Asana outage history

We have a significant degradation in our system for processing asynchronous work. We previously had some crashes from web application users, but that appears to have resolved. We're monitoring the asynchronous work.

We've paused some problematic workloads, and we think we're seeing recovery.

This incident has been resolved.

Asana services are currently experiencing a major service disruption. We have identified a likely cause and are working on applying a fix. This affects all services and all regions.

We have identified the cause of this outage and have initiated changes to address this. We are seeing some signs of recovery, and will post an update once we've confirmed recovery.

We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

The fix has been applied. We have observed recovery of error rates and traffic, and believe this incident is now resolved. We will post a postmortem/RCA within 72 hours.

**Incident:** An infrastructure update targeting security caused DynamoDB to become inaccessible across Asana's production environment. This change was related to a production isolation initiative, and was applied in a way that left all of our production services unable to use DynamoDB tables which we use for metadata and routing traffic. Once the change was reverted our services returned to normal operations.  **Impact:** Asana services were completely unavailable for approximately 30 minutes, 2026-10-21 15:21 UTC-15:51 UTC, and mostly unavailable for a further 20 minutes, including 15:05 UTC-15:55 UTC. This also caused delay for background actions during the impact period; recovery after the end of the incident completed by 16:00 UTC. **Moving forward:** We are updating the deployment process to catch this class of error. We will be moving to an isolation system which allows more gradual rollout of similar changes, allowing us to detect misconfiguration in pre-production testing. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

We are currently investigating this issue.

We are currently seeing system recovery and are actively monitoring the situation to ensure a full recovery.

This incident has been resolved.

We are currently investigating the issue.

The incident has been resolved.

We've heard reports of rules and automations not running in the EU region. We've identified the source of the issue and fixed it for new automations triggers going forward. Our engineers are currently working on the backlog of automations that triggered and did not run during the incident.

We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

We're currently working our way through the backlog of automations that did not run.

This incident has been resolved.

We received an alert for unusual slow performance in several regions. We're investigating.

We are continuing to investigate this issue.

This incident has been resolved.

We are currently investigating this issue.

We are continuing to investigate this issue.

The rollback seems to have completely resolved errors. We're monitoring closely, but users should be able to access Asana again.

A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

This incident has been resolved.

Incident: An internal system responsible for automatically scaling backend server capacity in one of our compute clusters stopped replacing capacity that had been cycled out during routine maintenance. This caused a gradual reduction in available capacity over several hours. A subsequent deployment was activated with insufficient capacity, causing all new requests for that compute cluster to fail. To mitigate the impact, we reverted to a previous release revision, which still had sufficient capacity. Impact: For approximately 30 minutes, customers whose traffic was handled by this compute cluster saw full downtime; other customers were unaffected. No customer data was lost. Moving forward: We have added additional monitoring to detect this type of capacity-scaling failure much earlier, and have added safeguards to prevent deployments from shifting traffic before sufficient healthy capacity is confirmed. _Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average._

We are investigating alerts for slow performance and application errors.

We are continuing to investigate the issue; we have reverted recent changes, and are working to identify the source of the errors.

We have made configuration changes and see partial recovery, but we continue to see some elevated errors.

We've applied a fix are seeing signs of recovery.

User-facing symptoms have recovered. We'll continue to monitor, and will prioritize a retrospective to understand and prevent similar incidents in the future.

We’ve been working to add a caching layer to our update pipeline, tuning it carefully and rolling it out gradually. On Wednesday, August 26 we enabled it for most use cases, and it initially performed well. On Monday, August 31, a combination of unrelated infrastructure changes and peak traffic pushed the cache past its scaling limits. Once that threshold was crossed, the cache became unusable, and many pods serving read traffic for the Asana application could no longer serve it. We mitigated the incident by reverting the system to use the previous, non-cached code path. The revert was successful, but recovery took longer than we would expect for this class of issue. A fuller analysis is underway. We will follow up with root causes, action items, and improvements, including why recovery took as long as it did. We were fully down for about 25% of our users, for 2 hours, 15 minutes.

From 2026-08-04 15:25 UTC until 2026-08-06 03:51 UTC, Asana failed to send some events to registered webhooks and to return them in the event streams API. Apps which rely on this should refetch the underlying data from the Asana API. Existing webhooks and event streams will continue to function, but events from the incident window will not be sent. Most events with type `task` and action `changed` were dropped during this period. Other events are not affected. The root cause of the incident was traced to a code change which unintentionally dropped change events for most fields on the task type, and the change was reverted.

We are seeing errors for part (about 10%) of users in US for the Asana webapp. We've identified the root cause and are working on identifying a resolution.

We have implemented a mitigation and are monitoring to ensure recovery.

We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

This incident has been resolved.

**Incident**: A configuration change inadvertently removed a critical resource required by one of our services. While existing infrastructure continued to operate normally, newly scaled infrastructure could not become ready. As morning traffic increased, there was a growing gap between incoming requests and our system's capacity to handle them, resulting in service degradation. We resolved the issue by manually restoring the missing resource and correcting the configuration change that caused its removal. ‌ **Impact**: For approximately 1.5 hours, a subset of customers experienced a full outage of our web application and desktop applications. During this time, affected users were unable to access Asana. No customer data was lost. ‌ **Moving forward**: We are implementing additional safeguards in our configuration management process to prevent critical resources from being inadvertently removed. We are also enhancing our monitoring systems to detect degradation earlier, before it impacts customer access. ‌ Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

Between April 21st and April 23rd, many rules triggered by date time triggers did not run. New rule triggers ran normally starting April 23rd, and the delayed triggers were processed by April 27th.

Starting on **April 20th, 2026 at 10:00 AM PDT**, a combination of scaled-up background action jobs in the EU and a recent change to how date time trigger volume is managed overloaded the system that processes resource intensive background action jobs. This caused multi-hour delays in email and inbox notifications in the EU and prevented date time triggers from executing in all regions. Engineers were first alerted on **April 21st** by our monitoring systems, but did not recognize the full scope of the incident until **April 23rd**. On April 23rd, the change to manage date time trigger volume was reverted and the problematic background action jobs were isolated. All delayed notifications were sent by **April 24th, 11:30 AM PDT**, and all delayed date time triggers were executed by **April 27th, 4:00 AM PDT**.

Between April 20th and April 24th, 60% of email and inbox notifications were delayed by at least one hour in EU. Notifications were delayed up to 3 days. Other resource intensive background actions were also impacted at a lesser rate.

Starting on **April 20th, 2026 at 10:00 AM PDT**, a combination of scaled-up background action jobs in the EU and a recent change to how date time trigger volume is managed overloaded the system that processes resource intensive background action jobs. This caused multi-hour delays in email and inbox notifications in the EU and prevented date time triggers from executing in all regions. Engineers were first alerted on **April 21st** by our monitoring systems, but did not recognize the full scope of the incident until **April 23rd**. On April 23rd, the change to manage date time trigger volume was reverted and the problematic background action jobs were isolated. All delayed notifications were sent by **April 24th, 11:30 AM PDT**, and all delayed date time triggers were executed by **April 27th, 4:00 AM PDT**.

We have received reports that some users are unable to load Asana, especially in and around New York/the East Coast of the US, and have observed intermittent errors. We are investigating this, and will provide an update within an hour.

We believe that this was related to http3, and have disabled http3 for the affected CloudFront distribution. We believe Asana should now load after a hard refresh.

This incident has been resolved.

Asana remains accessible to customers in the ME region, but we are seeing backends impacted by an AWS ME outage. If that isn't resolved soon, we expect to see some performance degradation and possible outages of the Asana application. This is only for the ME region; other regions are unaffected.

We no longer see impact on our servers. We're monitoring, as the AWS incident has not resolved.

We are continuing to investigate this issue.

We are seeing major impact in the ME region making Asana services unavailable to users whose data is stored in that region. We have taken steps to avoid additional loss of EC2 resources, but are continuing to see high error rates. This cause is AWS incidents affecting the infrastructure (az1 and az3) in the Middle East region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

We are still seeing major impact in the ME region making Asana services unavailable to users whose data is stored in that region. We are continuing to monitor the situation. The cause is AWS incidents affecting the infrastructure in the Middle East region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

We are still seeing major impact in the ME region making Asana services unavailable to users whose data is stored in that region. We are continuing to monitor the situation. The cause is widespread AWS incidents affecting the infrastructure in the Middle East region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

A small number of users were affected by the AWS outage in UAE (me-central-1); following AWS's recommendations, we have moved processing to other regions, and believe there is no user impact.

This incident has been resolved.

Our primary monitoring is observing an outage for our API and mobile services, but secondary monitoring indicates that API and mobile traffic is operating as usual. Our engineers are reviewing our primary monitoring and will provide updates on the situation.

Our engineers have rolled back recent changes to our primary monitoring systems, and our API and mobile systems are fully operational.

We are investigating an elevated rate of API errors as well as delays reflecting changes for the App in EU.

We have identified certain expensive workloads and reduced background processing to mitigate this. We see recovery in user facing services and are investigating the expensive workloads; user traffic is now working normally.

We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

This incident has been resolved.

We're investigating an outage, it looks like no one is able to reach the Asana webapp.

We are continuing to investigate this issue.

We've identified the cause and have rolled back. Based on our monitoring, we should be recovered for some users.

Error rates have dropped significantly, to about 2%. It's possible some users continue to see errors, but we expect most users to be able to use Asana.

Our error rates are back to normal baseline, and we don't expect an immediate recurrence. We'll create a post-mortem in the next few days with more details, including what happened and how we plan to prevent this going forward.

This incident has been resolved.

Incident: On 2026-01-22 the Asana App and all associated services had a service disruption due to dependency on a shared database used for storing metadata. This was triggered by a code path which caused overload for that database, followed by request queuing, timeouts, and errors. Impact: From 17:33 - 17:57 UTC the Asana App and all associated services were unavailable. There was a further 14 minutes of partial downtime from 18:45 - 18:59 UTC affecting 10-20% of users, also triggered by dependency on this shared database. Moving forward: We immediately rolled back our application code and added resources for this database. Going forward we will continue to reduce dependency on this shared database for common paths to reduce risk, and monitor for unexpected resource usage. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

On January 6th, 2026 at UTC 12:00, we experienced an approximately 50-minute service disruption affecting customers in non-US regions. During this time, some requests may have failed or timed out. What Happened: During routine maintenance, we upgraded a core infrastructure component. While the upgrade itself completed as expected, some services did not successfully reconnect to the updated infrastructure. This led to temporary communication issues and degraded service in the affected regions. We apologize for the inconvenience and want to assure you that we are taking steps to help prevent similar issues in the future.

Users are currently unable to begin new sessions in the Asana web app. Our engineers are working to investigate and mitigate this issue as soon as possible. Existing web sessions are unaffected, along with mobile and API traffic.

Our engineers have identified and reverted the change preventing users from starting new Asana web app sessions. We're monitoring the situation to ensure recovery. The Asana web app is operational, and other services (mobile, API) are unaffected.

Thank you for your patience. Service is fully restored, and the Asana web app is back to normal functionality.

Resolved - We have fully resolved an incident related to a product permissions bug that briefly impacted some of our customers between November 18 and November 19. This issue was contained entirely within customer domains and did not expose any data externally.