57 Pubnub incidents · 2023年3月 — official updates, affected components, duration and resolution details.
用户在法兰克福的"存在点"中可能与"历史"读取器相遇出高出错误. 我们正在努力进行补救,并将在我们取得进展时予以更新。 如果您认为自己受到了影响并想讨论,请联系支持@pubnub.com
一项措施已经执行,我们正在监测结果。 如果你觉得自己受到了这个影响,请伸出援手支持@pubnub.com.
这一事件已经得到解决。 如果你觉得自己受到影响,请联系支持@pubnub.com.
自动翻译自官方事件更新。
用户可能因存在API而出现较高的出错和延迟率。 我们正在努力进行补救,并将在我们取得进展时予以更新。 如果您认为自己受到了影响并想讨论,请联系支持@pubnub.com
对这个问题的解决已经落实,我们正在监测结果。 如果你觉得自己受到了这个影响,请伸出援手支持@pubnub.com.
我们正在继续监测任何其他问题.
这一事件已经解决,我们将在死后采取后续行动。 如果您有问题或担心, 请联系@pubnub.com.
自动翻译自官方事件更新。
用户可能正在经历来自法兰克福和孟买存在点的更高误差和延迟率。 我们正在努力进行补救,并将在我们取得进展时予以更新。 如果您受到影响, 请联系@pubnub.com .
这一问题已经确定,一个解决办法正在实施之中.
一项措施已经执行,我们正在监测结果。 如果你受到这个问题的影响,或者觉得你仍然受到影响,请伸出援手支持@pubnub.com.
这一事件已经得到解决。 如果你觉得自己受到影响,请联系支持@pubnub.com.
** 问题说明、影响和决议** 10月22日,UTC从大约14:45到16:13,我们的法兰克福\(FRA\)和孟买\(BOM\)存在点的用户可能已经看到存在API的电话错误率和延迟度升高. 其他PubNub服务没有受到影响。 在法兰克福的存在服务软件更新期间开始发行. 新版本与上个版本不相容,而两者同时运行. 这导致该区域的存在服务器一再重新启动,无法达到健康服务器的要求又退回了错误。 我们的团队确认更新是原因,并把它卷回。 协调世界时16:13左右,服务恢复正常. ** 减缓步骤和建议的未来预防措施** 我们正在修复不兼容 之前,这个更新再次发布。 我们还在增加测试,在每次发布前同时运行新旧版本,一次推出更新一个可用区,并改进我们的回滚程序,使其不同时运行不相容的版本.
自动翻译自官方事件更新。
更新安全证书的一个错误可能使一些客户遇到连接问题. 我们正在调查,并将随着我们发现更多情况而更新.
我们正在继续调查这一问题.
我们已查明这一问题,并正在采取补救措施。 如果您遇到问题请联系@pubnub.com.
我们完成了对这一问题的补救。 影响不大:只有一个最终用户报告了一个问题,但我们正在监测其他影响。 请联系@pubnub.com, 如果您有要报告的相关事宜 .
我们没有关于这个问题的其他报告。 如果你觉得自己受到影响,请联系支持@pubnub.com。 后会后出.
** 问题说明、影响和决议** 从协调世界时10月21日19:26起至协调世界时10月22日约02:04起,一些普布努布端点服务于我们证书局已经撤销的TLS证书. 检查证书吊销的客户端在该窗口中可能无法连接到受影响的端点 。 我国证书管理局发现,它签发的大约40万份证书载有与其公布的证书政策不符的政策信息。 这些证书没有被损坏,但行业规则要求撤销并更换这些证书。 PubNub的证书有:-.pubnub.com,-.pubnub.net,-.pndsn.com和-.pubnubapi.com,于10月21日被撤销. 我们的替换证书没有部署到我们所有的终点 直到撤销生效。 不检查证书吊销的客户端没有受到影响,也没有连接到默认的SDK源 [ps.pndsn.com] (http://ps.pndsn.com). 一个顾客的最终用户通知我们 我们向所有地区部署了替换证书,于协调世界时10月22日约02:04完成。 主机名和证书失效日期\(2027年1月7日\)不变. ** 减缓步骤和建议的未来预防措施** 我们正在增加监测,如果任何我们提供的证书被吊销,就会通知我们的行动小组。 我们还正在改变我们的证书替换程序,以便一旦发放,就迅速部署替换设备,使证书更新更快地到达所有地区.
自动翻译自官方事件更新。
从协调世界时2026年10月9日17:32开始,我们观测到全球订阅端点上5XX出错率和耐久性升高. 该问题于协调世界时18:18解决,服务已恢复正常水平. 人数有限的客户可能受到影响。 今后几天将发表一项根源分析。 我们对此可能造成的任何影响表示诚挚的歉意。 如果你觉得自己受到了影响,希望讨论,请通过电子邮件支持@pubnub.com.
** 问题说明、影响和决议** 2026年10月9日,在协调世界时17:30至18:20之间,我们观察到HTTP 5xxx错误升高,影响到子集客户的订阅端. 一些订阅请求可能已经失败,一个子集的信息可能已经延迟或没有实时发送. 没有丢失信件, 具有信件持久性的客户可以从历史中获取受影响的信件 。 事件由高容量载荷测试导致的流量意外增加而导致,测试对象是没有设定预期极限的开发密钥集. 由此产生的负载在一些共享基础设施中暂时耗尽了内存,从而引发了这个问题. 我们稳定了受影响的基础设施,对产生过剩负载的钥匙集适用了费率限制。 在协调世界时18:20前,服务恢复正常. ** 减缓步骤和建议的未来预防措施** 为了控制意外流量和恢复服务,我们采用了临时的出版费率限制,同时保留了受影响的密钥集的可用性。 为了帮助防止类似事件,PubNub正在增加额外检查,以确保保障措施正确到位,以探测和自动限制异常重的负载,然后才能影响共用同一基础设施的其他交通。 我们还正在更新用户记忆和自动调整的运作程序,以确保在缓解事件期间能力调整依然有效.
自动翻译自官方事件更新。
从UTC下午12点15分起,我们美国东PoP的用户正在经历一个与出版和订阅服务有关的问题,导致一些消息没有出现在服务电话中。 服务中不返回错误, 尽管信件没有正确返回 。 我们正在调查这个问题.
截至协调世界时13:55,影响美国"东方邮报"的出版和订户服务的问题已经缓解. 合成监测已经恢复正常,没有检测到丢失的消息. 目前据信,这一事件与监测失败有关。 目前正在进一步调查,并继续密切监测这项服务.
由于过去30分钟没有观察到其他问题,这一事件已经得到解决。 我们将很快进行根本原因分析。 请向PubNub Support报告@pubnub.com.
** 问题说明、影响和决议** 在协调世界时2026年8月25日(星期二)12:10, 我们的内部监测提醒我们注意一个问题, 在一个区域的一个可用区域内, 所有电文通常都在PubNub持久性服务范围内坚持,因此没有丢失电文数据。 ** 进出任何其他地区或AZ的交通没有受到影响,其他的PubNub服务也没有受到影响。 没有客户报告受到影响。 ** 循环原因** 在计划中的内部负载测试期间,一组内部路由服务器被移除服务. 由于配置缺陷,他们的网络地址没有完全退役,仍然被我们的出版层所缓存. 这基本上没有造成问题。 然而,一个地址后来被重新分配给一个通常在同一协议和港口上作出反应的无关的内部部分。 由于这一答复似乎成功,出版层没有收到任何错误,发送到该地址的信息被错误地路由。 在协调世界时13:25,受影响服务器的滚动重新启动清理了过时地址。 ** 减缓步骤和建议的未来预防措施** * 一旦确定受影响的服务器,即进行滚动重新启动,以清除过时的路由地址。 * 经调查证实其根源,2026年8月25日协调世界时22:00,全球所有出版服务器均安装了确保过时内部路由地址正确退役的固定装置.
自动翻译自官方事件更新。
From 13:55 to 14:15 UTC, users globally may have experienced errors with failure on Publish, and published messages may not have been received by subscribers. We also experienced errors and failures with PubNub Functions, and delays with Events & Actions during the period. Services have returned to normal and we are actively monitoring. A root cause analysis will be published in the coming days. If you believe you were impacted and would like to speak with us, please report impact to [email protected].
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** At approximately **13:55 UTC on Aug 14, 2026**, we observed elevated publish errors and message replication failures in our publish/subscribe service, which also caused latency in other PubNub services globally. Customers may have experienced increased publish error rates, delayed or missed message delivery, delayed message persistence, and increased latency for Functions and Events & Actions workflows. The root cause of the incident was an unusually large concentration of global publish traffic that was not limited by our throttling layers. That traffic created resource pressure in the publish and replication layers, increased load on storage systems, and caused downstream processing delays in dependent services. We mitigated the issue by adjusting targeted traffic controls, increasing capacity for affected publish and replication components, and isolating the high-volume traffic pattern to reduce broader platform impact. The issue was resolved at approximately **14:15 UTC on Aug 14, 2026**. This issue occurred because of an issue with our automated controls specific to this exceptional traffic pattern. As a result, the increased load affected multiple services before a mitigation could be fully applied. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, we have isolated the identified high-volume traffic pattern onto dedicated infrastructure and also increased baseline capacity for the affected components across our PoPs. We are also further strengthening our traffic detection and management processes for this exceptional load pattern so it will be identified and contained earlier without cascading impact across dependent services.
Starting at 17:00 UTC on June 10, a subset of publishes originating from the North America POP failed to replicate to subscribers globally. PubNub Technical Staff is investigating, and more information will be posted as it becomes available.
The PubNub Technical Staff identified that failures are limited to publishes from US-East and has identified, have applied a fix, and are now monitoring the results. If you are experiencing issues that you believe to be related to this incident, please report the details to PubNub Support ([email protected]).
Services have returned to normal. A root cause analysis will be published in the coming days. If you believe you were impacted and would like to speak with us, please report impact to [email protected].
## Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution At 19:50 UTC on June 10, 2026, we observed a small fraction of publishes originating from US-EAST-1 failing to replicate to subscribers globally. We removed the degraded publisher pod from service and the issue was resolved at 21:21 UTC on June 10, 2026. The root cause of the incident was triggered by a single process that fell into a degraded state where it continued receiving inbound traffic and passing health checks, but traffic sent outbound from the process was failing at an abnormally high rate. Our automated health check/recovery system did not auto-detect and replace the degraded process because its health check API reported itself as healthy. ## Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, we are improving the data within our health check APIs to return more complete performance metrics over a rolling time window. We are enhancing the issue detection logic to detect more patterns that infer process failure, even if the process itself is reporting as healthy.
From 13:20 to 13:48 UTC, users globally may have experienced errors with failure on Publish, and published messages may not have been received by subscribers. We also experienced errors and failures with PubNub Functions, and delays with Events & Actions during the period. Services have returned to normal and we are actively monitoring. A root cause analysis will be published in the coming days. If you believe you were impacted and would like to speak with us, please report impact to [email protected].
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** At approximately **13:20 UTC on June 9, 2026**, we observed elevated publish errors and message replication failures in our publish/subscribe service, which also caused latency in other PubNub services globally. Customers may have experienced increased publish error rates, delayed or missed message delivery, delayed message persistence, and increased latency for Functions and Events & Actions workflows. The root cause of the incident was an unusually large concentration of global publish traffic that was not limited by our throttling layers. That traffic created resource pressure in the publish and replication layers, increased load on storage systems, and caused downstream processing delays in dependent services. We mitigated the issue by adjusting targeted traffic controls, increasing capacity for affected publish and replication components, and isolating the high-volume traffic pattern to reduce broader platform impact. The issue was resolved at approximately **13:48 UTC on June 9, 2026**. This issue occurred because we did not have sufficient automated controls and isolation processes in place to protect shared infrastructure from this type of exceptional traffic pattern. As a result, the increased load affected multiple services before mitigation could be fully applied. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, we have isolated the identified high-volume traffic pattern onto dedicated infrastructure and also increased baseline capacity for the affected components across our PoPs. We are also further strengthening our traffic detection and management processes for exceptional load patterns so they can be identified and contained earlier without cascading impact across dependent services.
As of 19:27 UTC, we are investigating reports of connectivity issues affecting a subset of subscriptions across several global regions. While the majority of the PubNub network is operating normally, users on the affected segment may experience: - Connection delays and increased latency. - Intermittent errors when subscribing to channels. Our engineering team has identified the cause and is actively working to restore stability. We will provide updates as soon as more information is available.
The incident has been resolved. If you believe you were impacted by the incident and wish to discuss it with our team, please contact us by email at [email protected]
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** On March 24, 2026, at 19:27 UTC, one network shard experienced intermittent connectivity affecting a subset of customers. The affected users may have experienced elevated latency and temporary error responses related to their subscription requests. The instability was caused by an atypical surge in message volume within a shared processing environment that had improperly configured resource limits. This led to high resource utilization and triggered automated system restarts. PubNub Engineering resolved the issue by implementing the proper limits after expanding infrastructure capacity to accommodate the increased load. Service was fully stabilized once the environment was tuned to the new traffic profile. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** **Infrastructure Tuning:** Adjusted automated scaling parameters to provide greater headroom for rapid traffic fluctuations. **Enhanced Traffic Management:** Deployed refined monitoring heuristics to better isolate and manage high-volume traffic patterns without impacting shared resources. **Dynamic Resource Allocation:** Accelerating the rollout of enhanced vertical scaling technology to allow individual processing nodes to adapt more fluidly to demand spikes. **Operational Coordination:** Strengthening internal protocols for high-capacity events to ensure large-scale traffic shifts are proactively transitioned to dedicated environments.
Starting at 12:13AM GMT, we began seeing delays in published messages being written to history storage. Users may be unable to access recently stored messages through History API calls. The messages will eventually be published. Our engineers are actively working to address the issue and we will provide updates here. If you feel your service has been impacted and you would like to discuss, please email [email protected].
A fix has been applied and we are monitoring the results. Published messages waiting on queue to be written to history have now been successfully written. We will continue to monitor for the next 15 minutes.
The incident has been resolved. Published messages continue to be written to history storage normally. No messages were lost during the incident. If you believe you were impacted by the incident and wish to discuss it with our team, please contact us by email at [email protected]
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** On January 1, 2026 at 00:00 UTC, we observed elevated latency in our History service across multiple regions. Customers may have experienced delays in message persistence and history availability during this period. The issue was caused by a mismatch in newly created persistence tables. Specifically, required columns for message metadata were missing from the new tables, resulting in failed write operations and backed-up queues. This created downstream pressure on our storage systems, leading to higher latency in history processing. We mitigated the issue by manually applying the correct updates across all affected persistence spaces. After the updates were applied, message processing returned to normal and queue latency cleared. This issue occurred because we did not have proper controls in place to ensure schema consistency for newly generated monthly persistence tables. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To resolve the issue, we manually applied the required schema updates globally. In the coming days, we will update our change management processes to ensure schema changes are correctly applied to all future monthly tables. We are also auditing our schema tracking and automating validation to prevent inconsistencies across environments. These improvements will ensure that future table generation includes all necessary columns and reduce the risk of similar issues impacting History service performance.
Increased errors (5XX) observed On Nov. 20, 2025 between 16:36 UTC and 16:48 UTC, publish and replication errors (5xx) were observed in North American and Asia Pacific regions, and immediately resolved. Please contact [email protected] if you believe you were impacted by the issue and would like to discuss it with our team.
**Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** Starting at 16:46 UTC on Nov. 20, 2025, we noticed a small number of errors with the publish API in the North American and Asia Pacific regions. The system automatically recovered with all functionality fully restored by 16:50 UTC on Nov. 20, 2025.
Beginning at 12:40 UTC, we observed increased latency and errors in our US-West region for multiple services. PubNub Technical Staff is currently investigating, and more updates will follow once available.
We are continuing to investigate this issue.
Apologies, but we are continuing to investigate this issue.
We are still working with our infrastructure provider to mitigate the effects of the ongoing issues. We have been monitoring and handling traffic to minimize disruptions. While points of presence in the US may see slightly higher latencies, we are stable. Please reach out to PubNub support to report issues.
We are still stable, but seeing minor issues. We are still working with our infrastructure provider to address the remaining issues. Please reach out to PubNub support with any issues.
PubNub remains stable and fully operational. Our infrastructure provider is continuing to apply mitigation steps to restore normal health across their network and related services. We are closely monitoring the situation and coordinating with them to ensure continued stability. Please reach out to PubNub Support if you experience any service issues.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
PubNub continues to remains stable, with only minor issues being observed. Our infrastructure provider is making progress in restoring their services, with early signs of recovery in several regions. We continue to work closely with them as they complete mitigations across the remaining areas. Please reach out to PubNub Support if you experience any impact.
PubNub remains stable, with only minor issues being observed. Our infrastructure provider is making progress in restoring their services, with early signs of recovery in several regions. We continue to work closely with them as they complete mitigations across the remaining areas. Please reach out to PubNub Support if you experience any impact.
Our status is the same: stable, and working with our infrastructure provider to restore services to their normal state. Our normal policy is to update every 30 minutes, but we will stop issuing this status; we will update this page when a change to the status occurs. As always, reach out to PubNub support with any issues.
PubNub remains stable, and our infrastructure provider continues to make steady progress in restoring services. System performance and reliability are improving, and functionality across affected components is returning to normal levels. We continue to monitor closely and will share additional updates as recovery progresses. We will provide another update when there are any changes in status which we expect within the hour. Please contact PubNub Support if you experience any impact.
PubNub remains stable, and our infrastructure provider has restored normal service capacity. Systems are now operating at pre-event levels, and most dependent services are performing as expected. We continue to monitor closely and will share further updates as needed. Please contact PubNub Support if you experience any impact.
This incident has been fully resolved. Our infrastructure provider has restored normal operations, and all systems are functioning as expected. Service performance and reliability have returned to pre-event levels. PubNub continues to monitor systems closely to ensure ongoing stability and we will provide an RCA in in the next couple of day. Thank you for your patience and understanding throughout this event. If you experience any further issues, please reach out to PubNub Support.
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** On October 20th, 2025 at 07:06 UTC, our monitoring systems alerted us to elevated error levels across multiple PubNub services in the IAD region \(US-East\). Some customers may have experienced increased error rates and latency, as well as intermittent issues with Presence service availability across IAD \(US-East\), SJC \(US-West\), and HND \(AP-Northeast\). We quickly determined the issue was caused by a broader infrastructure outage affecting our cloud provider \(AWS\) in the IAD region. We initiated regional failover procedures and re-routed new connections to alternate regions. However, due to undefined steps in some of our failover processes and delays accessing some tools due to the provider issue, existing connections for some services remained degraded for longer than expected. To restore full service, we manually reset established connections, re-routed Presence traffic to Frankfurt \(EU-Central\), and brought on additional infrastructure in other regions to absorb traffic. Errors were mitigated by 09:20 UTC. Later in the day, additional regional load in US-West triggered a new wave of service degradation. We responded by isolating the US-East region again and scaling up balancer capacity in US-West. PubNub services were stabilized by 13:20 UTC, and remained in a monitoring state while our infrastructure provider worked to fully resolve the underlying issue. By 22:35 UTC, our provider reported full restoration of service. After validating stability in US-East, we completed rebalancing traffic by 23:48 UTC, and declared the incident resolved. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** While this incident was caused by an external infrastructure outage, we’ve identified several opportunities to strengthen our internal readiness and response procedures. We are consolidating and centralizing our regional failover procedures to ensure they are immediately accessible and complete for all production services. Any gaps in our process documentation for newer services will be addressed to ensure readiness before they are fully adopted into production. Additionally, we are reviewing and resolving issues with internal tooling, including inventory and DNS resolution problems, which made mitigation more difficult during the incident. These improvements will ensure faster and more consistent responses to future infrastructure-level disruptions, and reduce potential impact on customer traffic across regions.
At approximately 07:02 UTC, PubNub services began experiencing elevated latencies and server errors in the US-West and US-East regions. PubNub Technical Staff is currently investigating, and more updates will follow once available.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
With no further issues observed for the past 30 minutes, the incident has been resolved. We will follow up soon with a root cause analysis. If you believe you experienced an impact related to this incident, please report it to PubNub Support at [email protected].
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** On October 20th, 2025 at 07:06 UTC, our monitoring systems alerted us to elevated error levels across multiple PubNub services in the IAD region \(US-East\). Some customers may have experienced increased error rates and latency, as well as intermittent issues with Presence service availability across IAD \(US-East\), SJC \(US-West\), and HND \(AP-Northeast\). We quickly determined the issue was caused by a broader infrastructure outage affecting our cloud provider \(AWS\) in the IAD region. We initiated regional failover procedures and re-routed new connections to alternate regions. However, due to undefined steps in some of our failover processes and delays accessing some tools due to the provider issue, existing connections for some services remained degraded for longer than expected. To restore full service, we manually reset established connections, re-routed Presence traffic to Frankfurt \(EU-Central\), and brought on additional infrastructure in other regions to absorb traffic. Errors were mitigated by 09:20 UTC. Later in the day, additional regional load in US-West triggered a new wave of service degradation. We responded by isolating the US-East region again and scaling up balancer capacity in US-West. PubNub services were stabilized by 13:20 UTC, and remained in a monitoring state while our infrastructure provider worked to fully resolve the underlying issue. By 22:35 UTC, our provider reported full restoration of service. After validating stability in US-East, we completed rebalancing traffic by 23:48 UTC, and declared the incident resolved. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** While this incident was caused by an external infrastructure outage, we’ve identified several opportunities to strengthen our internal readiness and response procedures. We are consolidating and centralizing our regional failover procedures to ensure they are immediately accessible and complete for all production services. Any gaps in our process documentation for newer services will be addressed to ensure readiness before they are fully adopted into production. Additionally, we are reviewing and resolving issues with internal tooling, including inventory and DNS resolution problems, which made mitigation more difficult during the incident. These improvements will ensure faster and more consistent responses to future infrastructure-level disruptions, and reduce potential impact on customer traffic across regions.
We are currently investigating an incident that could lead to some missed messages by subscribers in the IAD region. All messages are being received and persisted, and can be retrieved from the Storage service. This incident started around 22:07 UTC (03:07 PDT) on 16th Oct 2025. We suspect a moderate impact. Please report any impact related to this incident to [email protected] with any details that you can provide.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
There have been no further issues for the past 45 minutes. We are resolving this issue, and we will follow up with a post-mortem soon.
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** On October 17, 2025 at 04:51 UTC, some customers may have experienced elevated latency and error rates with the Pub/Sub service in the IAD region \(US-East\). Our engineering teams began immediate investigation and identified a spike in errors related to a recent update to the Pub/Sub service. We began formal incident response and initiated rollback of the service deployment shortly thereafter. The issue was fully resolved by 06:50 UTC, and rollback across all regions was completed by 08:00 UTC. The issue occurred because a misconfiguration in the release caused incorrect behavior in the channel cleanup logic. Additionally, our alerting configuration did not include coverage for the synthetic test failures that would have surfaced this issue sooner, delaying detection. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, our engineering teams have written a simpler and more reliable replacement for the faulty logic. That code is currently undergoing rigorous testing before being reintroduced in a future release. We are also addressing the lack of proper alerting that contributed to a delayed response. Synthetic tests have been reviewed, and appropriate alerting will be implemented to ensure similar regressions are detected earlier. In parallel, we are updating our development and testing processes to catch such issues before code reaches production. Lastly, we are conducting a refresher training on our incident response process to ensure faster execution and coordination in the future.
At about 08:40 UTC, the Event & Action publish operation began to experience elevated error rates. Our Technical Staff is actively investigating, and more information will be posted as it becomes available. If you are experiencing issues that you believe are related to this incident, please report the details to PubNub Support ([email protected]).
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
With no further issues observed, the incident has been resolved. We will follow up soon with a root cause analysis. If you believe you experienced an impact related to this incident, please report it to PubNub Support at [email protected].
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** At 08:40 UTC on October 6, 2025, we observed elevated error rates in the Events & Actions service in our EU-Central \(FRA\) region, which led to delays in processing publish-triggered events. Some customers may have experienced slower-than-expected execution of their event workflows during this time. We identified a malformed payload that was causing backend consumers to fail when attempting to process the queue. We deployed an updated build with improved parsing logic, which cleared the blockage and restored normal service. The issue was fully resolved by 11:00 UTC on October 6, 2025. This issue occurred because our event processing service did not correctly handle a malformed message format, which caused the processing queue to stall. Additionally, the alerting system in place was not configured to detect this failure mode promptly, delaying our response. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To reduce the risk of similar delays in the future, we are refining our alert thresholds and naming conventions to improve early detection and clarity during response. We are also reviewing validation logic to ensure malformed messages are consistently isolated before reaching backend queues.
We experienced increased latencies and error rates in our Tokyo, San Jose, and Virginia points-of-presence from 18:14 - 18:17 UTC. A fix was deployed and we are monitoring the situation.
The issues affected the Presence service from 18:14 - 18:17 UTC. We will follow up with a post-mortem soon. We apologize for the impact this may have had on your service. Please reach out to us by contacting PubNub Support ([email protected]) if you wish to discuss the impact on your service.
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** At 18:14 UTC on September 7, 2025 we observed increased error rates and latency for our Presence service in our San Jose, Virginia, and Tokyo regions. We increased capacity in those regions and the issue was resolved at 18:17 UTC. This issue was a recurrence of the issue [experienced on September 2, 2025](https://status.pubnub.com/incidents/1n8xk6w5y9lk), where a bug in one of our APIs allowed a request to execute an operation that exceeded assumed limits in extreme cases, causing out-of-memory conditions for the Presence service. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** In the previous instance of this issue, we placed restrictions on the API in question; those changes were not restrictive enough, which allowed for this recurrence. We have corrected that oversight, as well as increased memory capacities in this area of our system as an additional safeguard.
At about 11:09, the Presence began to experience elevated latencies and error rates. PubNub Technical Staff is investigating and more information will be posted as it becomes available. If you are experiencing issues that you believe to be related to this incident, please report the details to PubNub Support ([email protected]).
The issues affected the Presence service from 18:08 to 18:16 UTC. We will follow up with a post-mortem soon. We apologize for the impact this may have had on your service. Please reach out to us by contacting PubNub Support ([email protected]) if you wish to discuss the impact on your service.
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** At 18:09 UTC on September 2, 2025 we observed increased error rates and latency for our Presence service in our San Jose, Virginia, and Tokyo regions. We increased capacity in those regions and the issue was resolved at 18:16 UTC. This issue occurred because a bug in one of our APIs allowed a request to execute an operation that exceeded assumed limits in extreme cases. In this case, a large number of such requests were executed that resulted in out-of-memory conditions for the Presence service. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future we have enforced the intended limit on the API in question. We have also added additional testing and monitoring in this area.
We have detected elevated error levels with the Presence service in multiple regions. Our Engineers are actively working to mitigate the issues and return service to normal levels. We will provide updates here. If you believe you have been impacted by the issue, please report impact to [email protected].
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented. We will provide updates here as progress is made.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
With no further issues observed, the incident has been resolved. We will follow up soon with a root cause analysis. If you believe you experienced an impact related to this incident, please report it to PubNub Support at [email protected].
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** On August 1, 2025 at 22:15 UTC, we observed elevated 5xx errors across the Presence service in multiple regions. Customers may have experienced intermittent failures when attempting to receive or update presence messages. We identified a subset of channels exhibiting highly concentrated activity patterns and applied a targeted configuration change to rebalance traffic across the cluster. The issue was resolved by 23:15 UTC on August 1, 2025. This issue occurred because our infrastructure lacked proactive safeguards to evenly distribute presence traffic across nodes in scenarios where a small number of channels receive a disproportionately high number of presence updates. This resulted in resource saturation on some nodes without triggering early mitigation. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, we have applied a sharding configuration to affected channel patterns, which redistributes load more evenly across infrastructure components. This approach reduces the risk of overload caused by concentrated traffic. In the coming days we will be: * Reviewing long-term suitability of the sharding configuration applied during this incident. * Investigating automation options for dynamically applying sharding logic based on real-time usage patterns. * Enhancing internal tooling and monitoring to better detect and respond to load imbalance scenarios before they cause service degradation.
Between 15:33-15:59 UTC we observed elevated levels of latency and errors with our presence service in our FRA region. The issue has been resolved and remains stable. We apologize for the impact this may have had on your service. Please reach out to us by contacting PubNub Support ([email protected]) if you wish to discuss the impact on your service.
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** At 14:43 UTC on July 22, 2025, we observed elevated latency and service degradation in our Presence system in the FRA region, impacting customers' ability to receive timely presence events. We implemented changes in our infrastructure to mitigate the pressure on the system, and the incident ended at 15:06 UTC on July 22, 2025. Unfortunately, before we were able to conclusively determine and address the root cause, the issue re-occurred from 15:33 to 15:59 UTC on July 24, 2025. The failures started with an out-of-memory condition in some Presence service nodes. The root cause of the memory condition was a caching system—operated by a third-party vendor—that we rely heavily on for this service began responding slowly at first, and later timing out. While nodes that run into critical issues are generally taken out of service and replaced automatically, this issue began affecting our system faster than new capacity could be brought online to mitigate the incident. Furthermore, a bug in a downstream internal system caused it to also experience failures under the pressure due to a misconfiguration in how it retried failed requests caused by the Presence system’s issues. On the 22nd, we took manual action to break the retry cycle, scale capacity, and allow the Presence service to recover. On the 24th, we identified and addressed the root cause at the caching layer. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** In the short term, we have scaled the capacity of the Presence system and we implemented changes in the affected caching layer to mitigate the issue of the vendor-provided cache system. Longer term, we are working with the vendor to fix their underlying issue, while also exploring alternatives. We also changed the retry configuration to prevent this kind of retry storm from happening again. We implemented monitoring and alerts for this failure mode, to allow us to more quickly identify this kind of issue.
