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    Exalate 中断历史

    54 Exalate incidents · 2021年12月 — official updates, affected components, duration and resolution details.

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    阿特拉斯西安有个活动事件 可能会影响你的连接

    开始时间 2026年8月27日 UTC 04:36 · 51m

    Pending
    受影响的组件
    Synchronisation node
    1. 2026年8月27日 UTC 04:36investigating

      阿特拉斯西亚目前遇到Jira和其他系统的问题,详情如下:https://status.atlassian.com/ 如果您正在连接 Jira 实例, 这将影响您的 Explate 连接 .

    2. 2026年8月27日 UTC 04:44identified

      这一问题已经确定,一个解决办法正在实施之中.

    3. 2026年8月27日 UTC 05:09monitoring

      Atlassian已经制定了解决问题的办法。 您的同步应该已经恢复正常, 但请伸出援手,以防出现任何问题.

    4. 2026年8月27日 UTC 05:27resolved

      所有阿特拉斯系统都恢复正常,同步工作如期进行. 如有问题请制作支持票 我们很乐意协助.

    5. 2026年9月8日 UTC 05:41postmortem

      不详

    自动翻译自官方事件更新。

    Atlassian Jira Cloud上的应用名称更改/代理用户

    开始时间 2026年7月24日 UTC 06:12 · 10h 21m

    Issues轻微事件
    受影响的组件
    Synchronisation node
    1. 2026年7月24日 UTC 06:12identified

      跟进未公告的应用程序名称更改,导致代理用户以应用程序的全名显示,而不只是"Explate". 这已通知阿特拉斯西亚人,我们正在等待他们采取必要行动,以恢复这一变化。 影响:Exlate所做的更新将显示"为Jira(双向同步)的exlate Classic Connector"作为用户进行更改.

    2. 2026年7月24日 UTC 09:15identified

      在Atlassian的支持下,我们继续研究解决这一问题的最佳办法.

    3. 2026年7月24日 UTC 12:39identified

      我们正与阿特拉斯组织一道积极努力,尽快确定解决这一问题的最佳办法.

    4. 2026年7月24日 UTC 15:47identified

      我们正与阿特拉斯组织一道积极努力,尽快确定解决这一问题的最佳办法。 我们将在6小时内或一旦掌握任何相关信息后立即提供下一次最新情况.

    5. 2026年7月24日 UTC 16:33resolved

      代理用户名被恢复到Exalate 。 我们认为这一事件已经解决.

    自动翻译自官方事件更新。

    JiraCloud 节点经历了一些不稳定

    开始时间 2026年7月16日 UTC 11:28 · 5h 50m

    Issues轻微事件
    受影响的组件
    Synchronisation node
    1. 2026年7月16日 UTC 11:28investigating

      一些Jira Cloud节点在过去30分钟里正经历着不稳定. 问题有限,只影响到一些客户。 我们将很快提供最新情况.

    2. 2026年7月16日 UTC 12:03identified

      我们将采取行动改变Exalate Cloud,以提高稳定性。 对您的节点的影响将仅限于重新开始, 节点在几分钟内无法使用 。 造成不便是令人遗憾的.

    3. 2026年7月16日 UTC 13:38identified

      节点的滚动重启正在进行中. 你会在JCloud节点上经历短暂的重启. 我们会随时通知你进展.

    4. 2026年7月16日 UTC 15:15identified

      重新启动仍在进行中,没有任何问题。 完成后,我们将尽快向你通报最新情况.

    5. 2026年7月16日 UTC 15:57monitoring

      所有节点恢复正常运行. 我们继续密切监测局势.

    6. 2026年7月16日 UTC 17:18resolved

      经过密切监测,该问题被认为已完全解决。 我们将在适当的时候在这里张贴RCA.

    7. 2026年10月25日 UTC 12:22postmortem

      ** 事件:** JiraCloud 穿透不稳定的节点——2026年7月16日 ** 期限:** 12:28 CET – 16:57 CET\(约4.5小时\). 18:18CET证实完全稳定. ** 影响:** 一些Jira Cloud集成节点在这一窗口中经历了间歇性的不稳定. 通常~10个节点同时受到影响. 在未受影响的节点上发布同步继续正常运行。 没有丢失数据 。 ** 摘要:** 2026年7月16日,Exalate Cloud平台上的一些Jira Cloud集成节点经历了间歇性重启和超时. 其根源是对其中一个基本托管服务器的资源制约。 一次偶然的软件更新最初针对应用层进行了调查,但交叉环境分析证实,其他基础设施上的节点没有受到影响——将问题缩小为单一的主机服务器. ** 时间线:** * 12:28 CET - 发现问题并开始调查 * 13:03 CET -- -- 实施稳定措施,启动滚动重新启动 * 16:57 CET - 所有节点恢复正常运行 * 18:18 CET - 完全稳定 ** 循环原因:** 由于例行软件更新周期工作量集中,一个主机服务器达到了资源上限. 这造成断断续续的资源饿死 运行在服务器上的节点。 ** 决议:** 整个主机基础设施重新分配了工作量,以平衡资源利用。 所有受影响的节点都恢复了,没有丢失数据。 ** 预防措施:** * 已对基础设施资源利用实施主动警告阈值 * 已重新平衡各主机服务器的工作量分配,以防止集中 我们为中断道歉。 我们仍然致力于增强平台的可靠性.

    自动翻译自官方事件更新。

    Jira Cloud 伪造应用软件的 Explate 循环同步

    开始时间 2026年7月13日 UTC 22:15 · 1d 0h

    Outage严重事件
    受影响的组件
    Synchronisation node
    1. 2026年7月13日 UTC 22:15investigating

      我们收到多起关于同步回路的报告 更新到新的Jira Cloud 伪造应用程序后 我们的初步调查让我们相信,由于代理用户账户的改变,这种情况正在发生. 我们正在积极努力确定根源,并落实一个解决办法.

    2. 2026年7月13日 UTC 23:48investigating

      我们继续与我们的工程师调查这一问题,以确定其根源.

    3. 2026年7月14日 UTC 04:58identified

      根源已经查明,我们正在设法解决问题。 请在一小时内再更新一次.

    4. 2026年7月14日 UTC 07:05identified

      目前正在验证这一办法,以找到最佳前进办法。 我们将在一小时内提供另一个最新情况.

    5. 2026年7月14日 UTC 08:11identified

      不幸的是,对固定装置的测试揭示出一个出乎意料的问题,我们现在正在对固定装置进行微调,以确保它包括所有可能使用的案例。 一小时后会有最新消息.

    6. 2026年7月14日 UTC 09:09identified

      新的固定装置已经建立,初步测试很有希望。 我们在 " 质量评估 " 中深处有新的解决办法,并将在一小时内提供有关结果的最新情况。 造成不便是令人遗憾的.

    7. 2026年7月14日 UTC 10:11identified

      我们仍然在测试修补方法,结果仍然很好。 我们即将完成这项工作。 下一次更新将在1小时内完成.

    8. 2026年7月14日 UTC 11:39identified

      修复工作已经就绪,我们正在制定部署办法,对客户的影响最小。 它将有系统地向所有客户推广。 我们将在下一个小时内提供有关部署的最新情况.

    9. 2026年7月14日 UTC 12:51identified

      我们已经对一些选定的客户进行了修复,并进一步确认了结果。 大众推广计划正在进行中。 我们将在下一个小时内向你们通报进展.

    10. 2026年7月14日 UTC 14:24identified

      我们仍在进行补丁部署,发放工作正在进行额外的质量保证验证(需要全面部署)。 我们期望在一小时内得到下一次更新.

    11. 2026年7月14日 UTC 16:11identified

      质检和测试所需时间比预期的略长,但我们预计在下个小时内开始部署. 在开始之前我们会给你更新.

    12. 2026年7月14日 UTC 17:41monitoring

      热接器的部署:Exalate Classic 5.35.4 -- -- Jira Cloud,正在进行(https://community.exalate.com/t/jira-cloud-version-5-35-4/8215)。 对任何异常情况都密切监测部署情况。 我们一小时后给你更新.

    13. 2026年7月14日 UTC 18:55monitoring

      部署工作继续进行。 一旦完成,我们将适时向你通报最新情况.

    14. 2026年7月14日 UTC 22:14resolved

      部署工作已顺利完成,所报告的问题已完全解决。 详细的RCA将在适当时候出版.

    15. 2026年7月28日 UTC 20:00postmortem

      ** 影响:** 在基础设施迁移到阿特拉斯西亚的福吉平台后,Jira Cloud连接的一些经典外延经历了反复重复的同步。 在受影响的连接上,客户看到: * ** 重复活动** ——同步循环对一个问题反复适用相同的更新、评论或字段更改。 * ** 重新开放/重新出现问题**——已关闭的问题重新开放,其他地位或实地价值在对等问题之间相互重叠。 * 因重复变动而导致的盘点和报告**。 * ** Broken 自动化和工作流程验证** — 因为集成用户名\ (和基础ID\) 更改, 客户端- 侧 Jira 自动化规则和工作流程验证器 引用“ exlate” 用户名时不再按配置方式行事 。 * ** 阻塞或失败同步**,有时连接会下降,需要人工重试或恢复. * 增加各小组的手动努力** 以解开同步并纠正所受影响的问题。 并非所有客户都受到影响——影响取决于连接配置。 最被曝光的是先前在"Explate"原始身份下创建或更新的本地连接和问题,然后被被被更名的身份所触摸. ** 摘要:** 作为将Jira Cloud的 Classic Explate 移动到 Atlassian 的 Forge 平台的一部分,为 Explate 内部的集成用户所显示的名称已更改为\ (从"Explate"变为更长的变体\). Exalate使用这个名称来识别自己的更新并避免它们重新同步. 一旦名称被更改,app就不再识别自己在受影响的连接上的写作,并重新处理这些连接,仿佛它们是新的外部变化——每个写入会触发另一个同步,产生循环. 同样的身份更改也打破了客户自动化和验证,这些验证引用了"exlate"用户的名字. ** 决议:** 一个补丁\(5.35.4\),用稳定的用户标识符而不是显示名称来确认Exlate自己的更新,在受影响的客户环境中被验证,并部署在Jira Cloud车队。 部署完成后,同步工作恢复正常。 阿特拉斯西安此后恢复并确认了集成用户名"Explate",现在稳定了——修复自动化器按名称引用. 在循环产生重复或重新开放项目的地方,我们正在与受影响的客户合作,以查明和纠正受影响的问题。 ** 预防措施:** 循环预防不再依赖于可改变的显示名称;我们正在围绕平台驱动的更改和app更新,增加一个影响审查和通知步骤,以及自动检测同步循环和数据库饱和度,因此恢复不依赖于客户报告。 我们对干扰表示歉意,并继续致力于Exalate平台的可靠性.

    自动翻译自官方事件更新。

    Excate.app不是装入连接.

    开始时间 2026年6月23日 UTC 09:10 · 3h 37m

    Outage重大事件
    受影响的组件
    Exalate.app
    1. 2026年6月23日 UTC 09:10investigating

      我们目前正在调查一个问题,试图从exalate装入连接。 应用页面得到错误 。 连接和同步不受出局影响,它们仍在工作,但目前无法从出局时看到或修改连接. 应用页面. 我们将在2小时内提供最新情况.

    2. 2026年6月23日 UTC 09:26monitoring

      这个问题已经得到解决。 Exalate Dashboard不恢复在线稳定. 我们将继续监测该系统.

    3. 2026年6月23日 UTC 12:47resolved

      这一事件已经得到解决.

    4. 2026年7月7日 UTC 08:49postmortem

      ** 期限:** 11:10 CEST - 11:26 CEST\(约16分钟\). 14:47CEST确认完全稳定. ** 影响:** Exalate.app连接和仪表板页面在此窗口无法访问。 问题同步没有受到影响 -- -- 一体化继续在整个过程中正常进行。 没有丢失数据 。 ** 摘要:** 2026年6月23日,Exalate.app接口在内部认证组件无法连接到其数据库后变得无法访问. 失败的原因是在生产部署期间出现了证书不匹配。 ** 时间线:** * 11:10 CEST - 发现问题,开始调查 * 11:26 CEST - 安装了固定设备,恢复了服务 * 14:47 CEST - 完全稳定 ** 循环原因:** 在6月19日的一次出品部署中,一个数据库证书在两个系统中独立配置. 在随后的配置更新中引入了微妙的错配. 由于应用程序维持了现有的数据库连接,这种不匹配现象仍然有可能发生。 6月23日的例行GKE维护事件将应用程序再生,迫使新的连接暴露出错配. ** 决议:** 数据库证书被对齐,应用程序被重新启动. 服务恢复全面运行,没有丢失数据. ** 预防措施:** * 部署后核证核查已纳入部署运行簿 * 已对应用程序数据库连接失败发出警报 * 正在合并证书配置程序,以消除双系统错配风险 我们为中断道歉。 我们仍然致力于增强平台的可靠性.

    自动翻译自官方事件更新。

    无法解开云节点

    开始时间 2026年5月4日 UTC 13:24 · 8h 3m

    Issues轻微事件
    受影响的组件
    connect.exalate.cloudHosting platformconnect.exalate.net (mapper)
    1. 2026年5月4日 UTC 13:24investigating

      有报告显示,一些极地云节点无法使用。 我们的小组目前正在调查这个问题.

    2. 2026年5月4日 UTC 13:42investigating

      我们正在继续调查这一问题.

    3. 2026年5月4日 UTC 14:50identified

      我们的云层小组已经查明了根源,并正在积极地进行纠正.

    4. 2026年5月4日 UTC 15:53identified

      受影响的节点正在恢复,而我们的云层小组继续研究这个问题.

    5. 2026年5月4日 UTC 18:50monitoring

      所有节点都已投入使用,我们的云层小组继续审查受影响的集群并进行维护工作.

    6. 2026年5月4日 UTC 21:28resolved

      该系统一直受到密切观察,并一直保持稳定。 我们将适时为事件提供尸检.

    7. 2026年10月25日 UTC 10:27postmortem

      ** 事件:** Excate Cloud服务中断 - 2026年5月4日 ** 期限:** 10:45 – 22:10 CEST\(约11小时25分,间歇\) ** 影响:** 在我们的一个欧洲集群上,几百个超高云节点在工作日中一再无法到达。 在这些窗口内没有运行受影响的节点上的同步,每次返回服务时都会自动恢复。 其他集群未受影响。 没有丢失数据,也不需要采取客户行动。 ** 摘要:** 2026年5月4日,服务于这些节点的数据库丢失了备用复制品,留下了一例包含全部流量. 它的存储与另一个工作量共用了一个物理设备,在负载下产生的争议减速磁盘写得足够我们自动健康检查超时. 平台将超时处理为故障并重启了繁忙而非被打碎的数据库,每次都切断了该集群上的节点. ** 时间线:** * 10:45 CEST——节点报告无法到达,开始调查 * 15:24 CEST——向我国现状网页宣布并公布的事件 * 22:10 CEST——备用复制品恢复,集群确认健康 ** 循环原因:** 在共用物理设备上的存储争议导致体检超时,导致自动重启。 备用复制件的再造也放大了同样的争论,因为流出数据库的复制件从仍服务于客户的例子中抽取了磁盘吞吐量。 ** 决议:** 存储被移到专用设备上,额外分配了CPU,并且磁盘吞吐量在主机上提高,同时故意限制复制品,因此重建时会更温和地绘制出数据. ** 预防措施:** 我们正在将数据库存储与整个环境中的其他工作量分开,重新调整健康检查阈值,从而不重新启动一个负重但健康负荷下的数据库,平行地走节点恢复路径来缩短恢复,并在到达客户之前增加主机级监测的争议警报。 我们为干扰道歉。 我们仍然致力于增强平台的可靠性.

    自动翻译自官方事件更新。

    Exalate.app (英语). 不装入工作空间

    开始时间 2026年4月15日 UTC 09:03 · 3h 13m

    Outage重大事件
    受影响的组件
    Exalate.app
    1. 2026年4月15日 UTC 09:03investigating

      我们正在调查一个工作空间页面没有加载的问题。 同步不受影响, 只有 New Exlate 的 UI 不装入 .

    2. 2026年4月15日 UTC 09:04identified

      我们查明了问题的根源,目前正在设法解决问题.

    3. 2026年4月15日 UTC 10:16monitoring

      技术问题已完全解决,该应用程序现已启动并运行。 我们正在密切监测局势.

    4. 2026年4月15日 UTC 12:16resolved

      应用程序运行顺利,没有任何问题,我们没有发现任何异常现象。 将在适当时候提供尸检.

    5. 2026年7月7日 UTC 12:41postmortem

      ** 事件:** 不装入工作空间 - 2026年4月15日 ** 期限:** 11:03 CEST – 12:16 CEST\(约73分\). ** 影响:** 此窗口无法访问 Exalate. app UI 。 问题同步没有受到影响。 没有丢失数据 。 **摘要:** 2026年4月15日,Exalate.app接口在计划基础设施认证更新后变得无法访问. 二次配置依赖没有作为变化的一部分更新,使应用程序无法连接到数据库。 ** 时间线:** * 11:03 CEST - 发现问题,开始调查 * 11:04 CEST - 查明的根源 * 12:16 CEST - 安装了固定装置,恢复服务 ** 循环原因:** 在证书更新中丢失了配置依赖性, 使得应用程序无法认证到数据库 。 这与4月6日事件有关;现已查明其他依赖性,并将其纳入轮调程序。 ** 决议:** 受影响的配置被重新生成并重新启动应用程序. 服务恢复全面运行,没有丢失数据. ** 预防措施:** * 所有证书依赖关系都已经充分绘制,并更新了旋转程序,以涵盖单一原子操作 我们为中断道歉。 我们仍然致力于增强平台的可靠性.

    自动翻译自官方事件更新。

    Exalate.app (英语). 不装入工作空间

    开始时间 2026年4月6日 UTC 11:07 · 4h 24m

    Outage重大事件
    受影响的组件
    Exalate.app
    1. 2026年4月6日 UTC 11:07investigating

      我们目前正在调查一个问题,因为工作空间没有装入信息。 同步不受影响, 但来自 New Exalate 的 UI 没有加载 .

    2. 2026年4月6日 UTC 11:28monitoring

      我们已经确定并实施了解决办法。 Exalate.app目前正在运作,并如所期望的那样运作,我们将继续监测局势并很快提供最新情况.

    3. 2026年4月6日 UTC 15:31resolved

      这一事件已经得到解决.

    4. 2026年7月7日 UTC 12:30postmortem

      ** 事件:** 未装入工作空间 - 2026年4月6日 ** 期限:**13:07 CEST - 13:28 CEST\(约21分钟\). ** 影响:** 此窗口无法访问 Exalate. app UI 。 问题同步没有受到影响 -- -- 一体化继续在整个过程中正常进行。 没有丢失数据 。 ** 摘要:** 2026年4月6日,Exalate.app接口作为计划中的安全改进方案的一部分,在基础设施证书被旋转后变得无法访问. 负责数据库连通性缓存的组件在启动时会获取证书,不会自动再加载. 之前的证书在组件重启取出新的证书之前被移除,导致认证失败. ** 时间线:** * 13:07 CEST - 发现问题,展开调查 * 13:28 CEST -- -- 已安装固定设备,恢复服务 ** 循环原因:** 完成从序列中取出证书的旋转——旧证书在消费部分与新部分一起重新启动之前被取出. ** 决议:** 受影响的部分以正确的证书重新开始。 服务恢复全面运行,没有丢失数据. ** 预防措施:** * 已建立证书旋转程序,执行强制序列:更新、重新启动消费者、核实、然后去除旧证书 * 正在对数据库连接认证失败进行直接监测 * 正在向自动化证书管理过渡,取消人工轮换这一工作量 我们为中断道歉。 我们仍然致力于增强平台的可靠性.

    自动翻译自官方事件更新。

    目前无法到达一些扩展节点

    开始时间 2026年4月2日 UTC 15:41 · 5h 45m

    Outage重大事件
    受影响的组件
    Exalate for ServiceNow in Exalate CloudSynchronisation nodeFreshserviceExalate ConsoleFreshdeskExalate for SalesForceExalate for Azure DevOpsExalate for GitHub
    1. 2026年4月2日 UTC 15:41investigating

      我们正在调查一些Exalate节点无法使用的问题。 我们将很快提供调查的最新情况。 下一次更新在两小时内 - 或一旦我们有任何相关的更新

    2. 2026年4月2日 UTC 16:37identified

      这一问题已经确定,我们目前正在努力尽快恢复节点。 下一次更新在2小时内或一旦我们收到任何相关的更新

    3. 2026年4月2日 UTC 18:25identified

      我们继续恢复努力。 一些节点已经可用 。 下一次更新将在2小时之内进行,或者在我们得到任何相关更新后立即进行.

    4. 2026年4月2日 UTC 19:18monitoring

      所有节点已成功恢复 。 我们的小组正在密切监测该系统,以确保持续稳定.

    5. 2026年4月2日 UTC 21:26resolved

      这一事件已经得到解决.

    6. 2026年10月25日 UTC 10:25postmortem

      ** 事件:** Excate Cloud服务中断 - 2026年4月2日 ** 期限:** 16:30 — 21:25 CEST\(4小时55分\) ** 影响:** 比利时集群上托管的约60个Exalate Cloud节点无法使用。 这些节点的同步在断电期间没有运行,一旦节点恢复,将自动恢复。 没有丢失数据 。 ** 摘要:** 在内部Kubernetes证书的定期轮换期间,集群中的每个工人节点同时重启其代理. 然后,每个工人同时要求存储的API重新验证其磁盘,同时请求的数量超过了API. 由于存储的API没有响应,受影响的节点无法附加磁盘并保持下线. ** 决议:** 通往存储的API的交通被隔离,部件重新开始清理积压. 随后节点以可控顺序返回服务,一次一个工人,直到所有节点在21:25 CEST上线. ** 预防措施:** 证书旋转程序正在被更改,以便节点重启被分步进行并分批进行,而不是同时执行,这种相距正在被构建到工具中而不是手动应用中. 此外,我们正与我们的基础设施伙伴合作,制定限制存储API的保护费率,修改存储驱动程序,以便节点在当地验证其磁盘,而不是拨打API,并监测API饱和度的警报,以免影响客户。 我们为干扰道歉。 我们仍然致力于增强平台的可靠性.

    自动翻译自官方事件更新。

    Exalate App unavailable

    开始时间 2026年3月16日 UTC 15:13 · 2h 0m

    Issues轻微事件
    受影响的组件
    Exalate.app
    1. 2026年3月16日 UTC 15:13investigating

      We are investigating reports by some users that the Exalate app is not available right now.

    2. 2026年3月16日 UTC 15:56identified

      We have identified the problem and the team is working to rectify this. We will provide an update of progress shortly.

    3. 2026年3月16日 UTC 16:09monitoring

      The services are fully functional again. We are very closely monitoring the situation.

    4. 2026年3月16日 UTC 17:13resolved

      All systems are functional. We will be providing a post-mortem of the incident here in due course.

    5. 2026年3月31日 UTC 09:44postmortem

      **Incident:** Exalate Application Unavailability — March 16, 2026 **Duration:** 16:13 CET – 17:09 CET \(approximately 56 minutes\) **Impact:** The Exalate UI was inaccessible during this window. Issue synchronisation was not affected — integrations continued to run normally throughout. No data was lost. **Summary:** On March 16, 2026, the Exalate application became unavailable following a production infrastructure configuration change. A resource allocation adjustment applied to a critical authentication component proved insufficient under production load, causing repeated service interruptions. **Timeline:** * 16:13 CET — Issue reported, investigation initiated * 16:56 CET — Root cause identified, remediation initiated * 17:09 CET — Fix deployed, service restored * 18:13 CET — Full stability confirmed **Root Cause:** A resource limit adjustment deployed without cross-team review under-provisioned a critical authentication component. Under production load, the platform repeatedly terminated the component, rendering the application inaccessible. **Resolution:** Resource limits were corrected, restoring service. A further optimisation was applied during a subsequent scheduled maintenance window following joint engineering review. **Preventive Measures:** * All production infrastructure configuration changes now require joint sign-off from infrastructure and engineering leads before deployment * Resource and capacity parameters validated against production load baselines prior to deployment

    Exalate Website Unavailable

    开始时间 2026年3月13日 UTC 11:56 · 6h 23m

    Issues轻微事件
    受影响的组件
    Exalate.com website
    1. 2026年3月13日 UTC 11:56investigating

      We are currently investigating an issue causing the Exalate website to be temporarily unavailable. Our team is actively working to identify the root cause and restore access as quickly as possible. This issue is strictly isolated to the Exalate.com webpage. Please note that Exalate.app and individual Nodes are not affected, and there is no impact on active integrations. We will provide an update within 4 hours, or sooner if new information becomes available.

    2. 2026年3月13日 UTC 13:03investigating

      Update: We are continuing to investigate the performance issues affecting Exalate.com. We have identified an ongoing incident with our hosting provider, Hostinger, and are currently verifying the extent of the impact on our services. You can track their status directly here: https://statuspage.hostinger.com We will provide another update as soon as we have more information, or within the next 4 hours.

    3. 2026年3月13日 UTC 14:31monitoring

      We have identified and mitigated the issue that was causing performance degradation and intermittent unavailability of the Exalate.com website. After implementing mitigation measures, the website is now fully accessible and performing as expected. We have confirmed that Exalate.app, individual Nodes, and all active integrations remained unaffected throughout this incident. Our team will continue to monitor the situation closely to ensure continued stability. We will provide further updates only if the situation changes.

    4. 2026年3月13日 UTC 18:19resolved

      This incident has been resolved.

    5. 2026年3月31日 UTC 09:46postmortem

      **Date:** March 17, 2026 **Duration:** 12:10 CET - 15:00 CET \(2 hours, 50 minutes\) **Impact:** The [exalate.com](http://exalate.com) website was completely inaccessible to all users for the duration of the incident. **Summary:** The hosting environment experienced resource exhaustion triggered by a sudden surge in web traffic. This was further exacerbated by a malfunctioning security plugin. **Timeline:** 12:10 CET: Incident start \(resource exhaustion begins\) 12:28 CET: Issue detected 14:40 CET: Root cause identified 15:00 CET: Service fully restored **Root Cause:** A spike in unique visitors has led to resource depletion on the hosting server. During the investigation, it was discovered that an installed security plugin was behaving inefficiently under high load, significantly compounding the CPU and memory usage, preventing the server from recovering. **Resolution:** Identified and blocked specific IP addresses responsible for an anomalous volume of requests. Deactivated and removed the problematic security plugin. Implemented an alternative solution to handle the plugin's core functionality without the performance overhead. **Preventive Measures:** Investigate and implement automated rate-limiting and IP blocking solutions \(e.g., WAF rules\) to handle traffic spikes.

    Some exalate cloud nodes unavailable

    开始时间 2026年3月9日 UTC 06:59 · 2h 1m

    Issues轻微事件
    受影响的组件
    Hosting platform
    1. 2026年3月9日 UTC 06:59investigating

      We have reports of some Exlate cloud nodes being unavailable. Our team is currently investigating the issue.

    2. 2026年3月9日 UTC 07:11identified

      Our cloud team has identified the root cause and is actively engaged in rectifying it.

    3. 2026年3月9日 UTC 07:20monitoring

      The issue has been fully rectified and all nodes are fully restored. We are closely monitoring the situation.

    4. 2026年3月9日 UTC 09:00resolved

      After close monitoring, we consider the issue fully resolved. An RCA would be published here in due course.

    5. 2026年4月1日 UTC 03:39postmortem

      **Incident:** Exalate Cloud Service Disruption - March 9, 2026 **Duration:** 07:30 CET – 08:10 CET \(approximately 40 minutes\) **Impact:** Some Exalate Cloud nodes experienced temporary service disruption. Database write operations were briefly affected. Issue synchronisation resumed automatically once the issue was resolved. No data was lost. **Summary:** On March 9, 2026, the primary database instance serving part of the Exalate Cloud infrastructure reached full storage capacity. This prevented the database from processing write operations, temporarily impacting node availability. **Timeline:** * 07:30 CET - Issue detected, investigation initiated * 08:05 CET - Storage expanded, database operations resumed * 08:10 CET - Fix verified, nodes confirmed operational * 10:00 CET - Full stability confirmed after extended monitoring **Root Cause:** The primary database storage volume gradually reached full capacity under normal operational growth. Proactive storage monitoring did not fire in time. **Resolution:** Database storage was expanded and the service returned to full operation automatically. Additional alerting configured.

    Exalate.app page is not loading.

    开始时间 2026年1月23日 UTC 09:59 · 2h 19m

    Outage严重事件
    受影响的组件
    Exalate.app
    1. 2026年1月23日 UTC 09:59investigating

      We have identify an incident with exalate.app that is currently not loading. We are currently investigating the issue and will be providing updates within the hour. This is not affecting the sync of issues but the UI for exalate is currently unavailable.

    2. 2026年1月23日 UTC 10:18monitoring

      A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

    3. 2026年1月23日 UTC 12:18resolved

      This incident has been resolved.

    4. 2026年3月31日 UTC 09:43postmortem

      **Incident:** Exalate Application Unavailability — January 23, 2026 **Duration:** 10:59 CET – 11:18 CET \(approximately 19 minutes\) **Impact:** The Exalate UI was inaccessible during this window. Issue synchronisation was not affected — integrations continued to run normally throughout. No data was lost. **Summary:** On January 23, 2026, our monitoring detected a service outage affecting the Exalate application. The root cause was a deployment configuration change that unintentionally removed an active compute resource from the production environment. **Timeline:** * 10:59 CET — Issue detected, investigation initiated * 11:18 CET — Fix deployed, service restored * 13:18 CET — Full stability confirmed **Root Cause:** A deployment configuration change targeted the wrong resource section, resulting in an active production compute resource being removed and the application becoming inaccessible. **Resolution:** The affected resource was recreated and all services returned to full operation with no data loss. **Preventive Measures:** * Infrastructure-as-code changes must be validated in a non-production environment before production deployment * Peer review steps introduced to verify configuration targets prior to execution

    Exalate nodes unrachable

    开始时间 2025年12月12日 UTC 16:15 · 12h 11m

    Outage重大事件
    受影响的组件
    Exalate for ServiceNow in Exalate CloudSynchronisation nodeconnect.exalate.cloudExalate.appFreshserviceExalate ConsoleFreshdeskExalate for SalesForceconnect.exalate.net (mapper)Exalate for Azure DevOpsExalate for GitHub
    1. 2025年12月12日 UTC 16:15investigating

      There is an outage on one of the clusters in Exalate cloud that might affect access to the nodes temporarily. We are currently investigating the issue to ensure that service is restored as soon as possible. A new update will be provided within 1 hour

    2. 2025年12月12日 UTC 16:31identified

      We have root caused the issue and the restoration process is underway already. The next update will be provided in 30mins.

    3. 2025年12月12日 UTC 16:58identified

      The recovery process is still ongoing. We will provide an update within an hour.

    4. 2025年12月12日 UTC 19:11identified

      We continue to work on the restoration of the affected nodes. We will be providing a new update in one hour.

    5. 2025年12月12日 UTC 20:20identified

      Nodes are being restored now, most nodes are now online, a full operational message will be posted once all nodes are back online.

    6. 2025年12月13日 UTC 01:51identified

      Most nodes are back on operational status, a full operational message will be posted once all nodes are back.

    7. 2025年12月13日 UTC 02:56monitoring

      All nodes are back to operational status now. We continue to monitor the stability closely.

    8. 2025年12月13日 UTC 04:26resolved

      All Exalate nodes are stable and working normally. A post-mortem for the incident will be published in due course.

    9. 2025年12月22日 UTC 04:43postmortem

      **Incident: Service Outage - December 12, 2025** **Duration:** 16:35 CET - 03:01 CET \(approximately 10 hours\) **Impact:** A significant number of Exalate Cloud nodes experienced service unavailability, resulting in temporary disruption to data synchronization services. No data was lost during this incident. **Summary:** On December 12, 2025, our infrastructure monitoring detected a service outage affecting Exalate Cloud customers on our production clusters. The root cause was identified as a storage system failure triggered by network latency on a legacy infrastructure component, which caused storage connectivity issues for customer workloads. **Timeline:** * 16:35 CET - Issue detected by monitoring systems * 17:31 CET - Root cause identified, restoration initiated * 21:20 CET - Majority of nodes restored to service * 03:01 CET - Full service restoration confirmed **Root Cause:** A storage management component became unresponsive due to elevated network latency caused by a legacy networking layer. This resulted in storage disconnection for customer workloads. **Resolution:** The storage system was restored, all affected workloads were rescheduled, and the external dependency was updated to a supported version. All nodes were returned to full operation with no data loss. **Preventive Measures:** * Deploying patches to address the storage component stability issue * Accelerating migration away from the legacy networking layer to modern infrastructure * Implementing internal mirroring of critical external dependencies to eliminate reliance on third-party availability * Enhancing operational safeguards for infrastructure management procedures We sincerely apologize for the disruption this incident caused. Our team remains committed to improving the reliability and resilience of the Exalate Cloud platform.

    Some Exalate nodes are unavailable

    开始时间 2025年11月27日 UTC 11:47 · 19h 22m

    Outage重大事件
    受影响的组件
    Hosting platform
    1. 2025年11月27日 UTC 11:47investigating

      We are investigating reports of some Exalate nodes being unavailable. We will be providing an update shortly on the investigation.

    2. 2025年11月27日 UTC 12:33identified

      We have identified the problem and are working to restore full service as soon as possible.

    3. 2025年11月27日 UTC 13:47identified

      Most nodes are currently running but we are still experiencing intermittent service failures. The full fix is being implemented now.

    4. 2025年11月27日 UTC 15:31monitoring

      All nodes are back online and we are closely monitoring the cluster health.

    5. 2025年11月27日 UTC 16:51identified

      We have detected some instability again and are investigating why some nodes are not reachable again.

    6. 2025年11月27日 UTC 20:48identified

      All nodes are now back online and our team is working on stabilizing the services

    7. 2025年11月27日 UTC 22:04monitoring

      All nodes are now fully operational. Any communication error reported in the console should now disappear after hitting "Resolve and retry". If you encounter any further problem please reach out to our support team. We continue to monitor the cluster closely and investigate to root cause the incident.

    8. 2025年11月28日 UTC 07:08resolved

      We have closely monitored the health of the affected Exalate nodes, and they are all performing as per expectation. A post-mortem of the incident will be published in due course.

    9. 2025年12月12日 UTC 12:02postmortem

      **Incident: Service Degradation - November 27, 2025** **Duration:** 11:26 CET - 21:37 CET \(~10 hours\) **Impact:** Approximately 700 Exalate Cloud nodes experienced intermittent connectivity issues, resulting in temporary disruption to data synchronization services. No data was lost during this incident. **Summary:** On November 27, 2025, our infrastructure monitoring detected service degradation affecting a subset of Exalate Cloud customers. The root cause was identified as storage I/O contention on the underlying database infrastructure, which caused the primary database to become unresponsive intermittently. **Timeline:** * 11:26 CET - Issue detected by monitoring systems * 11:30 CET - Engineering team began investigation * 15:30 CET - Initial mitigation applied \(infrastructure scaling\) * 18:30 CET - Root cause identified and permanent remediation initiated * 21:37 CET - Full service restoration confirmed **Root Cause:** Database storage was experiencing resource contention due to shared infrastructure components, causing elevated I/O latency. This triggered automated health checks to restart the database service repeatedly, compounding the connectivity issues. **Resolution:** The database was migrated to dedicated storage resources and allocated additional compute capacity. All affected nodes were restored to full operation with no data loss. **Preventive Measures:** * Implementing enhanced storage latency monitoring and alerting * Reviewing infrastructure health check configurations for database workloads * Auditing storage allocation across all database clusters to prevent similar contention We apologize for any inconvenience this incident may have caused. Our team remains committed to maintaining the reliability and performance of the Exalate Cloud platform.

    SyncRoom website and Community not loading.

    开始时间 2025年11月20日 UTC 09:43 · 1h 40m

    Issues轻微事件
    受影响的组件
    Exalate for ServiceNow in Exalate CloudSynchronisation nodeFreshserviceExalate SupportExalate ConsoleFreshdeskExalate for SalesForceExalate for Azure DevOpsExalate for GitHub
    1. 2025年11月20日 UTC 09:43identified

      We have identified an issue when trying to access the SyncRoom page, caused by a significant increase in DNS traffic originating from an external problem between Hostinger and Cloudflare. This external issue is currently impacting our service and is preventing the SyncRoom page and the community from loading Important Note: This issue does not affect the core Exalate functionality. Synchronization is continuing to work as expected. We are actively working to resolve this and will provide an update within the next two hours. Thank you for your patience.

    2. 2025年11月20日 UTC 10:29monitoring

      A fix has been implemented by Hostinger and the services have been restored (Exalate community and SyncRoom) We will continue to monitor the results.

    3. 2025年11月20日 UTC 11:23resolved

      This incident has been resolved.

    4. 2026年4月1日 UTC 04:08postmortem

      timeout

    Some Exalate nodes down (specially on Jira Cloud)

    开始时间 2025年10月4日 UTC 06:18 · 36m

    Outage重大事件
    受影响的组件
    Synchronisation node
    1. 2025年10月4日 UTC 06:18investigating

      We are investigating reports of users unable to access the Exalate console on some systems. We will be providing an update soon.

    2. 2025年10月4日 UTC 06:30monitoring

      The problem has been identified and the fix has been put in place.

    3. 2025年10月4日 UTC 06:54resolved

      The issue is fully resolved and all nodes are operational. A post-mortem will be provided here in due course.

    4. 2025年11月14日 UTC 12:23postmortem

      ## **Summary** On October 4, 2025, Exalate Cloud experienced an issue that caused some Exalate nodes to become temporarily inaccessible at 04:00 CEST. This resulted in UI access issues and potential synchronization interruptions for part of our customer base. All services were fully restored by 09:00 CEST. ## **Impact** Customers using Exalate cloud nodes experienced: * Inability to access nodes * Sync failures or delays * Temporary disruption of workflow automations No data loss occurred. ## **Root Cause** There was an error in the certification renewal process. This prevented affected nodes from completing required secure connections, making them temporarily unreachable. ## **Resolution** After identifying the cause, the certificate was renewed and deployed. Services began recovering immediately and full functionality was validated shortly thereafter. ## **Preventive Measures** We are implementing several improvements to prevent recurrence, including: * Expanded automated monitoring for certificate validity * Additional service health checks, including customer-facing endpoints * Automated renewal processes for critical certificates * Strengthened operational procedures around certificate lifecycle management

    Jira Cloud: Script Configuration Update Available

    开始时间 2025年10月3日 UTC 09:43 · 33d 4h

    Issues轻微事件
    受影响的组件
    Synchronisation node
    1. 2025年10月3日 UTC 09:43monitoring

      We've released a configuration update for Jira Cloud connections running version 5.28.5. Who is affected: Customers using external script repositories in their Jira Cloud connections may experience script-related errors after upgrading to 5.28.5. Resolution: If you're experiencing issues with your scripts, please contact our support team at [email protected] - we'll assist you with a quick configuration update. Status: We're actively monitoring and reaching out to affected customers.

    2. 2025年11月5日 UTC 14:17resolved

      This incident has been resolved.

    3. 2026年4月1日 UTC 04:09postmortem

      timeout

    Some Exalate nodes unavailable

    开始时间 2025年9月24日 UTC 10:56 · 1d 3h

    Outage重大事件
    受影响的组件
    Exalate for ServiceNow in Exalate CloudSynchronisation nodeFreshserviceExalate ConsoleFreshdeskExalate for SalesForceExalate for Azure DevOpsExalate for GitHub
    1. 2025年9月24日 UTC 10:56investigating

      There is an outage on one of the clusters in Exalate cloud that might affect access to the nodes temporarily. We are currently investigating the issue to ensure that service is restored as soon as possible.

    2. 2025年9月24日 UTC 11:18identified

      We have root caused the issue and the restoration process is underway already. The next update will be provided in 30mins.

    3. 2025年9月24日 UTC 11:47identified

      The recovery process is still ongoing. We will provide an update within an hour.

    4. 2025年9月24日 UTC 13:00monitoring

      All nodes are fully recovered. We continue to closely monitor the situation.

    5. 2025年9月24日 UTC 14:50identified

      Our monitoring uncovered a problem still lingering with the cluster. We are working to restore full functionality as soon as possible.

    6. 2025年9月24日 UTC 16:56identified

      Node recovery has presented some challenges and is taking longer than expected. We continue to strive to bring all nodes back online as soon as possible. Next update will be provided within 2 hours.

    7. 2025年9月24日 UTC 18:47identified

      Infrastructure component failures have been addressed by our Engineering team. Next step: We are restarting the individual Exalate nodes impacted by the failure. More information will be provided in an hour.

    8. 2025年9月24日 UTC 19:54identified

      We continue restarting the individual Exalate nodes impacted by the failure. 5% of the affected nodes have been brought back online. Further updates to be expected in an hour

    9. 2025年9月24日 UTC 20:51identified

      The team is actively working through the restart sequence for all individual Exalate nodes. This is a deliberate, multi-step process to ensure stability upon full restoration. Further updates to be expected in an hour.

    10. 2025年9月24日 UTC 21:45identified

      Following the deliberate, multi-step sequence, the engineering team has now moved into the main restoration phase. We are actively scaling up the restart of the affected Exalate nodes. We'll continue to monitor stability closely. We will provide the next update in one hour.

    11. 2025年9月24日 UTC 22:49identified

      The engineering team continue working on the main restoration phase. We'll continue to monitor stability closely. Further updates to be expected in an hour

    12. 2025年9月24日 UTC 23:50identified

      During the scale-up phase, the restoration process has presented some challenges that are taking longer than initially expected to resolve. The engineering team is actively working to address these stability issues. We will provide the next update within one hour.

    13. 2025年9月25日 UTC 00:48identified

      The previous technical challenges have been addressed. We have re-initiated the scale-up of the Exalate nodes and are closely monitoring the environment for stability. We will provide the next update within one hour.

    14. 2025年9月25日 UTC 01:44identified

      We are continuing the scale-up of the Exalate nodes. The team is maintaining a close monitoring posture to ensure stability throughout this process. We will provide the next update in one hour.

    15. 2025年9月25日 UTC 03:23monitoring

      All nodes are fully restored and functioning normally now. We continue to monitor the cluster carefully to ensure stability.

    16. 2025年9月25日 UTC 14:21resolved

      We have extensively monitored the cluster health and there have been no outstanding issues found.

    17. 2025年10月10日 UTC 10:41postmortem

      ## Executive Summary On September 24, 2025, Exalate experienced a service interruption lasting 17 hours and 28 minutes that affected our cloud-hosted integration nodes. During this time, customers were unable to synchronize data between their integrated systems. **No customer data was lost.** We sincerely apologize for the inconvenience and want to share what happened and how we're preventing future issues. ## What Happened **Timeline:** * **10:02 UTC \(Sept 24\):** Infrastructure issue detected through customer reports * **13:00 UTC:** Partial service restoration achieved * **13:45 UTC:** Secondary technical issue caused complete service unavailability * **17:24 UTC:** Core infrastructure restored * **21:00 UTC:** Priority customer services online * **03:30 UTC \(Sept 25\):** Full service restoration completed **Root Cause:** A network connectivity issue on our hosting platform triggered a cascading infrastructure failure. The recovery process was complex due to database resilience challenges and infrastructure management system complications. ## Customer Impact **During the outage:** * Data synchronization between systems \(Jira, ServiceNow, etc.\) was unavailable * Automated workflow processes were temporarily halted **What was NOT affected:** * **No customer data was lost or corrupted** * All existing synchronized data remained intact * Customer configurations and sync histories were preserved ## Our Response We immediately activated our 24/7 incident response team, maintained continuous status page updates, directly contacted Enterprise customers, and coordinated with infrastructure providers throughout the recovery. ## Prevention Measures We're implementing comprehensive improvements on an accelerated timeline: **Immediate \(October 2025\):** * Enhanced infrastructure monitoring and alerting systems * Comprehensive disaster recovery documentation **Short-term \(November 2025\):** * Infrastructure resilience improvements * Automated recovery procedures * Regular disaster recovery testing **Medium-term \(Q1 2026\):** * Multi-cloud architecture implementation * Advanced predictive monitoring ## Customer Support If you need assistance related to this outage: * **Enterprise Customers:** Use your dedicated support channels * **Standard Support:** Submit tickets through our support portal * **Status Updates:** Monitor our status page for ongoing information We apologize for this service disruption and appreciate your patience. Your trust is essential to our business, and we're committed to earning it through reliable service delivery and continuous improvement.

    Jira Cloud IssueLinks being Removed

    开始时间 2025年8月29日 UTC 16:18 · 6d 19h

    Issues轻微事件
    受影响的组件
    Synchronisation node
    1. 2025年8月29日 UTC 16:18investigating

      We are investigating a problem where IssueLinks are being removed from Jira cloud tickets. Progress and actions will be notified accordingly, if you encountered this problem please reach us on support portal.

    2. 2025年8月29日 UTC 16:57identified

      The issue has been identified and we are performing remediation actions.

    3. 2025年8月29日 UTC 21:04identified

      All nodes have been moved from the affected version and a workaround to remediate the possible effects on issue links is being investigated.

    4. 2025年8月31日 UTC 19:00monitoring

      We identified the affected instances and provided remediation steps to all affected clients to restore the removed links.

    5. 2025年9月5日 UTC 11:56resolved

      The issue affecting Jira Cloud issue links has been fully resolved. A detailed postmortem will be published soon outlining the root cause and preventive measures being implemented.

    6. 2025年9月18日 UTC 06:57postmortem

      # Exalate v5.28 Issue Links Synchronization - Technical Incident Report **Incident Date:** 29/Aug/2025 **Duration:** ~4 hours from detection to rollback completion **Impact:** Issue link synchronization behavior change affecting multiple customer instances **Status:** Resolved with data restoration completed ## Timeline The incident was first detected  on 29/Aug at 17:56 when a customer reported issue links being removed after upgrading to v5.28. Within eight minutes, at 18:04, the support team received multiple similar reports and immediately requested a rollback. The formal incident response was initiated at 18:17, and the rollback process to v5.27.0 began at 18:48. The rollback was completed across all affected instances by 22:12 the same day, approximately four hours after initial detection. Recovery efforts continued over the weekend. On 30/Aug at 09:43, the data restoration team was assembled and began developing recovery procedures. The comprehensive customer communication deployment occurred on 01/Sep at 17:05, providing affected customers with restoration instructions and individualized support. _\(All times CET\)_ ‌ ‌ ## Root Cause Analysis The technical issue stemmed from a synchronization enhancement in v5.28 that compared issue links between source and destination systems. The implementation operated under the assumption that links present on the destination but not on the source represented synchronization inconsistencies requiring removal. This approach failed to distinguish between links managed by Exalate and links created independently outside the synchronization scope. Several contributing factors enabled this issue to reach production. The scope definition did not account for mixed environments where synchronized and non-synchronized links coexist on the same system. Test coverage focused primarily on standard synchronization flows rather than these mixed data environments. Additionally, the modification affected a broader scope than initially anticipated during the development and review process. The impact characteristics were significant but recoverable. Multiple customer instances experienced removal of issue links that existed outside the intended synchronization scope. However, service functionality continued throughout the incident, and comprehensive audit logs preserved all affected link data, which enabled complete restoration of the removed links.Regarding data security and privacy, the audit logs contain only metadata elements such as issue identifiers, link types, and relationship mappings. No sensitive customer content, comments, or detailed issue information was captured in these logs. This metadata-only approach ensured that the restoration process could proceed while maintaining appropriate data protection standards. ## Learnings On the positive side, the incident response team made a rapid rollback decision, quickly identifying this as the appropriate technical solution rather than attempting a forward fix. The comprehensive logging infrastructure proved invaluable, enabling complete data restoration from audit trails. Cross-functional coordination worked well across engineering, customer success, and operations teams. The structured communication approach maintained clarity and transparency throughout the resolution process. The incident also revealed important areas for system enhancement. Synchronization logic in complex integration scenarios requires better handling of mixed data environments where multiple systems manage different subsets of the same data types. Testing scope needs expansion to cover mixed synchronized and non-synchronized environments comprehensively. Change evaluation processes require enhancement for modifications that affect customer data. Monitoring capabilities need improvement to enable proactive detection of synchronization behavior changes before customer impact. Several process improvements have been \(or are being\) implemented as a result. Enhanced code review procedures now include additional requirements specifically for data modification operations. Expanded testing protocols cover scenarios involving mixed data environments and include dedicated data preservation validation. Improved monitoring systems detect synchronization pattern changes and unusual data modification activities. Updated release procedures include enhanced evaluation criteria for data-affecting changes and improved rollback automation capabilities.