Jira outage history

We are investigating an issue impacting the project sidebar and navigation in Jira Cloud. Users may encounter timeouts or missing menus when attempting to access project views. Teams are actively analyzing telemetry to identify a mitigation. We will provide our next update in 60 minutes, or sooner.

Mitigations are in place and we are seeing recovery across Jira Cloud navigation services. Project sidebars are now loading as expected. Our teams continue to monitor the situation, and we expect to confirm full resolution in our next update in 1 hour or sooner.

On October 21, 2026, JIRA, JSM, JPD, and JWM users may have experienced performance degradation impacting the project sidebar and navigation. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

Job processing and job scheduling is degraded, which is affecting scheduled and asynchronous work across several products, including Jira, Confluence and Bitbucket Cloud. Affected users may see delayed or missing job execution, including delayed email-to-ticket processing and schedules that do not run as expected.

Our teams have identified the root cause of this incident and is now actively working on mitigating the issue. We will provide further updates within an hour or sooner if we have any significant progress to share.

Our teams have taken corrective steps to mitigate the issue and are observing some improvements. We continue to monitor the situation and will take necessary actions until the incident is fully recovered.

Our teams continue to work on recovery until the incident is fully resolved. We will provide further updates if we have significant progress to share. Along with impact to scheduled and asynchronous work across several products, we also identified SLA component in Jira Service Management is not appearing as expected.

Our teams continue to work on recovery until the incident is fully resolved. We will provide further updates if we have significant progress to share. There is also an impact to the new support tickets created in terms of missing SLA component, notifications which may be affecting the response times and backlog management of some tickets.

On 01st Oct 2026, between 01:00 UTC and 07:25 UTC, users may have seen missing job execution, including delayed email-to-ticket processing and schedules that do not run as expected. We have now implemented a fix and and services have been restored to normal operation for affected customers. The impact to support tickets with missing SLA component and delayed notifications have also confirmed recovery. Note: For Bitbucket customers, if there was any scheduled pipelines that did not run during the incident window, you may wait for the next scheduled execution or trigger them manually.

### Summary On October 1, 2026, between 01:00 and 07:25 UTC, degraded job processing and scheduling impacted Atlassian products including Bitbucket Cloud, Confluence, Forge apps, Jira, and Jira Service Management in all commercial cloud regions. This caused delayed or missed background tasks, such as email-to-ticket processing and scheduled pipelines; interactive product use was not affected. The event was triggered when an unexpected volume of scheduled tasks became due simultaneously, overwhelming our shared job scheduling platform. Automated monitoring detected the incident within three minutes. Recovery began around 03:45 UTC as engineering scaled capacity and the platform worked through the backlog, with full resolution reached in 6 hours and 25 minutes. ### IMPACT Most scheduled tasks stopped running at 01:00 UTC and resumed from about 03:45 UTC. Most delayed work had caught up by about 06:00 UTC, and the remaining delays had cleared by 07:25 UTC. Across affected products: - Recurring scheduled tasks skipped or delayed runs due during the incident; skipped runs were not automatically re-run, and tasks resumed at their next scheduled time. - Most one-time scheduled tasks ran late; a small number may not have run. - Automation rules, including scheduled rules, ran normally, except as noted below. Bitbucket Cloud Scheduled pipelines due between 01:00 and about 03:50 UTC did not run. If a scheduled pipeline did not run during the incident, you can wait for the next scheduled execution or trigger it manually. Other pipeline runs were not affected. Confluence Some calendar event reminders due between 01:00 and about 03:45 UTC were not sent. Forge apps Scheduled triggers stopped at 01:00 UTC and resumed from about 04:00 UTC; missed invocations were not replayed. Goals Start of the month email reminders to update goals could be delayed. Jira and Jira Service Management Incoming emails stayed in their mailboxes and were processed automatically after recovery. Scheduled notifications, such as filter subscriptions, were delayed. In some service projects, automation rules and notifications triggered by SLAs or time in status ran late. SLA timer data remained intact. Atlassian Support Until 07:25 UTC, issues with our support tools may have slowed some of our responses. Based on our investigation to date, we have not identified any loss of work items, pages, repositories, or incoming emails. ### ROOT CAUSE Our shared job scheduling platform operates at high scale under normal conditions. One of the platform consumers scheduled an abnormally high volume of tasks to be executed at the same time on October 1st at 01:00 UTC. This order-of-magnitude surge exceeded our architectural and scaling limits, creating a processing backlog across dependent services. Engineering manually increased capacity to handle the abnormal load, enabling the service to process the backlog and return to normal operations. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS We know that delayed and missed work affects your productivity. We are prioritizing these actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents: - **Enhance workload isolation:** Implement fair scheduling guardrails so volume surges from a single source do not starve or delay tasks across other products. - **Strengthen surge controls:** Add operational capabilities to quickly throttle or pause scheduled workloads from specific sources during unexpected traffic spikes. - **Improve system scaling and recovery:** Enhance platform capacity and optimize scaling processes to handle extreme demand spikes and recover more rapidly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

We continue to investigate the issue impacting Jira issue creation, issue viewing, and board loading. Our teams remain engaged on identifying a resolution. We will provide the next update in 1 hour, or sooner if there is material progress.

Mitigations have been deployed and we are seeing positive signs of recovery across Jira. Issues viewing work items, loading boards, and creating tickets are subsiding. We are continuing to monitor system health to ensure full stability and will share our next update within 60 minutes.

On September 24th 2026, some Jira and JSM users in the US region may have experienced a performance degradation impacting Jira issue creation, issue viewing, and board loading. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

We have been tracking an issue impacting Jira where users may have encountered errors or degraded performance accessing Jira and viewing issues. Mitigations are in place and we are seeing positive signs of recovery. Our teams are continuing to monitor the situation, and we expect to confirm resolution within the next 60 minutes.

We are continuing to closely monitor the situation to ensure full stability across Jira. Recovery signs remain steady. Our next update will be shared in 60 minutes, or sooner.

On Sept 24th, 2026, between 07:28 to 08:08 UTC, some Jira users may have experienced errors or degraded performance when accessing Jira and viewing issues. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all customers.

We are investigating reports of an issue affecting Jira Software and Jira Service Management. Affected users may experience errors or delays when loading issue views and viewing boards. We are working to identify the root cause and will provide an update as more information becomes available.

A mitigation has been deployed, and we are observing recovery across Jira Software and Jira Service Management issue views and boards. Our engineering teams are closely monitoring the environment to ensure sustained stability. We will provide another update once full resolution is confirmed or within 60 minutes.

On 11 September 2026, Between 07:02 UTC and 07:56 UTC, some Jira Software and Jira Service Management users may have experienced degraded performance and errors when accessing Work Items and Boards. The issue has now been resolved, and all services are operating normally.

### Summary On September 11, 2026, between 07:02 and 07:56 UTC, Atlassian customers primarily from the EU region and some from APAC region using Jira and Jira Service Management products were unable to view work items or access boards consistently. The event was triggered by a backward-incompatible internal configuration rollout in the underlying graph data platform. The incident was detected within 3 minutes by our automated monitoring system and mitigated by rolling forward the stable deployment to all regions. The total time to resolution was about 54 minutes. ### IMPACT The overall impact occurred between September 11, 2026, 07:02 UTC and September 11, 2026, 07:56 UTC on two products. During this period, some customers in the EU region using Jira and Jira Service Management experienced intermittent failures or degraded performance. We noted that a configuration failure prevented critical dependency services from scaling, which resulted in an outage for affected users. Jira and Jira Service Management users experienced timeout errors and failed or delayed page loads when attempting to access the work item view, issue navigator, and board view. ### ROOT CAUSE The incident was caused by the deployment of a change to the graph store service, which serves links to third-party entities such as pull requests. The change caused startup checks to fail, preventing new nodes from joining the cluster. During peak traffic, the service could not scale sufficiently, causing requests from Jira and Jira Service Management to the graph store service to fail. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS We know that outages impact your productivity. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to avoid repeating this type of incident: - Implement Code-Based Configuration: We are moving configuration definition files to be part of the core codebase to ensure they are versioned and deployed synchronously with the application logic. - Graceful Degradation in Jira: We are implementing changes to the affected Jira views to segregate core queries from noncritical dependency queries, allowing the page to remain functional even if a downstream service fails. - Optimize Deployment Pipeline: Deployment pipelines are being optimized to enable accelerated, parallel updates during operational response scenarios. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting JIRA customers in US East. We will share updates here as more information is available.

Our teams have taken mitigation steps to reduce the impact and recovery among affected customers began at 16:15 UTC. We continue to investigate the root cause of the issue, and will share additional updates here as more information is available.

On September 3, 2026, JIRA experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

### Summary On September 3, 2026, between 14:52 and 17:02 UTC, Atlassian customers using Jira and Jira Service Management in the US-East region experienced intermittent errors and degraded access to core Jira experiences, including Rovo, viewing issues, boards, navigation, search-backed experiences, workflow-related actions. The event was triggered by a progressive rollout of a caching change in Atlassian's authorization service. The change increased cache traffic and caused saturation in the cache layer used for authorization checks, which then resulted in timeouts and service errors for some customers in the region. The incident was detected by our monitoring within approximately 12 minutes. We mitigated by deploying the affected cache service and disabling the feature flags associated with the new cache path. The total time to resolution was 2 hours and 10 minutes. ### IMPACT The overall impact occurred on September 3, 2026 between 14:52 and 17:02 UTC. During this period, some customers in the US-East region using Jira and Jira Service Management experienced intermittent failures or degraded performance when accessing experiences that depend on authorization checks. These included issue view, Rovo, board view, navigation, search-backed experiences, API, and workflow-related actions. ### ROOT CAUSE The issue was caused by a progressive rollout of a new cache path in Atlassian’s authorization service. The change was intended to improve scalability for customers with large authorization datasets by changing how some authorization information was cached. During the rollout, both the existing and new cache paths were active for consistency checks, which increased the number of cache entries and cache operations. In the US-East region, where traffic volume was highest, this additional load saturated parts of the shared cache layer. As cache requests timed out, the authorization service made more fallback requests to upstream systems, further increasing load and causing circuit breakers and timeouts. Dependent Jira experiences that require authorization checks then returned intermittent errors or failed to load for affected users. The initial rollout monitoring did not surface the risk early enough because lower-traffic regions did not show the same level of degradation and some alerts were not scoped or routed in a way that highlighted the regional cache saturation before customer impact grew. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS We know that outages impact customer productivity, and we apologize to customers who were affected during this incident. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents: - **Enhance deployment safeguards:** Improve rollout practices for high-risk cache and authorization-service changes by using smaller, region-aware rollout increments and validating behavior in higher-traffic regions before broader enablement. - **Implement graceful degradation:** Evaluate graceful-degradation options for authorization checks so dependent experiences can continue working, if a cache dependency is unavailable. - **Strengthen regional telemetry and capacity monitoring:** Strengthen cache capacity and health monitoring, including regional detectors for cache CPU, memory pressure, hit rate, eviction rate, timeout rate, and connection behavior. - **Expand production-scale load testing:** Review cache design and capacity planning for authorization data so changes that increase key cardinality or cache operations are load-tested against representative production-scale traffic before rollout. - **Harden client resilience:** Review cache client timeout and reconnect behavior to reduce the risk of connection storms when cache nodes become slow or saturated. We will continue to validate these actions through the incident review process and track them to completion with the responsible engineering teams. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting forms functionality. We will share updates here as more information is available.

We have identified the likely cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on a mitigation. Affected users may experience forms not working as expected. We will continue to share additional updates here as more information is available.

Our teams continue to work on the mitigation. We will continue to share additional updates here as more information is available.

The performance degradation of JIRA has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

On September 1, some JIRA users may have experienced performance degradation affecting forms functionality. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

We are aware of an issue impacting Jira Work Item transitions. Affected users may experience errors when attempting to transition issues. Our teams are actively investigating the root cause. We will provide the next update in 60 minutes, or sooner if there is a material update.

We have identified the root cause of the issue impacting Jira Work Item transitions and have applied a fix. We are currently seeing signs of recovery and will continue to monitor. We will provide the next update in the next 1 hour, or sooner if there is a material update.

On 1st Sept 2026, between 04:22 UTC to 10:59 UTC, some Jira users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all the customers.

Impact

Jira Incoming Emails are experiencing elevated failures when fetching mail from Microsoft accounts. This affects email-based creation and updates of Jira work items. Users may see 500 internal server errors when email fetch attempts occur. We are tracking updates from Microsoft and continuing to review the impact. These updates are available publicly via https://status.cloud.microsoft/

We're now seeing full recovery across Atlassian services that have been impacted, and this incident is now resolved. For those continuing to experience issues relating to this incident we encourage you to please check https://status.cloud.microsoft/ as they continue to provide further updates about additional services.

Our teams have identified this issue is also impacting Jira Service Management. We will update further as soon as possible.

We are investigating an issue with accessing products that is impacting Confluence, Jira Cloud and Jira Serivce Management customers. Our team is urgently investigating this issue and we will provide further details within one hour or sooner if information is available.

Our teams have identified a possible fix for the issues impacting Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence. This is now being rolled out to impacted regions and we will update within one hour, or sooner if further information is available.

The issues relating to loading Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence are now in recovery. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability and provide an update within one hour, or sooner as more information becomes available.

On 27 August 2026 UTC, Atlassian products including Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers. A public postmortem for this incident will be made available on this page when our full investigation of the incident has been completed.

**SUMMARY** On August 27, 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC, Atlassian customers in the Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions were unable to reach Atlassian Cloud products, including Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The event was triggered by a defective code change to the routing layer of one of our proxy fleets. This led to HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. The incident was detected within 1 minute by our automated monitoring systems, and mitigated by rolling back to the previous configuration release, which put the proxy fleet into a known good state. After the proxy fleet recovered, some Jira and Confluence customers (regardless of location) received HTTP 503 errors between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC as server fleets adjusted to the influx of traffic. **IMPACT** The overall impact was split into two discrete periods: - First, on 27 August 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC on Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The incident caused service disruption to customer traffic originating from Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions, with HTTP 404 errors returned. There was no impact to customer API traffic, regardless of origin location. - Second, on 27 August 2026, between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC, some Jira and Confluence customers regardless of location received HTTP 503 errors after the HTTP 404 errors were solved: ~32% of requests in ap-southeast-2, ~4% of requests in eu-west-1, ~2.5% of requests in us-west-2 and ap-southeast-1, and <1% of requests in all remaining global regions. **ROOT CAUSE** The event was triggered by a code change to one of our proxy fleets. However, there was a defect in the code deployed which was not detected by manual and automated testing. This led to a misconfiguration of a tenant lookup functionality in the proxy tier, which led to traffic not having a valid network path, resulting in HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. After the proxy tier impact recovered, a second period of impact was caused to some Jira and Confluence customers. Due to the reduction of traffic served to Jira and Confluence by the proxy fleet, the Jira and Confluence service tiers had automatically scaled in the number of servers serving customer traffic. Once the proxy fleet functionality was restored, the surge of traffic overwhelmed the Jira service tier, which returned an elevated rate of HTTP 503s until it automatically scaled out again. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn’t identified because the change was related to a very specific kind of edge case that was not picked up by our automated continuous deployment suites and manual test scripts. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help avoid repeating this type of incident: - **Adding further deployment safeguards:** The deployment pipeline for the configuration of the impacted proxy tier was using a legacy system and did not have the appropriate slow regional rollout features configured correctly. We have already added the correct safeguards, and we are moving this to our company standard deployment pipeline that includes all of our safety controls enabled by default. We are also auditing all networking services to validate that they are all on the new standard pipeline deployment service. - **Enhancing service fleet scaling policies:** The auto scaling configuration for our Jira and Confluence service fleets was configured to scale in too aggressively. We are thoroughly reviewing and updating all of the complex Jira and Confluence auto scaling policies to ensure that this doesn’t occur again. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation resulting in increased latency for email, mobile, and slack notifications for Jira, JSM and Confluence. Our teams are investigating the issue and more information will be shared within the next 1 hour.

Our teams have identified the impacted regions and are actively working to mitigate the issue. We will provide further updates within an hour, or sooner if we have significant progress to share.

Our teams have taken few corrective measures to mitigate the issue in one of the impacted regions and are observing some improvements. We continue to monitor the situation and will take necessary actions until the incident is fully recovered. We will provide further updates within next two hours, or sooner if we have significant progress to share.

Our teams continue to mitigate the issue and are observing some improvements. We continue to monitor the situation and will take necessary actions until the incident is fully recovered. We will provide further updates within next two hours, or sooner if we have significant progress to share.

On 25th Aug 2026, some users may have experienced increased latency in email, mobile and slack notifications. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all customers.

We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation resulting in increased latency for email, mobile, and Slack notifications for JIRA, JSM, and Confluence. We will share updates here as more information is available.

Our teams have identified three impacted regions, and continue to investigate the increased latency affecting email, mobile, and Slack notifications for JIRA, JSM, and Confluence.

We have identified the likely cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on a mitigation. Affected users may experience increased latency in email, mobile, and Slack notifications for JIRA, JSM, and Confluence. We will continue to share additional updates here as more information is available.

On August 24, 2026, some JIRA, JSM, and Confluence users may have experienced performance degradation resulting in increased latency in email, mobile, and Slack notifications. The issue has been resolved for newly created notifications, and service is operating normally. There may be older notifications that are being processed, and we expect them to be completed in next few hours.

We are investigating issues affecting your services. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

Some customers experienced issues accessing affected services in the Central European region. We have been able to apply the fix to mitigate the issues and we are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

On August 7th - 2026, between 10:27 UTC to 11:49 UTC, some users in the Central European region may have experienced service access issues. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all the customers.

We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting JIRA. Affected users may experience errors viewing issues and boards. We will share updates here as more information is available.

We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting JIRA and JSM. Affected users may experience errors viewing issues and boards. We will share updates here as more information is available.

The performance degradation of JIRA has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

On August 7, 2026, JIRA, JWM, and JSM users may have experienced performance degradation when viewing issues and boards. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting Automation rules for Jira and Jira Service Management. We will share updates here as more information is available.

Our teams are continuing to investigate delays in Jira and Jira Service Management automation rule executions for some customers. We are seeing signs of improvement, but affected users may still experience delays. We'll share updates here as more information is available.

The team has identified a root cause and after initial testing, is now enacting scaling changes to help to prevent these rule execution delays. We'll monitor performance over the next 24 hours and provide an update at that time or sooner if we can confirm the improvement is in place.

Our team has been able to validate that all rule executions are performing normally and this issue is now resolved.

We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting Automation rules for Jira and Jira Service Management. We will share updates here as more information is available.

We have identified the likely cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on a mitigation. We are currently seeing signs of improvements, however, affected users may experience delays in Jira and Jira Service management Automation rule executions. We'll continue to share additional updates here as more information is available.

On July 20, 2026, some Jira and Jira Service Management users may have experienced performance degradation of automation rule executions. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting Automation for JIRA. We will share updates here as more information is available.

We continue to investigate performance degradation affecting Automation for JIRA in Europe regions. We will share updates here as more information becomes available.

We have identified the likely cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on a mitigation. Affected users may experience performance degradation affecting Automation for JIRA in Europe regions. We will continue to share additional updates here as more information is available.

The performance degradation of Automation for JIRA in Europe regions has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

On July 6, 2026, some users in Europe regions may have experienced performance degradation with Automation for JIRA. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers. If you believe the issue continues to persist, please contact our Support team for further assistance and troubleshooting.

## Summary On Jul 6, 2026, between 06:51 and 20:17 UTC, Atlassian customers using cloud products in European (EU) regions experienced service disruptions affecting automation rule execution, user search, user picker, and related workflows. The incident began when a core identity service experienced database saturation in EU regions, increasing latency and error rates. While responders worked to restore capacity, an emergency mitigation was applied which blocked automation rules from accessing the identity endpoint. In parallel, the elevated identity latency contributed to a cascading failure in a downstream user search service, degrading user search and user picker experiences across multiple products. Service was progressively restored after additional database read capacity was added, the emergency block was removed, and the user search service was manually scaled up. ## Impact The incident affected customers across multiple Atlassian products in EU regions on Jul 6, 2026 between 06:51 and 20:17 UTC. - **Core Identity service degradation:** elevated intermittent access denied rates were observed across products in EU regions. - **Automation rule execution failures:** automation rules using the default user (Automation for Jira) in Jira, Jira Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery in EU regions failed with a permissions error. - **User search and user picker failures:** user search success rates dropped significantly in EU regions, with user picker capability largely unavailable across products. ## Root Cause The incident originated from a recent configuration change that reduced the cache lifetime for a core identity service. As EU workday traffic ramped up on July 6, 2026, a larger share of requests began reaching the backing database directly rather than being served from cache. The EU databases did not have sufficient regional capacity to absorb the increased load, and database CPU reached saturation, causing elevated intermittent access denied rates. As part of the mitigation, an emergency block was applied to reduce load on the saturated identity service database and prioritize restoring the core identity service. This inadvertently prevented automation rules from passing their pre-execution permission checks, causing them to fail. The extended duration was primarily due to a secondary wave of automation rule failures caused by the processing limit throttling. In parallel, the sustained degradation caused increased latency and intermittent failures across products that depend on these checks, and contributed to a cascading failure in a downstream user search service. As a result, user search and user picker experiences became largely unavailable in EU regions until the permissions service recovered and the user search service was scaled up to restore capacity. ## Remedial Actions Plan & Next Steps We know outages impact customers' productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: - **Improve safeguards for high-impact emergency mitigations:** Harden operational tooling so mitigation steps that could disable customer-facing workflows require additional review. - **Strengthen identity infrastructure capacity and change safety:** Review regional database sizing and capacity headroom to reduce the risk of saturation during peak traffic periods, and refine the assessment process for configuration changes so downstream load impact is evaluated before production rollout. - **Strengthen resilience against cascading failures from upstream degradation:** Audit backpressure handling, circuit breaker configuration, and autoscaling behavior in services, so that upstream degradation does not cause broader product impact across user search, user picker, and related experiences. - **Harden replay mechanisms for Automation rule failures:** Increase resilience of automation rules to reduce impact associated with incidents occurring in dependencies.. We recognize how critical reliable product workflows are for our customers, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

We are investigating issues affecting your services. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

We have successfully applied the fix and are seeing recovery. Automation capabilities are being restored and should operate normally going forward. Data processing requests submitted during the outage period were not completed due to service unavailability. We continue to monitor the situation and expect full recovery within the next hour. We will provide additional updates in the next one hour or sooner.

We are still seeing some issues with user-search, user-picker and assets across with the EU-Region. We continue to investigate the situation and will provide additional updates in the next one hour or sooner.

We have applied the fix to mitigate the issue and are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

On July 6th 2026, between 06:51 UTC to 09:39 UTC some users may have experienced issues related Automation, and  between 08:10 UTC to 11:50 UTC some users may have experienced issues related to user-search, user-picker and assets in the EU-Region. The issues have now been resolved and the services are operating normally for all the customers.

## Summary On Jul 6, 2026, between 06:51 and 20:17 UTC, Atlassian customers using cloud products in European (EU) regions experienced service disruptions affecting automation rule execution, user search, user picker, and related workflows. The incident began when a core identity service experienced database saturation in EU regions, increasing latency and error rates. While responders worked to restore capacity, an emergency mitigation was applied which blocked automation rules from accessing the identity endpoint. In parallel, the elevated identity latency contributed to a cascading failure in a downstream user search service, degrading user search and user picker experiences across multiple products. Service was progressively restored after additional database read capacity was added, the emergency block was removed, and the user search service was manually scaled up. ## Impact The incident affected customers across multiple Atlassian products in EU regions on Jul 6, 2026 between 06:51 and 20:17 UTC. - **Core Identity service degradation:** elevated intermittent access denied rates were observed across products in EU regions. - **Automation rule execution failures:** automation rules using the default user (Automation for Jira) in Jira, Jira Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery in EU regions failed with a permissions error. - **User search and user picker failures:** user search success rates dropped significantly in EU regions, with user picker capability largely unavailable across products. ## Root Cause The incident originated from a recent configuration change that reduced the cache lifetime for a core identity service. As EU workday traffic ramped up on July 6, 2026, a larger share of requests began reaching the backing database directly rather than being served from cache. The EU databases did not have sufficient regional capacity to absorb the increased load, and database CPU reached saturation, causing elevated intermittent access denied rates. As part of the mitigation, an emergency block was applied to reduce load on the saturated identity service database and prioritize restoring the core identity service. This inadvertently prevented automation rules from passing their pre-execution permission checks, causing them to fail. The extended duration was primarily due to a secondary wave of automation rule failures caused by the processing limit throttling. In parallel, the sustained degradation caused increased latency and intermittent failures across products that depend on these checks, and contributed to a cascading failure in a downstream user search service. As a result, user search and user picker experiences became largely unavailable in EU regions until the permissions service recovered and the user search service was scaled up to restore capacity. ## Remedial Actions Plan & Next Steps We know outages impact customers' productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: - **Improve safeguards for high-impact emergency mitigations:** Harden operational tooling so mitigation steps that could disable customer-facing workflows require additional review. - **Strengthen identity infrastructure capacity and change safety:** Review regional database sizing and capacity headroom to reduce the risk of saturation during peak traffic periods, and refine the assessment process for configuration changes so downstream load impact is evaluated before production rollout. - **Strengthen resilience against cascading failures from upstream degradation:** Audit backpressure handling, circuit breaker configuration, and autoscaling behavior in services, so that upstream degradation does not cause broader product impact across user search, user picker, and related experiences. - **Harden replay mechanisms for Automation rule failures:** Increase resilience of automation rules to reduce impact associated with incidents occurring in dependencies.. We recognize how critical reliable product workflows are for our customers, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Jira and JSM customers using Microsoft OAuth for automatic creation of Jira tickets from email were unable to read email. This is now fixed and functional for all new incoming email processing. The impacted customers during the incident period need to re-authorise the Microsoft mail server to restore and below are the instructions. To re-authorise an incoming Microsoft mail server: Login in Jira as Admin Select  > System Select Mail > Incoming Mail. Select Edit incoming mail server. Select re-authorise . Enter your Microsoft credentials to continue using your Microsoft mail server.

Our team has proactively reached out to all impacted organizations providing the below instructions to re-authorize their Microsoft mail server. If you are still experiencing this issue, please attempt to complete the re-authorization as advised below. If further issues still occur that you believe to be related to this incident, please reach out to Atlassian support for further assistance.

We are investigating reports of extended delays being experienced across tasks such as processing of Incoming Emails, Notifications relating to changes or creation of Work Items, in addition to delays in processing Scheduled Triggers from Marketplace apps. Our team is looking into this with urgency and we will provide further update within one hour as our investigation continues.

Our team has identified the root cause for this issue and has now deployed a fix that is rolling out across impacted products. At this time we are monitoring for the recovery of these events across Jira Service Management, Jira Cloud and Ecosystem app Scheduled Triggers. We will provide further update within one hour or when we have seen a full recovery of all task processing across these products.

Our team has now determined that performance has returned to expected levels for those impacted by this incident. Additional products that are now known to have been impacted by this incident are Confluence, Customer Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery. These products would have seen similar impact where email notifications or processing of events may have been delayed while this incident was underway. We are now monitoring for the full recovery of performance across all products and will update when we are confident this issue is fully resolved, or within one hour, whichever is sooner.

We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.