Atlassian Support 中断历史

1. 2026年10月1日 UTC 07:01identified

   我们的小组继续致力于恢复工作,直到事件得到充分解决。 如果我们要分享重大进展,我们将提供进一步的最新情况。 新的支助票也影响到苏丹解放军缺失部分,通知可能影响响应时间和一些门票的积压管理.

2. 2026年10月1日 UTC 07:51resolved

   2026年10月1日 UTC凌晨1:00至7:25 UTC凌晨,用户可能已经看到缺少工作执行,包括延迟的电子邮件到ticket处理和没有按预期运行的时间表. 我们现在已实施一个固定方案,并为受影响的客户恢复了正常业务。 支持有苏丹解放军缺失部分的罚单的影响和延迟通知也证实已经恢复。 注意:对于 Bitbucket 客户,如果在事件窗口中存在任何没有运行的预定管线,您可以等待下一次的预定执行或者手动触发.

3. 2026年10月9日 UTC 18:24postmortem

   页:1 2026年10月1日 UTC凌晨1点至07:25分之间,工作处理和时间安排的退化影响到了阿特拉斯西亚产品,包括Bitbucket Cloud, Conculation, Forge apps, Jira,以及所有商业云区的Jira Service Management. 这导致延迟或错过了背景任务,如电子邮件到盘点处理和排定的管道;交互式产品使用没有受到影响. 这一事件是当一大批计划外的任务同时到期时引发的,使我们共享的工作日程安排平台不堪重负。 自动监测在三分钟内检测出事故。 UTC凌晨3点45分左右开始恢复,因为工程规模扩大,平台通过积压工作运转,6小时25分后完全解析出. 影响 大多数计划任务从协调世界时01:00停止运行,从协调世界时03:45左右恢复. 大多数被延迟的工程在协调世界时6:00左右赶上了,其余被延迟的工程在协调世界时07:25已经清除了. 在所有受影响的产品中: - 事件期间重复的预定任务被跳过或推迟运行;跳过的任务没有自动重新运行,任务在下个预定时间恢复。 - 多数一次性排定任务延迟执行;少数可能没有执行。 - 自动化规则,包括预定规则,正常运行,但下文所述除外。 键盘云 应于协调世界时01:00至约03:50之间的排水管没有运行. 如果一个预定的管道在事件期间没有运行,您可以等待下一次预定的行刑或者手动触发. 其他管道运行没有受到影响。 组合 协调世界时1:00至约03:45之间到期的一些日历事件提醒没有发出. Forge 应用程序 时刻表触发器于协调世界时01:00停止,从协调世界时04:00左右恢复;被忽略的引用没有被重放. 目标 每月的电子邮件提醒以更新目标可能会被推迟。 Jira和Jira服务管理 收到的电子邮件留在邮箱内,在回收后自动处理。 诸如过滤器订阅等排定的通知被推迟。 在一些服务项目中,苏丹解放军或处于状态时间引发的自动化规则和通知延误了。 苏丹解放军的计时器数据仍然完好无损。 Atlas系统支助 在协调世界时7:25之前,我们的支助工具问题可能减缓了我们的一些反应。 根据我们迄今进行的调查,我们没有发现任何丢失的工作物品、网页、储存库或收到的电子邮件。 踢踢篮球 我们的共享工作时间安排平台在正常条件下大规模运作。 其中一个平台消费者在协调世界时10月1日01:00将异常高量的任务安排在同一时间执行. 这一规模级的激增超过了我们的建筑和规模限制,造成了依赖性服务处理的积压。 工程人工提高了处理异常负载的能力,使服务能够处理积压并恢复正常运行. 复原行动计划和下一步 我们知道,拖延和错过工作影响了你的生产力。 我们确定这些行动的优先次序,以帮助减少类似事件的可能性和影响: - ** 加强工作量隔离:** 实施公平的调度护栏,使单一来源的激增不会饿死或拖延其他产品的任务。 - ** 加强增援控制:** 增加作业能力,以便在交通高峰出乎意料的情况下迅速节流或暂停特定来源的预定工作量。 - ** 改进系统规模和恢复:** 增强平台能力并优化规模化流程,以应对极端需求激增并更快地恢复. 我们向在这一事件中服务受到影响的客户道歉。 谢谢 阿特拉斯语

自动翻译自官方事件更新。

1. 2026年9月23日 UTC 12:44identified

   我们确定了一个影响进入Jira产品发现社区以及阿特拉斯社区支助资源的问题。 受影响的用户在试图访问Jira产品发现讨论小组、文章、FAQs或相关文件时可能遇到错误或断开链接。 我们的工程小组正在积极制定一项决议。 我们将在两小时后提供下一次更新,或一旦我们得到材料更新.

2. 2026年9月23日 UTC 14:41identified

   我们已经安装了一个配置固定器,它恢复了对Jira产品发现关键文章、FAQs、公共路线图和产品手册的访问。 我们的工程小组正继续努力解决剩余的社区小组和讨论联系的准入问题。 我们将在2小时后再次提供最新情况,或者如果我们取得进一步进展,将更早提供最新情况.

3. 2026年9月23日 UTC 16:47identified

   我们的小组继续设法减轻影响。 受影响的用户可能会遇到社区小组和讨论链接的准入问题。 我们将继续在获得更多信息后,在此分享其他最新情况.

4. 2026年9月23日 UTC 19:07identified

   我们的小组已聘请第三方供应商来缓解这一问题,一旦获得更多信息,我们将在此提供最新情况.

5. 2026年9月23日 UTC 20:14resolved

   2026年9月23日,受到影响的用户在Atlassian社区可能经历了一些服务中断. 这个问题现已解决,这项服务对所有受影响的客户正常运行.

自动翻译自官方事件更新。

1. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:03investigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

2. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:11identified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

3. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:24identified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

4. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:34identified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

5. 2026年5月14日 UTC 05:43monitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

6. 2026年5月14日 UTC 06:40monitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

7. 2026年5月14日 UTC 06:48resolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

8. 2026年5月19日 UTC 19:06postmortem

   ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 2026年5月8日 UTC 01:31investigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 2026年5月8日 UTC 02:02resolved

   Upon further investigation, it was identified that Atlassian support was not affected due to this incident and is operating as usual.

3. 2026年5月20日 UTC 06:44postmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年5月2日 UTC 01:38investigating

   We are investigating an incident affecting Jira Software (viewBoard, viewIssue, createIssue). Our team is working to identify the cause and restore service to normal levels. We will provide the next update within 60 minutes.

2. 2026年5月2日 UTC 01:38investigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting the issue viewing experience in Jira. This is also impacting the accessibility of support tickets. We will share updates here as more information becomes available.

3. 2026年5月2日 UTC 02:00investigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting the Work Item viewing experience in Jira. This is also impacting the accessibility of support tickets. We will share updates here as more information becomes available.

4. 2026年5月2日 UTC 02:47resolved

   The Jira Work Item View experience has been restored to normal service. Our teams are continuing to investigate the root cause affecting this issue. We will provide more details once we identify the root cause

5. 2026年5月14日 UTC 19:44postmortem

   ### SUMMARY ### Between May 1, 2026 at 23:34 UTC and May 2, 2026 at 02:53 UTC Atlassian customers using Jira and Jira Service Management (JSM) across all Cloud tenants received an error page when attempting to open a work item due to a schema incompatibility, and editing work item fields was degraded for both products. Navigating to and interacting with boards were degraded for Jira specifically. On Jira mobile, users were unable to view work items and work item search was degraded. This was caused by a deployment of a schema configuration change that had only been validated against some production environments. The issue also affected Atlassian's customer support operations and temporarily impacted Atlassian’s ability to respond to incoming support requests. Customers were able to raise tickets as usual. Atlassian’s automated monitoring systems detected the issue on May 1, 2026 at 23:41 UTC, and engineering teams promptly began investigating. The issue was reported on Statuspage on May 2, 2026 at 00:55 UTC. The issue was resolved after 3 hours and 19 minutes on May 2, 2026 at 02:53 UTC when the previous version of the schema configuration was successfully redeployed to all regions. ### IMPACT ### - **Duration**: 3 hours 19 minutes (May 1, 2026 at 23:34 UTC – May 2, 2026 at 02:53 UTC) - **Affected regions**: All regions. - **Affected products**: Jira, JSM, Jira Mobile - **Customer experience**: - Users were unable to view work items using the work item view; consequently updating and creating work items from the work item view was affected. - Editing work items was degraded. - Boards did not show under Spaces in the Jira navigation. - Certain board interactions were affected. - Other areas of Jira not dependent on the broken schema configuration continued to operate normally. ### ### ROOT CAUSE ### The root cause was a deployment sequencing issue. A schema configuration change was deployed to the API gateway layer before the corresponding application-level change had been deployed across all production environments. This created a mismatch between the schema expected by the gateway and the schema served by the application servers. ### ### MITIGATIONS ### The engineering team identified the problematic schema change and initiated a rollback of the deployment. A deployment blocker was put in place to prevent further changes while the rollback was executed. The previous version of the schema configuration was redeployed, and service was restored across all regions. ### ### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: - We are adding automated pre-deployment checks to verify that schema configurations are compatible across all production environments before changes are deployed. - We will streamline our incident communication processes, incident response training and tooling to reduce the time between incident detection and customer notification. - We are working to improve resilience of critical customer-facing support services to ensure SLA continuity during outages. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 2026年4月13日 UTC 07:29monitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 2026年4月13日 UTC 08:33monitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 2026年4月13日 UTC 10:17resolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 2026年4月21日 UTC 02:35postmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年4月2日 UTC 01:49investigating

   Our team is investigating an issue relating to 503 errors being displayed when attempting to load confluence.atlassian.com. We are investigating this issue with urgency and will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 2026年4月2日 UTC 02:23monitoring

   We are now seeing recovery across confluence.atlassian.com and ja.confluence.atlassian.com sites. We are continuing to monitor the recovery and will update when we are satisfied that this incident is fully resolved.

3. 2026年4月2日 UTC 02:39resolved

   Our team has been able to successfully recover all services from confluence.atlassian.com and ja.confluence.atlassian.com and these sites are now performing as expected. This incident is now resolved. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 2025年12月17日 UTC 13:48investigating

   Support ticket creation is slow or partially impacted for some of our customers. Support chats are being initiated but not visible to Atlassian support teams. Our team is aware and investigating the same. We will update you in next 60 mins or sooner.

2. 2025年12月17日 UTC 14:15monitoring

   This issue resulted from a permission problem. The Atlassian team quickly identified and has fixed it. All support tickets raised during this period are being created. Our support team will process the tickets in the order they were received. For expired chat support sessions, support tickets will be created and our support team will proactively reach out. We continue to monitor the status.

3. 2025年12月17日 UTC 14:43resolved

   Team has reconfirmed everything is working as expected. This issue is resolved.

1. 2025年12月5日 UTC 08:08investigating

   We are aware that access to created Ecohelp support tickets is not available for some of our customers. Our team is investigating this issue. Repeat creation of tickets is not required as the created tickets are visible to the Atlassian teams. We will provide next update in 60 minutes.

2. 2025年12月5日 UTC 09:56investigating

   Customers encounter a permission error when accessing tickets: No Access - You do not have permission to view this request. Ticket creation works and created tickets are visible to the Atlassian teams. The Atlassian team continues investigating. The root cause remains unclear. We will provide next update in 60 minutes.

3. 2025年12月5日 UTC 11:06investigating

   Customers continue to encounter a permission error when accessing tickets: No Access - You do not have permission to view this request. Ticket creation works and created tickets are visible to the Atlassian teams. The Atlassian team is engaged and continues investigation. However, the root cause remains unclear. We will provide next update in 3 hours or sooner.

4. 2025年12月5日 UTC 12:09resolved

   The feature flag causing the issue has been reverted, fixing the problem. With that this incident is resolved.

1. 2025年11月6日 UTC 19:36investigating

   Marketplace Community is experiencing slow load times and degraded performance on the Forums. We are actively investigating and hope to have a resolution as soon as possible.

2. 2025年11月6日 UTC 19:50investigating

   Atlassian Community is experiencing slow load times and degraded performance on the Forums. We are actively investigating and hope to have a resolution as soon as possible.

3. 2025年11月7日 UTC 14:10monitoring

   The incident has been fixed and continue to stay under monitoring.

4. 2025年11月10日 UTC 04:17resolved

   The issue has been resolved and there is no performance related slowness on Atlassian Community Forums now.

1. 2025年10月20日 UTC 07:56investigating

   We have noticed that Atlassian Cloud services are impacted and our teams are actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress every hour.

2. 2025年10月20日 UTC 08:24investigating

   Atlassian Cloud services are impacted and we are aware that our customers might not be able to create support tickets. Our teams are actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress every hour.

3. 2025年10月20日 UTC 09:24investigating

   We are experiencing an outage due to some issue at the end of our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to get this resolved or mitigated as quickly as possible. ETA of the same is not know at the moment. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

4. 2025年10月20日 UTC 09:58identified

   We understand that our public cloud provider has identified the cause of the issue. We are starting to see some recovery and is working towards mitigation. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

5. 2025年10月20日 UTC 11:07identified

   We continue to work with our public cloud provider towards mitigating the issue at the earliest. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

6. 2025年10月20日 UTC 12:06identified

   Atlassian team is actively engaged and continues to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue at the earliest. We are starting to see partial operations succeed. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

7. 2025年10月20日 UTC 13:58identified

   Our public cloud provider is working to mitigate this issue quickly. We are seeing some early positive indicators and are continuing to monitor. We appreciate your patience and will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner.

8. 2025年10月20日 UTC 14:02identified

   We understand your pain and mitigating or fixing this issue is of utmost importance. Our public cloud provider is actively working to mitigate this issue on priority. We have been seeing partial operational success. We appreciate your patience and will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner.

9. 2025年10月20日 UTC 16:36identified

   Update - Thank you for your continued patience. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority. Our public cloud provider is still actively working to mitigate this issue with urgency and while we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will be providing hourly updates on this issue.

10. 2025年10月20日 UTC 17:27identified

    Update - We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority. Our public cloud provider is actively working to mitigate this issue with urgency. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner as new information becomes available.

11. 2025年10月20日 UTC 17:43identified

    We are currently aware of an ongoing incident impacting Atlassian Cloud services due to an outage with our public cloud provider, AWS. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority and we are closely monitoring the health of AWS services. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner as new information becomes available.

12. 2025年10月20日 UTC 18:38monitoring

    There have been no changes since our last update. We will provide our next updated by 9:00PM UTC or sooner as new information becomes available. We are currently aware of an ongoing incident impacting Atlassian Cloud services due to an outage with our public cloud provider, AWS. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority and we are closely monitoring the health of AWS services. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation.

13. 2025年10月20日 UTC 21:26monitoring

    Monitoring - We've started seeing continued product experience improvement. While we still have a backlog of event processing, we are seeing improvements in systems operational capabilities across all products. We estimate a significant improvement with the next few hours and will continue to monitor the health of AWS services and the effects on Atlassian customers. We appreciate your continued patience and remain committed to full resolution as we work through this situation. We will post our next update in two hours.

14. 2025年10月20日 UTC 22:58monitoring

    Our teams are continuing to monitor the recovery of systems across Atlassian products. This update is to inform that the Atlassian Support portal is fully operational at this time for customers that wish to contact support.

15. 2025年10月21日 UTC 00:03monitoring

    Our team is now seeing recovery across all impacted Atlassian products. We are continuing to monitor for individual products that may still be processing backlogged items now that services are restored. The Atlassian Support portal is currently still displaying a message directing customers to our temporary support channel. Please note that our support portal is currently fully functional for those attempting to raise requests. We are continuing to look into this alert to remove this message. We will provide further update on our recovery status in one hour.

16. 2025年10月21日 UTC 01:07monitoring

    We continue to see recovery progressing across all impacted products as backlogged items continue to be processed. The Atlassian Support portal is currently displaying a message directing customers to our temporary support channel. Please note that our support portal is currently fully functional for those attempting to raise requests. We are continuing to look into this alert to remove this message. We will provide further update on our recovery status in two hours.

17. 2025年10月21日 UTC 03:24monitoring

    The issue relating to the Atlassian Support portal displaying a message to customers to use our temporary support channel has now been resolved. The Atlassian Support portal is fully functional for any ongoing support issues. With regards to other Atlassian products, we continue to see recovery continuing across all impacted products and our teams are continuing to monitor as the recovery continues. We will provide further update on our recovery status within two hours.

18. 2025年10月21日 UTC 05:24resolved

    Our team is now able to see full recovery across the vast majority of Atlassian products. We are aware of some ongoing issues with specific components such as migrations and JSM virtual service agents, and our team is continuing to investigate with urgency. We apologise for the inconvenience that this incident has caused and we will provide further information when the Post Incident Investigation has been completed.

19. 2025年10月24日 UTC 17:47postmortem

    ### Postmortem publish date: Nov 19th, 2025 ### Summary All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. Customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 04:05. The service disruptions were triggered due to an [AWS DynamoDB outage](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=1%3A50%20PM.-,DynamoDB,-Between%2011%3A48) and further affected by subsequent failures in [AWS EC2](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) and [AWS Network Load Balancer](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) within the us-east-1 region. The incident started at Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and was detected within six minutes by our automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore all core services by Oct 21, 2025 04:05. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues was completed on Oct 22, 2025. We recognize the critical role our products play in your daily operations, and we offer our sincere apologies for any impact this incident had on your teams. We are taking immediate steps to enhance the reliability and performance of our services, so that you continue to receive the standard of service you have come to trust. ### IMPACT Before examining product-level impacts, it's helpful to understand Atlassian's service topology and internal dependencies. Products such as Jira and Confluence are deployed across multiple AWS regions. The data for each tenant is stored and processed exclusively within its designated host region. This design is intentional and represents the desired operational state, as it limits the impact of any regional outage strictly to tenants in-region, in this case us-east-1. While in-scope application data is pinned to the region selected by the customer, there are times when systems need to call other internal services that may be based in a different region. If a problem occurs in the main region where these services operate, systems are designed to automatically fail over to a backup region, usually within three minutes. However, if unexpected issues arise during this failover, it can take longer to restore services. In rare cases, this could affect customers in more than one region. It’s important to note that all in-scope application data for supported products is pinned according to a customer’s chosen region. **Jira** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 20:00, customers with tenants hosted in the us-east-1 region experienced increased error rates when accessing core entities such as Issues, Boards, and Backlogs. This disruption was caused by AWS's inability to allocate AWS EC2 instances and elevated errors in AWS Network Load Balancer \(NLB\). During this window, users may also have observed intermittent timeouts, slow page loads, and failures when performing operations like creating or updating issues, loading board views, and executing workflow transitions. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced elevated failure rates when attempting to load Jira pages. This disruption was caused by the regional frontend service entering an unhealthy state during this specific time interval. Normally, the frontend service connects to the primary AWS DynamoDB instance located in the us-east-1 to retrieve the most recent configuration data necessary for proper operation. Additionally, the service is designed with a fallback mechanism that references static configuration data in the event that the primary database becomes inaccessible. Unfortunately, a latent bug existed in the local fallback path. When the frontend service nodes restarted, they were unable to load critical operational configuration data from primary or fallback sources, leading to the observed failures experienced by customers. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 06:30, customers experienced significant delays and missing Jira in-app notifications across all regions. The notification ingestion service, which is hosted exclusively in us-east-1, exhibited an increased failure rate when processing notification messages due to AWS EC2 and NLB issues. This issue resulted in notifications being delayed - and in some cases, not delivered at all - to users worldwide. **Jira Service Management \(JSM\)** JSM was impacted similarly to Jira above, with the same timeframes and for the same reasons. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced significantly elevated failure rates when attempting to load JSM pages. This affected all JSM experiences including the Help Centre, Portal, Queues, Work Items, Operations, and Alerts. **Confluence** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 02:45, customers using Confluence in the us-east-1 region experienced elevated failure rates when performing common operations such as editing pages or adding comments. The primary cause of this service degradation was the system's inability to auto-scale due to AWS EC2 issues to manage peak traffic load effectively. Though the AWS outage ended at Oct 20, 21:09, a subset of customers continued to experience failures as some Confluence web server nodes across multiple clusters remained in an unhealthy state. This was ultimately mitigated by recycling the affected nodes. To protect our systems while AWS recovered, we made a deliberate decision to enable node termination protection. This action successfully preserved our server capacity but, as a trade-off, it extended the time required for a full recovery once AWS services were restored. **Automation** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 23:59, automation customers whose rules are processed in us-east-1 experienced delays of up to 23 hours in rule execution. During this window, some events triggering rule executions were processed out of order because they arrived later during backlog processing. This caused potential inconsistencies in workflow executions, as rules were run in the order events were received, not when the action causing the event occurred. Additionally, some rule actions failed because they depend on first-party and third-party systems, which were also affected by the AWS outage. Customers can see most of these failures in their audit logs; however, a few updates were not logged due to the nature of the outage. By Oct 21, 2025 5:30, the backlog of rule runs in us-east-1 was cleared. Although most of these delayed rules were successfully handled, there were some additional replays of events to ensure completeness. Our investigation confirmed that a few events may never have triggered their associated rules due to the outage. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 11:20, all non-us-east-1 regional automation services experienced delays of up to 4 hours in rule execution. This was caused by an upstream service that was unable to deliver events as expected. The delivery service encountered a failure due to a cross-region dependency call to a service hosted in the us-east-1 region. Because of this dependency issue, the delivery service was unable to successfully deliver events throughout this time frame, resulting in customer-defined rules not being executed in a timely manner. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:33, Bitbucket experienced intermittent unavailability across core services. During this period, users faced increased error rates and latency when signing in, navigating repositories, and performing essential actions such as creating, updating, or approving pull requests. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage that impacted downstream services. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 22:46, numerous Bitbucket Pipeline steps failed to start, stalled mid-execution, or experienced significant queueing delays. Impact varied, with partial recoveries followed by degradation as downstream components re-synchronized. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage, compounded by instability in AWS EC2 instance availability and AWS Network Load Balancers. Furthermore, Bitbucket Pipelines continued to experience a low but persistent rate of step timeouts and scheduling errors due to AWS bare-metal capacity shortages in select availability zones. Atlassian coordinated with AWS to provision additional bare-metal hosts and addressed a significant backlog of pending pods, successfully restoring services by 01:30 on Oct 21, 2025. **Trello** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 15:25, users of Trello experienced widespread service degradation and intermittent failures due to upstream AWS issues affecting multiple components, including AWS DynamoDB and subsequent AWS EC2 capacity constraints. During this period, customers reported elevated error rates when loading boards, opening cards, adding comments or attachments. **Login** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, a small subset of users experienced failures when attempting to initiate new login sessions using SAML tokens. This resulted in an inability for those users to access Atlassian products during that time period. However, users who already had valid active sessions were not affected by this issue and continued to have uninterrupted access. The issue impacted all regions globally because regional identity services relied on a write replica located in the us-east-1 region to synchronize profile data. When the primary region became unavailable, the failover to a secondary database in another region failed, which delayed recovery. This failover defect has since been addressed. **Statuspage** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, Statuspage customers who were not already logged in to the management portal were unable to log in to create or update incident statuses. This impact was restricted only to users who were not already logged in at the time. The root cause was the same as described in the Login section above, and it was resolved by the same remediation steps. ### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS We have completed the following critical actions designed to help prevent cross-region impact from similar issues: * Resolved the code defect in the fallback option to ensure that Jira Frontend Services in other regions remain unaffected during a region-wide outage. * Fixed the issue that prevented timely failover of the identity service which impacted new login sessions. * Resolved the code defect so that delivery services in unaffected regions remain operational during region-wide outages. Additionally, we are prioritizing the following improvement actions: * Implement mitigation strategies to strengthen resilience against region-wide outages in the notification ingestion service. Although disruptions to our cloud services are sometimes unavoidable during outages of the underlying cloud provider, we continuously evaluate and improve test coverage to strengthen resilience of our cloud services against these issues. We recognize the critical importance of our products to your daily operations and overall productivity, and we extend our sincere apologies for any disruptions this incident may have caused your teams. If you were impacted and require additional details for internal post-incident reviews, please reach out to your Atlassian support representative with affected timeframes and tenant identifiers so we can correlate logs and provide guidance. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2025年10月8日 UTC 22:20identified

   We have identified an issue starting at 17:00 UTC on Monday, October 6th, 2025 affecting all Loom users who record videos with the Chrome Extension, causing unexpected delays when saving videos. If the browser is closed before the video is playable, the recording may be lost. To address this, we have developed an updated version of the extension, which is currently under review by Google. We anticipate the fix to be published by 20:00 UTC on October 15th, 2025, or sooner. In the meantime, users will see an in-browser message if their video has not yet been saved, advising them not to close the browser session. We will provide an update again when the fix is available.

2. 2025年10月9日 UTC 20:00resolved

   We have resolved the incident. A new version of the Loom chrome extension has been approved and published to the Chrome Extension store. Update to the latest version(v5.5.142) of the extension.

1. 2025年10月6日 UTC 01:10investigating

   We are investigating cases of degraded performance for attachments in the Customer Support portal. We will provide more details within the next hour.

2. 2025年10月6日 UTC 01:37monitoring

   We have identified the root cause of the performance degraded service and have mitigated the problem. We are now monitoring closely.

3. 2025年10月6日 UTC 04:32investigating

   On further monitoring, we see the issue resurfacing so our team is actively investigating with urgency and we will provide an update as soon as possible. We apologise for any inconvenience caused by this issue.

4. 2025年10月6日 UTC 04:49monitoring

   We identified that there was a temporary regression in our backend service health and we have mitigated the problem. We will continue to monitor the issue.

5. 2025年10月6日 UTC 06:08investigating

   We are continuing to investigate the regression issue and we will provide more details once we identify the root cause.

6. 2025年10月6日 UTC 07:04investigating

   We are continuing to see issues with customers uploading new attachments and viewing existing attachments. We have identified the root cause and work is underway to resolve the issue.

7. 2025年10月6日 UTC 08:21investigating

   We are investigating the issue of being unable to view Support tickets and uploading attachments in Atlassian support portal. We will provide more details within the next hour.

8. 2025年10月6日 UTC 09:02investigating

   We are continuing to investigate issues with our Customer Support portal. Please note that support ticket creation is still working as expected. You can continue to interact with us by replying to the email you received when your support ticket was created.

9. 2025年10月6日 UTC 10:01investigating

   Our team is actively engaged and continuing to investigate issues with our Customer Support portal. Please note that support ticket creation is still working as expected. You can continue to interact with us by replying to the email you received when your support ticket was created.

10. 2025年10月6日 UTC 11:01investigating

    Atlassian team continues to investigate the issue with utmost importance. Please note that support ticket creation is still working as expected. You can continue to interact with us by replying to the email you received when your support ticket was created.

11. 2025年10月6日 UTC 12:01investigating

    Our team continues to investigate the issue on priority. Please note that support ticket creation is still working as expected. You can continue to interact with us by replying to the email you received when your support ticket was created.

12. 2025年10月6日 UTC 13:02identified

    We have identified the cause of the issue and expect recovery shortly.

13. 2025年10月6日 UTC 13:13monitoring

    We have identified the root cause of partially impacting Atlassian support portal that led to the issue of visibility of the Support tickets and customers being unable to upload attachments. We have mitigated the problem and continue to monitoring the services closely. There will be no further updates here until the status is changed to 'Resolved' unless the issue recurs.

14. 2025年10月6日 UTC 14:02investigating

    We are again seeing issues with uploading new attachments and viewing existing attachments. We will provide more details within the 2 hours.

15. 2025年10月6日 UTC 15:01investigating

    Atlassian team is investigating the issues with viewing existing attachments and uploading attachments. We will provide more details within the next hour.

16. 2025年10月6日 UTC 16:15investigating

    We continue to investigate to identify root cause of the issue. We have made changes to contain the issue to listing attachments for tickets. As a result of some mitigation changes, rest of the support portal is working as expected. New attachments are getting uploaded and a comment is added in the support ticket indicating successful upload of the attachment. From the comment, customers can view the attachment (if required). Customers don't need to upload the attachment again. Currently, the table/list of attachments to the support ticket is not visible to our customers and we continue to work to restore this functionality. We will provide more details within the next hour.

17. 2025年10月6日 UTC 17:54investigating

    No change since our last update. We are continuing to work to restore full attachment functionality. Customers can upload attachments, but may receive an error message when doing so, and will not be able to view the attachment list at this time. However, soon after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket that the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take additional upload steps, and our Support team will be able to access the attachment. The rest of the support portal is working as expected. Thank you for your patience. We will provide an update by 19:00 UTC, if not sooner.

18. 2025年10月6日 UTC 18:58investigating

    No change since our last update. We are continuing to work to restore full attachment functionality. Customers can upload attachments, but may receive an error message when doing so, and will not be able to view the attachment list at this time. However, soon after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket that the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take additional upload steps, and our Support team will be able to access the attachment. The rest of the support portal is working as expected. Thank you for your patience. We will provide an update by 22:00 UTC, if not sooner.

19. 2025年10月6日 UTC 22:00investigating

    No change since our last update. We are continuing to work to restore full attachment functionality. Customers can upload attachments, but may receive an error message when doing so, and will not be able to view the attachment list at this time. However, soon after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket that the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take additional upload steps, and our Support team will be able to access the attachment. The rest of the support portal is working as expected. Thank you for your patience. We will provide an update by October 7th 04:00 UTC, if not sooner.

20. 2025年10月7日 UTC 04:01investigating

    No change since our previous update. Our team is continuing to work to restore full attachment functionality. Customers can upload attachments, but may receive an error message when doing so, and will not be able to view the attachment list at this time. Soon after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket that the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take additional upload steps, and our Support team will be able to access the attachment. The rest of the support portal is working as expected. Thank you for your patience. We will provide further update by October 7th 08:00 UTC, if not sooner.

21. 2025年10月7日 UTC 08:28investigating

    We don't have any new update to share at this point. However, please be rest assured that out team is continuing to work to restore full attachment functionality. Customers can upload attachments, but may receive an error message when doing so, and will not be able to view the attachment list at this time. Soon after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket that the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take additional upload steps, and our Support team will be able to access the attachment. The rest of the support portal is working as expected. Thank you for your patience. We will provide further update by October 7th 12:00 UTC, if not sooner.

22. 2025年10月7日 UTC 11:59investigating

    Atlassian teams have identified some likely root causes and are testing and simulating to confirm them. Once the root cause is confirmed, our teams will carefully conduct thorough checks before making any changes. Meanwhile, customers can upload attachments but may see an error message and cannot view the attachment list. Shortly after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket confirming the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take extra steps; our Support team can access the attachments. The rest of the support portal is working normally. We appreciate your patience. We will provide further update by October 7th 18:00 UTC, if not sooner.

23. 2025年10月7日 UTC 18:04identified

    Our teams are continuing to make progress and are in the final stages of validating potential fixes to address this issue. Meanwhile, customers can upload attachments but may see an error message and cannot view the attachment list. Shortly after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket confirming the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take extra steps; our Support team can access the attachments. The rest of the support portal is working normally. We appreciate your patience and will provide a further update by October 7th, 21:00 UTC, if not sooner.

24. 2025年10月7日 UTC 21:02identified

    Our teams are continuing to make progress and are actively working on finalizing the deployment plan for fixes to address this issue. Meanwhile, customers can upload attachments but may see an error message and cannot view the attachment list. Shortly after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket confirming the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take extra steps; our Support team can access the attachments. The rest of the support portal is working normally. We appreciate your patience and will provide a further update by October 8th, 01:00 UTC, if not sooner.

25. 2025年10月8日 UTC 02:18resolved

    We are closing this incident on Statuspage as the Atlassian Support portal functionality has been restored. We are aware that the ticket attachments panel remains unavailable and that some customers may be receiving a 'Something went wrong!' error message despite successfully uploading ticket attachments. We are working to resolve these UX issues. Atlassian Support is available for customers needing further assistance.

1. 2025年6月17日 UTC 08:10investigating

   We are investigating the issue

2. 2025年6月17日 UTC 08:12identified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 2025年6月17日 UTC 08:32resolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 2024年8月15日 UTC 20:27investigating

   We are investigating cases of degraded performance for support.atlassian.com ticket system. This may cause delays in receiving responses from Support tickets. We will provide more details as they are available.

2. 2024年8月15日 UTC 21:13resolved

   Between 18:55 UTC to 21:00 UTC, we experienced degraded performance for the support.atlassian.com ticket system. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

1. 2024年8月13日 UTC 15:46investigating

   Currently, chat support for all products is offline. The team is actively investigating the incident and working on a fix.

2. 2024年8月14日 UTC 09:45resolved

   The issue with chat has been resolved and is functional again.

1. 2024年7月3日 UTC 20:50investigating

   We are investigating an issue with that is impacting Atlassian, Atlassian Partners, Atlassian Support, Confluence, Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, Jira, Opsgenie, Atlassian Developer, Atlassian (deprecated), Trello, Atlassian Bitbucket, Guard, Jira Align, Jira Product Discovery, Atlas, Atlassian Analytics, and Rovo Cloud customers. We will provide more details within the next hour.

2. 2024年7月3日 UTC 21:45monitoring

   We have mitigated the problem and continue looking into the root cause. The outage was between 8:08pm 03/07 UTC - 08:31pm 03/07 UTC We are now monitoring closely.

3. 2024年7月3日 UTC 22:02resolved

   We mistakenly believed there was impact to these services. The service is operating normally.

1. 2024年6月3日 UTC 23:10identified

   We are investigating an issue with error responses for some Cloud customers across multiple products. We have identified the root cause and expect recovery shortly.

2. 2024年6月4日 UTC 00:34resolved

   Between 22:18 UTC to 22:56 UTC, we experienced errors for multiple Cloud products. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

3. 2024年6月11日 UTC 00:59postmortem

   ### Summary On June 3rd, between 09:43pm and 10:58 pm UTC, Atlassian customers using multiple product\(s\) were unable to access their services. The event was triggered by a change to the infrastructure API Gateway, which is responsible for routing the traffic to the correct application backends. The incident was detected by the automated monitoring system within five minutes and mitigated by correcting a faulty release feature flag, which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. The first communications were published on the Statuspage at 11:11pm UTC. The total time to resolution was about 75 minutes. ### **IMPACT** The overall impact was between 09:43pm and 10:17pm UTC, with the system initially in a degraded state, followed by a total outage between 10:17pm and 10:58pm UTC. _The Incident caused service disruption to customers in all regions and affected the following products:_ * Jira Software * Jira Service Management * Jira Work Management * Jira Product Discovery * Jira Align * Confluence * Trello * Bitbucket * Opsgenie * Compass ### **ROOT CAUSE** A policy used in the infrastructure API gateway was being updated in production via a feature flag. The combination of an erroneous value entered in a feature flag, and a bug in the code resulted in the API Gateway not processing any traffic. This created a total outage, where all users started receiving 5XX errors for most Atlassian products. Once the problem was identified and the feature flag updated to the correct values, all services started seeing recovery immediately. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have several testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn’t identified because the change did not go through our regular release process and instead was incorrectly applied through a feature flag. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to avoid repeating this type of incident: * Prevent high-risk feature flags from being used in production * Improve the policy changes testing * Enforcing longer soak time for policy changes * Any feature flags should go through progressive rollouts to minimize broad impact * Review the infrastructure feature flags to ensure they all have appropriate defaults * Improve our processes and internal tooling to provide faster communications to our customers We apologize to customers whose services were affected by this incident and are taking immediate steps to address the above gaps. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2024年4月18日 UTC 19:42resolved

   support.atlassian.com/requests intermittent page load issues

1. 2024年4月5日 UTC 23:20investigating

   We are investigating issues with customers' ability to submit support tickets. We will provide updates here as we have them. If you have an urgent technical issue, you can reach out to us using the following email addresses: https://confluence.atlassian.com/support/contact-support-temporary-channel-950800787.html

2. 2024年4月6日 UTC 00:28resolved

   Between 9:22 PM UTC to 00:35 AM UTC, we experienced an issue for http://support.atlassian.com. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally.

3. 2024年4月19日 UTC 21:49postmortem

   ### Summary Between April 05 at 21:22 and April 6, 2024, at 00:21 UTC, some Atlassian customers were unable to submit support tickets via the Atlassian Support portal. The event was triggered by a failure release of a route configuration for a support form backend service. The changes included a redirection of an API route in a resource file. The incident was detected within one minute by a customer and mitigated by rolling back the configuration change which put Atlassian Support form system into a known good state. The total time to resolution was about three hours and 21 minutes. ### **IMPACT** The overall impact was between April 05 at 21:22 and April 6, 2024, at 00:21 UTC on the Atlassian support portal. The Incident caused service disruption to some customers where they attempted to submit a support case through the online portal. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The issue was caused by a change to a support form backend service resource file.  As a result, the support site could not make online support ticket requests, and the users received support form connectivity errors when attempting to submit the form as well as a banner notification alerting to the system issue.  ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn’t identified because the change was related to a very specific service descriptor file change that was not covered by our automated continuous deployment suites and tests. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to avoid repeating this type of incident: * Create additional route configuration automated testing and monitoring * Consider adding deployment / region specific configuration controls to APIs * Create additional endpoint PDV \(post-deployment verification\) monitors for system health * Updates to hot fix deployment pipeline processes to support incident remediation We apologize to customers who were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the Atlassian Support portal availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support