Confluence 中断历史

1. 2026年10月1日 UTC 02:55investigating

   工作处理和工作时间安排出现退化,这正在影响包括Jira、Conculation和Bitbucket Cloud在内的若干产品的预定和同步工作。 受影响的用户可能看到工作执行被拖延或缺失,包括电子邮件到盘点处理被拖延,以及时间表没有如预期的那样运行.

2. 2026年10月1日 UTC 03:47identified

   我们的小组已经查明了这一事件的根源,目前正在积极努力减轻这一问题。 如果有任何重大进展需要分享,我们将在一小时内或更早地提供进一步的最新情况.

3. 2026年10月1日 UTC 04:03identified

   我们的小组已采取纠正措施来缓解这一问题,并看到一些改进。 我们继续监测局势,并将采取必要行动,直至事件完全恢复.

4. 2026年10月1日 UTC 05:00identified

   我们的小组继续致力于恢复工作,直到事件得到充分解决。 如果我们要分享重大进展,我们将提供进一步的最新情况。 除了对一些产品的预定和同步工作产生影响外,我们还查明了Jira服务管理中的苏丹解放军部分没有如预期的那样出现.

5. 2026年10月1日 UTC 07:01identified

   我们的小组继续致力于恢复工作,直到事件得到充分解决。 如果我们要分享重大进展,我们将提供进一步的最新情况。 新的支助票也影响到苏丹解放军缺失部分,通知可能影响响应时间和一些门票的积压管理.

6. 2026年10月1日 UTC 07:51resolved

   2026年10月1日 UTC凌晨1:00至7:25 UTC凌晨,用户可能已经看到缺少工作执行,包括延迟的电子邮件到ticket处理和没有按预期运行的时间表. 我们现在已实施一个固定方案,并为受影响的客户恢复了正常业务。 支持有苏丹解放军缺失部分的罚单的影响和延迟通知也证实已经恢复。 注意:对于 Bitbucket 客户,如果在事件窗口中存在任何没有运行的预定管线,您可以等待下一次的预定执行或者手动触发.

7. 2026年10月9日 UTC 18:24postmortem

   页:1 2026年10月1日 UTC凌晨1点至07:25分之间,工作处理和时间安排的退化影响到了阿特拉斯西亚产品,包括Bitbucket Cloud, Conculation, Forge apps, Jira,以及所有商业云区的Jira Service Management. 这导致延迟或错过了背景任务,如电子邮件到盘点处理和排定的管道;交互式产品使用没有受到影响. 这一事件是当一大批计划外的任务同时到期时引发的,使我们共享的工作日程安排平台不堪重负。 自动监测在三分钟内检测出事故。 UTC凌晨3点45分左右开始恢复,因为工程规模扩大,平台通过积压工作运转,6小时25分后完全解析出. 影响 大多数计划任务从协调世界时01:00停止运行,从协调世界时03:45左右恢复. 大多数被延迟的工程在协调世界时6:00左右赶上了,其余被延迟的工程在协调世界时07:25已经清除了. 在所有受影响的产品中: - 事件期间重复的预定任务被跳过或推迟运行;跳过的任务没有自动重新运行,任务在下个预定时间恢复。 - 多数一次性排定任务延迟执行;少数可能没有执行。 - 自动化规则,包括预定规则,正常运行,但下文所述除外。 键盘云 应于协调世界时01:00至约03:50之间的排水管没有运行. 如果一个预定的管道在事件期间没有运行,您可以等待下一次预定的行刑或者手动触发. 其他管道运行没有受到影响。 组合 协调世界时1:00至约03:45之间到期的一些日历事件提醒没有发出. Forge 应用程序 时刻表触发器于协调世界时01:00停止,从协调世界时04:00左右恢复;被忽略的引用没有被重放. 目标 每月的电子邮件提醒以更新目标可能会被推迟。 Jira和Jira服务管理 收到的电子邮件留在邮箱内,在回收后自动处理。 诸如过滤器订阅等排定的通知被推迟。 在一些服务项目中,苏丹解放军或处于状态时间引发的自动化规则和通知延误了。 苏丹解放军的计时器数据仍然完好无损。 Atlas系统支助 在协调世界时7:25之前,我们的支助工具问题可能减缓了我们的一些反应。 根据我们迄今进行的调查,我们没有发现任何丢失的工作物品、网页、储存库或收到的电子邮件。 踢踢篮球 我们的共享工作时间安排平台在正常条件下大规模运作。 其中一个平台消费者在协调世界时10月1日01:00将异常高量的任务安排在同一时间执行. 这一规模级的激增超过了我们的建筑和规模限制,造成了依赖性服务处理的积压。 工程人工提高了处理异常负载的能力,使服务能够处理积压并恢复正常运行. 复原行动计划和下一步 我们知道,拖延和错过工作影响了你的生产力。 我们确定这些行动的优先次序,以帮助减少类似事件的可能性和影响: - ** 加强工作量隔离:** 实施公平的调度护栏,使单一来源的激增不会饿死或拖延其他产品的任务。 - ** 加强增援控制:** 增加作业能力,以便在交通高峰出乎意料的情况下迅速节流或暂停特定来源的预定工作量。 - ** 改进系统规模和恢复:** 增强平台能力并优化规模化流程,以应对极端需求激增并更快地恢复. 我们向在这一事件中服务受到影响的客户道歉。 谢谢 阿特拉斯语

自动翻译自官方事件更新。

1. 2026年8月27日 UTC 04:22investigating

   我们的小组已查明这一问题也影响到Jira服务管理。 我们将尽快进一步更新.

2. 2026年8月27日 UTC 04:25investigating

   我们正在调查一个获取产品的问题,这些产品正在影响Conculation、Jira Cloud和Jira Serivce管理客户。 我们的小组正在紧急调查这一问题,如果有资料,我们将在一小时内或更早地提供进一步的细节.

3. 2026年8月27日 UTC 04:33identified

   我们的小组已经确定了解决影响Jira Cloud、Jira服务管理和协同的问题的可能办法。 目前正在受影响地区推广,我们将在一小时内更新,如果有进一步的信息,则将提前更新.

4. 2026年8月27日 UTC 04:51monitoring

   有关装载Jira Cloud、Jira Service Management和Conclus的问题目前正在恢复之中。 我们将继续密切监测,以确认稳定性,并在一个小时内提供最新情况,或者在获得更多信息后更快.

5. 2026年8月27日 UTC 05:16resolved

   在协调世界时2026年8月27日,包括Jira Cloud,Jira Service Management和相交公司在内的Atlassian产品出现中断,受影响用户无法获得服务. 这个问题现已解决,这项服务对所有受影响的客户正常运行。 我们完成对事件的全面调查后,将在本页公布这一事件的公开尸检结果.

6. 2026年9月7日 UTC 02:53postmortem

   页:1 2026年8月27日,协调世界时03:51至04:35,西欧和东南APAC地区的阿特拉斯斯客户无法到达阿特拉斯云产品,包括阿特拉斯云分析,康帕斯,相会,焦点,卫视,吉拉,JPD,JSM,Opsgenie,Rovo Search,和人才. 这次事件的起因是 我们代理舰队的路由层有缺陷的代码更改 这导致HTTP 404出错通过西欧和东南APAC区域的这些代理车队向所有客户流量服务. 我们的自动监控系统在1分钟内发现了这个事件,并通过回滚到之前的配置发布中来缓解,这让代理机队进入了已知的良好状态. 在代理机队恢复后,随着服务器机队适应流量的涌入,一些Jira和Congress客户(无论位置)在协调世界时04:33至04:53之间收到了HTTP 503出错. ** 缩略语** 总体影响分为两个独立的时期: - 首先,2026年8月27日,协调世界时03:51至04:35之间,关于阿特拉斯西亚分析、指南、聚合、焦点、警卫、吉拉、JPD、JSM、Opsgenie、Rovo搜索和人才。 该事件给来自西欧和东南APAC地区的客户流量造成服务中断,HTTP 404错误被退回. 不论来源地,对客户API的交通没有影响。 - 第二,2026年8月27日,协调世界时04:33至04:53之间,在HTTP 404出错解决后,一些Jira和Conculation客户收到了HTTP 503出错:在Ap-东南-2区~32%的请求,在eu-西-1区~2.5%的请求,在我们-西-2区和AP-东南-1区~2.5%的请求,在所有其余全球区域~1%的请求. [原件:英文] 这件事情的起因是 密码更改为我们的代理舰队之一 然而,所部署的代码有缺陷,而人工和自动测试没有发现。 这导致代理级的租户查询功能配置不当,导致流量没有有效的网络路径,导致HTTP 404出错通过西欧和东南APAC地区的这些代理车队向所有客户流量提供服务. 代理级影响恢复后,对一些Jira和Conculting客户造成了第二期影响。 由于代理机队向Jira和Concult服务减少,Jira和Concult服务级自动缩减了服务客户流量的服务器数量. 代理机队功能被恢复后,流量的猛增使Jira服务层不堪重负,它还原了HTTP 503s的高速率,直到再次自动缩放. ** 紧急行动计划和下一步** 我们知道停电会影响你的生产力。 虽然我们有一些测试和预防程序, 但这个具体问题并没有被确定, 因为改变与非常具体的边缘案例有关, 我们正优先采取以下改进行动来帮助避免此类事件再次发生: - ** 增加进一步的部署保障:** 受影响代用级别配置的部署管道使用遗留系统,没有正确配置适当的缓慢区域推出功能。 我们已经增加了正确的保障措施,我们正在将这些措施移至我们的连队标准部署管道,其中包括我们默认能够进行的所有安全控制。 我们还正在审计所有联网服务,以证实它们都在新的标准管道部署服务上。 - ** 加强服务队规模政策:** 我们的Jira和Confactive服务车队的自动缩放配置过于严格。 我们正彻底审查并更新所有复杂的Jira和相通汽车缩放政策, 我们向服务在这一事件中受到影响的客户道歉;我们正在立即采取步骤改善平台的性能和可用性。 谢谢 阿特拉斯客户支助

自动翻译自官方事件更新。

1. 2026年8月25日 UTC 08:42investigating

   我们正积极调查有关业绩退化的报告,这些报道导致对Jira、JSM和Conference的电子邮件、移动和不及时通知的延迟性增加。 我们的小组正在调查这一问题,并将在今后一小时内分享更多信息.

2. 2026年8月25日 UTC 09:44investigating

   我们的小组已经查明了受影响地区,并正在积极努力减轻这一问题。 我们将在一小时内提供进一步的最新情况,如果有重大进展要分享,则更早提供.

3. 2026年8月25日 UTC 10:49investigating

   我们的小组没有采取什么纠正措施来缓解一个受影响地区的问题,并且看到一些改进。 我们继续监测局势,并将采取必要行动,直至事件完全恢复。 我们将在今后两个小时内提供进一步的最新情况,或者,如果我们有重大进展可以分享,则更早地提供.

4. 2026年8月25日 UTC 13:01monitoring

   我们的小组继续缓解这一问题,并看到一些改进。 我们继续监测局势,并将采取必要行动,直至事件完全恢复。 我们将在今后两个小时内提供进一步的最新情况,或者,如果我们有重大进展可以分享,则更早地提供.

5. 2026年8月25日 UTC 14:33resolved

   2026年8月25日,一些用户在电子邮件,移动和不便通知中可能遭遇了更大的延缓. 这个问题现已解决,服务正常适用于所有客户.

自动翻译自官方事件更新。

1. 2026年8月24日 UTC 19:22investigating

   我们正积极调查有关业绩退化的报告,这些报告导致对JIRA、JSM和Confact的电子邮件、手机和Slack通知的延迟性增加。 我们将在此分享更多信息.

2. 2026年8月24日 UTC 20:25investigating

   我们的团队确定了三个受影响的地区,并继续调查影响JIRA、JSM和Confact的电子邮件、手机和Slack通知的日益延迟.

3. 2026年8月24日 UTC 21:30identified

   我们已查明了这一问题的可能原因,我们的小组正努力缓解这一问题。 受影响用户在电子邮件、手机和JIRA、JSM和Conference的Slack通知方面可能会遇到更多的不耐烦。 随着更多信息的提供,我们将继续在此分享更多的最新情况.

4. 2026年8月24日 UTC 23:15resolved

   2026年8月24日,一些JIRA,JSM,和相交用户可能经历了性能退化,导致电子邮件,手机和Slack通知的延迟性增加. 这一问题已针对新创建的通知得到解决,服务正常运行。 可能会有更早的通知正在处理之中,我们期望在接下来的几个小时内完成.

自动翻译自官方事件更新。

1. 2026年8月21日 UTC 07:16identified

   我们已查明一个问题的根源,它影响到Complace App 宏。 用户可能经历宏不正确渲染或显示错误. 我们的工程小组已经查明了根源,目前正在进行补救。 我们将在今后60分钟提供进一步的最新情况.

2. 2026年8月21日 UTC 08:15identified

   已经确定并正在部署一个固定装置。 用户应该开始看到受到影响的"MarketPlace App - 连接宏",一旦固定器被充分推广,开始正确渲染. 我们将在今后两个小时内提供进一步的最新资料.

3. 2026年8月21日 UTC 10:10resolved

   2026年8月21日,在协调世界时04:26至协调世界时09:33之间,一些用户可能经历了宏在Conference中不正确渲染的问题. 这个问题现已解决,服务正常适用于所有客户.

自动翻译自官方事件更新。

1. 2026年8月12日 UTC 20:11identified

   Some Confluence Cloud users visiting public links saw a Something went wrong error page. The issue affected anonymous access paths for public links, and some related Confluence areas could also show the same error message.

2. 2026年8月12日 UTC 22:13resolved

   On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年7月6日 UTC 09:23investigating

   我们正在调查影响你服务的问题 我们正在积极努力查明原因并解决问题。 我们将在一个小时内提供进一步的最新资料.

2. 2026年7月6日 UTC 10:04monitoring

   我们成功地应用了修复方法,并正在看到恢复。 自动化能力正在得到恢复并应当正常运行。 由于无法提供服务,在停用期间提交的数据处理请求没有完成。 我们继续监测局势,并期望在下一个小时内全面恢复。 我们将在今后一个小时或更早地提供补充资料.

3. 2026年7月6日 UTC 11:46investigating

   我们仍在看到一些与欧盟区域用户搜索、用户选择和资产有关的问题。 我们继续调查这一局势,并将在今后一个小时或更早地提供更多的最新情况.

4. 2026年7月6日 UTC 12:25monitoring

   我们已运用这一办法来缓解这一问题并正在恢复。 我们继续监测局势,并应尽快完全恢复。 我们应该能够在下一个小时或更早时提供更多的最新情况.

5. 2026年7月6日 UTC 13:04resolved

   2026年7月6日 06:51 UTC至09:39 UTC部分用户可能经历过与自动化有关的问题,而08:10 UTC至11:50 UTC部分用户可能经历过与欧盟地区用户搜索,用户选择器和资产有关的问题. 这些问题现已得到解决,服务正常适用于所有客户.

6. 2026年7月17日 UTC 16:59postmortem

   □ 总结 在协调世界时2026年7月6日,6:51至20:17之间,欧洲(欧盟)地区使用云产品的Atlassian客户经历了影响自动化规则执行,用户搜索,用户取取用,及相关工作流程的服务中断. 事件开始于一个核心身份服务机构在欧盟地区经历了数据库饱和,时间不长和出错率上升. 在应急人员努力恢复能力的同时,采用了紧急缓解措施,阻碍自动化规则进入身份终点。 与此同时,身份延迟度的提高导致下游用户搜索服务出现连锁故障,使用户搜索和从多个产品中取取取用户的经验降低。 在增加了额外的数据库读取能力后,服务被逐步恢复,紧急区块被移除,用户搜索服务被手动提升. □ 影响 该事件在协调世界时6:51至20:17之间于2026年7月6日影响到欧盟地区多个Atlassian产品的客户. - ** 核心身份服务退化:** 在欧盟区域,产品间歇性准入率下降。 - ** 自动规则执行失败:** 自动化规则使用默认用户(Automation for Jira)在Jira,Jira Service Management,以及Jira产品发现在欧盟区域以权限错误失败. - ** 用户搜索和取用失败:** 在欧盟区域,用户搜索成功率大幅下降,产品中基本上没有取用用户的能力。 □ 根源 事件源于近期的配置改变,缩短了核心身份服务缓存寿命. 随着欧盟工作日流量于2026年7月6日猛增,更大比例的请求开始直接进入后援数据库,而不是从缓存中送达. 欧盟数据库没有足够的区域能力来吸收增加的负载,数据库CPU达到了饱和度,导致断断续续的访问率被否决。 作为缓解措施的一部分,采用了应急区块来减少饱和身份服务数据库的负荷并优先恢复核心身份服务。 这无意中阻止了自动化规则通过他们的执行前许可检查,导致其失败. 延长时间主要是由于处理限制节奏导致的二次自动化规则故障. 与此同时,持续退化导致依赖这些检查的产品间歇性增加和间歇性故障,并导致下游用户搜索服务出现连锁故障。 因此,在恢复权限服务以及扩大用户搜索服务以恢复能力之前,欧盟地区基本上无法获得用户搜索和取取取用户的经验。 □ 补救行动计划和下一步 我们知道停电会影响顾客的生产力。 Atlassian正在优先采取以下行动来帮助防止今后发生类似事件: - ** 改进高效紧急缓解措施的保障措施:** 需要更多审查Harden操作工具,以便采取减缓措施,使客户工作流程无法运作。 - ** 加强身份基础设施的能力并改变安全性:** 审查区域数据库的尺寸和容量,以减少在交通高峰期饱和的风险,并完善配置变化的评估程序,从而在生产推出前评估下游负荷影响。 - ** 增强抵御上游退化造成的连锁故障的能力:** 审计后压处理,断路器配置,以及服务中的自动升级行为,这样上游退化不会在用户搜索,取用者,以及相关经验中造成更广泛的产品影响. - ** 自动化规则故障的哈登重放机制:** 提高自动化规则的适应能力,以降低与依赖性事件有关的影响。 我们认识到,对我们的客户而言,关键可靠的产品工作流程是何等重要,我们向受这一事件影响的客户道歉。 谢谢 阿特拉斯客户支助

自动翻译自官方事件更新。

1. 2026年6月16日 UTC 13:46investigating

   Our team is investigating degraded performance affecting your service. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

2. 2026年6月16日 UTC 14:28identified

   We have identified the source of degraded performance affecting some Confluence Cloud users. A subset of users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or editing pages. Our team has initiated a remediation and is actively monitoring recovery. We will provide another update within one hour or once the issue is fully resolved.

3. 2026年6月16日 UTC 14:53monitoring

   We have been able to apply the fix to mitigate the issue and we are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

4. 2026年6月16日 UTC 15:56resolved

   On June 16, 2026, Confluence Cloud users for some customers may have experienced performance degradation of view and edit page experiences. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 2026年6月23日 UTC 18:25postmortem

   ### Summary ### On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT ### The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ### ROOT CAUSE ### 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. We have already deployed the following fix: - Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: - Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. - Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年6月12日 UTC 07:39investigating

   Users are experiencing experiencing degraded performance in Confluence Cloud affecting view page and edit page functionality. Our teams are actively investigating and will be sharing more updates in next 1 hour or sooner.

2. 2026年6月12日 UTC 08:45investigating

   Users are experiencing degraded performance with view content, create and edit functionality on Confluence Cloud primarily in the EU region. Our teams are actively working to identify the root cause of the issue. We will share additional updates in next 2 hours or sooner as more information is available.

3. 2026年6月12日 UTC 10:29identified

   Our teams have identified the root cause of this issue and implemented a fix. We are beginning to observe signs of recovery, with some affected users regaining access to view, create, and edit content on Confluence Cloud. We will provide a further update within one hour, or sooner if we confirm full recovery for all affected customers.

4. 2026年6月12日 UTC 11:15resolved

   On June 12th 2026, between 07:04 to 11:06 UTC, some Confluence users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 2026年6月23日 UTC 18:28postmortem

   ### Summary On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ‌ ### ROOT CAUSE ‌ 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ‌ ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ‌ We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. ‌ We have already deployed the following fix: * Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. * Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ ‌ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年6月10日 UTC 06:14investigating

   We are investigating reports of extended delays being experienced across tasks such as processing of Incoming Emails, Notifications relating to changes or creation of Work Items, in addition to delays in processing Scheduled Triggers from Marketplace apps. Our team is looking into this with urgency and we will provide further update within one hour as our investigation continues.

2. 2026年6月10日 UTC 06:14identified

   Our team has identified the root cause for this issue and has now deployed a fix that is rolling out across impacted products. At this time we are monitoring for the recovery of these events across Jira Service Management, Jira Cloud and Ecosystem app Scheduled Triggers. We will provide further update within one hour or when we have seen a full recovery of all task processing across these products.

3. 2026年6月10日 UTC 06:14monitoring

   Our team has now determined that performance has returned to expected levels for those impacted by this incident. Additional products that are now known to have been impacted by this incident are Confluence, Customer Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery. These products would have seen similar impact where email notifications or processing of events may have been delayed while this incident was underway. We are now monitoring for the full recovery of performance across all products and will update when we are confident this issue is fully resolved, or within one hour, whichever is sooner.

4. 2026年6月10日 UTC 06:31resolved

   We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 2026年5月27日 UTC 06:03investigating

   We are investigating an issue where customers attempting to view Calendars receive an error message on Confluence Cloud pages. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 2026年5月27日 UTC 07:06identified

   Our teams have identified the root cause and are in process of deploying a fix. We will share further updates in next 1 hours, or sooner if we have any meaningful developments to report.

3. 2026年5月27日 UTC 07:48resolved

   Between 00:50 UTC and 07:30 UTC on 27 May 2026, some users were facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and this incident has been fully restored.

1. 2026年5月26日 UTC 11:58investigating

   We are investigating an issue where some custom extensions may fail to load when editing Confluence Cloud pages. Affected users may see 'Error loading the extension!' messages or notice that certain macros are missing from the editor's extension selection menu. Viewing published pages is not affected. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 2026年5月26日 UTC 11:58investigating

   We are actively investigating an issue affecting the editing macros in Confluence Cloud editor. Our team is working to identify the root cause. We will provide an update within approximately one hour.

3. 2026年5月26日 UTC 13:55resolved

   Between 08:30 UTC and 13:51 UTC on 26 May 2026, some users were unable to load or edit certain macros in the Confluence Cloud page editor. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and macro functionality has been fully restored.

1. 2026年5月14日 UTC 04:54investigating

   We are investigating an issue with multiple Atlassian products that is impacting a large number of Confluence and Jira Cloud customers. We are continuing to investigate and will add further details about additional impact as our investigation continues. We will provide more details within the next hour or sooner if further information becomes available

2. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:03investigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

3. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:11identified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

4. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:24identified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

5. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:34identified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

6. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:43monitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

7. 2026年5月14日 UTC 06:40monitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

8. 2026年5月14日 UTC 06:41monitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

9. 2026年5月14日 UTC 06:48resolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

10. 2026年5月19日 UTC 19:04postmortem

    ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 2026年5月8日 UTC 01:31investigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 2026年5月8日 UTC 04:10identified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 2026年5月8日 UTC 04:10identified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 2026年5月8日 UTC 04:10identified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 2026年5月8日 UTC 05:53monitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 2026年5月8日 UTC 08:03monitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 2026年5月8日 UTC 11:12monitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 2026年5月8日 UTC 19:45resolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 2026年5月20日 UTC 06:55postmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 2026年4月14日 UTC 12:25investigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Rovo, specifically for customers using automation rules that invoke Rovo agents. Some customers may find that these automations are not completing as expected. We'll share updates here as more information becomes available.

2. 2026年4月14日 UTC 12:25investigating

   We have identified that this incident also affects automation rules in Confluence that use Rovo agents. We are investigating and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. 2026年4月14日 UTC 14:11identified

   We have identified the issue, and our teams are working to resolve it and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as they become available.

4. 2026年4月14日 UTC 15:46monitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 2026年4月14日 UTC 16:11resolved

   On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年4月13日 UTC 07:29monitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 2026年4月13日 UTC 08:33monitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 2026年4月13日 UTC 10:17resolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 2026年4月21日 UTC 02:33postmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年4月8日 UTC 06:01investigating

   The impact of this incident is now understood to also be impacting search in Jira and Confluence, as well as additional downstream impacts to Rovo Chat, User Management, Administration and Guard. Our team is continuing to investigate with urgency and we will provide further update within 1 hour.

2. 2026年4月8日 UTC 06:25investigating

   Our team is aware that users are currently experiencing errors while attempting to search in Confluence and Jira. Our team is investigating with urgency and will be providing an update within 1 hour.

3. 2026年4月8日 UTC 07:40identified

   Confluence and Jira search reliability is improving, and we expect full recovery shortly; we will continue to closely monitor the services to ensure they remain stable.

4. 2026年4月8日 UTC 08:33identified

   We have restored core search functionality and services are operating again, but some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour while new data continues to be indexed. We are actively working to complete reindexing and will update this page as performance fully recovers.

5. 2026年4月8日 UTC 09:03identified

   We are also aware of impact as a result of these search failures to Customer Service Management, Asset Reports, Jira Service Management and dashboards within Focus. Our team have identified the potential root cause of the issue and our teams are working with urgency on a resolution. We will provide further update within 1 hour.

6. 2026年4月8日 UTC 09:03monitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally. Some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour, while new data continues to be indexed. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

7. 2026年4月8日 UTC 11:43resolved

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

8. 2026年4月17日 UTC 16:24postmortem

   ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年3月12日 UTC 13:38investigating

   Confluence Cloud users may experience errors when accessing certain Marketplace macros. Affected customers are seeing the message Error rendering macro 'static-macro': Page loading failed. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner.

2. 2026年3月12日 UTC 13:38identified

   Our team has identified the cause of this issue, and a fix is currently being deployed. We are monitoring the deployment, and we will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner if needed.

3. 2026年3月13日 UTC 00:26resolved

   On March 12, 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年3月10日 UTC 00:15investigating

   We are aware of customers experiencing delays with their automations within Jira, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Jira Product Discovery and Confluence. Our team is investigating with urgency and we will provide an update within one hour.

2. 2026年3月10日 UTC 00:15identified

   Our team has now identified the cause of this issue relating to delayed automation events and has put a hotfix in place to help restore automation performance. We will continue to monitor performance as the backlog of issues is now being processed.

3. 2026年3月10日 UTC 00:51monitoring

   The performance degradation of automations has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 2026年3月10日 UTC 00:59resolved

   On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年2月20日 UTC 04:14identified

   Customers using Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours as we continue our investigation.

2. 2026年2月20日 UTC 12:26identified

   We understand that customers using Customer Service Management, Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours or sooner based on significant progress.

3. 2026年2月20日 UTC 12:26resolved

   This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.