lagged. Not affected: server metrics \(CPU, memory, disk\) and their corresponding alarms, Notice alarms, broker availability, and the metric graphs shown in the CloudAMQP console \(these use a separate data path and continued to update normally\). ## Timeline \(UTC\) * 03:25 — broker-metrics collection begins degrading * 03:35 — ~30% of broker-metric samples missing * 03:50 — ~50% plateau * 05:25 — collector workers cycled and re-initialised * 05:35 — full throughput restored ## Root cause Broker metrics are polled from each cluster's management HTTP API by a pool of collector workers and published to an internal message bus that both the Alarms service and Metrics Integrations consume from. At 03:25 UTC this service became unresponsive without raising an error. Affected workers silently stopped polling while remaining alive to the platform, so automatic restart did not trigger. On-call staff began investigating around 05:00 UTC; force-restarting the service restored metric flow. The exact trigger has not been identified. Our focus is on ensuring the condition is detected and handled promptly if it recurs. ## What we are changing * Added metrics and alarms specific to this service, with high-urgency paging for on-call. * Reliability improvements in the service itself to detect and restart stalled work. ## What you can do CloudAMQP offers a new generation of metrics integrations based on Prometheus, with a re-engineered pipeline that does not rely on these centralised services — each server forwards data directly to your endpoint. These have been running in production for some time and have proved very reliable. * [https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/prometheus-metrics-integrations.html](https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/prometheus-metrics-integrations.html) * [https://www.cloudamqp.com/docs/monitoring\_metrics\_datadog\_v3.html](https://www.cloudamqp.com/docs/monitoring_metrics_datadog_v3.html) * Background: [https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/decentralized-observability-with-open-telemetry-part-1.html](https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/decentralized-observability-with-open-telemetry-part-1.html)
One of our backend components suffered a small outage due to an unexpected full services restart. Connectivity with the servers were broken and service triggered alarms for many clusters. We apologize for the inconvenience. All clusters were operational and healthy within the incident/alarms timespan.
Customers are experiencing Management UI being unavailable with 502 Bad Gateway. Timeline: - 14:16 UTC -> The issue was identified - 14:30 UTC -> Recent code changes were reverted. No relationship with incident noted.
The Management UI and brokers are serving traffic normally. You can still use the Management UI by using the Broker URL and properly typing User and Password. The impact is related to our backend service logs into Management UI via CloudAMQP SSO.
We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.
The Management UI SSO shortcut is back to service. Impacted Clusters: All customers with clusters created more than 6 months ago Cause: Some code changes unexpectedly changed the communication schema between our backend services and the SSO component on the clusters. The proxy configuration conflicted with those changes causing the 502 Bad Gateway error to show up. Impact: Only the SSO via CloudAMQP Console was impacted given it required communication with our backend components. The AMQP Clusters were healthy and servicing traffic via both AMQP and HTTP on Management UI and API. Logging into the Management UI via Credentials and all Authentications Backends was functioning normally.
