Workspot Status

Update from Microsoft: Current Status: Resolved What went wrong and why? Due to an increase in demand for compute resources in a particular zone in the region, there were capacity constraints on available compute infrastructure. This in turn resulted in service management operation and allocation failures for VM resources. How did we respond? We’ve load balanced the capacity demands and restored the capacity buffers to a healthy state. With the congestion resolved, services should now function as usual. What happens next? • Ensuring capacity for our customers is a top priority for Microsoft. We sincerely apologize for any impact this may have caused, but be assured, we are continuously improving tools around monitoring usage, forecasting stock out, maintaining healthy buffers and improving cycle times to reduce this type of issue from happening.

Workspot investigated the restart of the Control Dynos reported by our platform provider. The system is stable and we are closing the incident on status, but continuing to actively monitor and investigate the root cause. We will share the RCA and updates as soon as they become available. Thank you.

Update: We have received the Preliminary Post Incident Review(PIR) from Microsoft for the Azure East US control plane issue that impacted your environment on April 24. Here is a summary of what happened and why: STATUS: RCA COMMUNICATION: This is our Preliminary PIR to share what we know so far. After our internal retrospective is completed (generally within 14 days) we will publish a Final PIR with additional details. What happened? Between 11:30 UTC on 24 April and 00:15 UTC on 25 April 2026, customers may have experienced failures or delays when attempting to provision, scale, or update resources in East US. Beyond this, a smaller subset of impacted customers may have experienced intermittent connectivity issues on existing workloads (including Virtual Machines and Azure Virtual Desktop sessions) for scenarios dependent on unhealthy internal service dependencies. The issue initially began with impact to a subset of customers in a single Availability Zone (physical AZ-01) but as demand shifted, similar symptoms were observed impacting a subset of customers in AZ-02 and AZ-03. While none of these zones were impacted for the full duration of the incident, customers experienced periods of impact in each zone for portions of the incident. The following services were among those affected: Azure Application Gateway, Azure App Service, Azure Batch, Azure Cache for Redis, Azure Data Explorer, Azure Data Factory, Azure Databricks, Azure Health Data Services, Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS), Azure Red Hat OpenShift, Azure Service Fabric, Azure Synapse Analytics, Azure Virtual Desktop, Azure Virtual Machines, Azure Virtual Network Manager, Azure VMware Solution, Oracle Database@Azure, Virtual Machine Scale Sets – and potentially additional services that were dependent on new compute allocations in the region. Note: Logical availability zones assigned to customer subscriptions may map to different physical availability zones. Customers can use the Locations API to understand this mapping: https://learn.microsoft.com/rest/api/resources/subscriptions/list-locations?HTTP#availabilityzonemappings. What went wrong and why? The Azure PubSub service is a key component of the networking control plane, acting as an intermediary between resource providers and networking agents on Azure hosts. Resource providers, such as the Network Resource Provider, publish customer configurations during Virtual Machine or networking create, update, or delete operations. Networking agents (subscribers) on the hosts retrieve these configurations to program the hosts networking stack. Additionally, the service functions as a cache, ensuring efficient retrieval of configurations during VM reboots or restarts. This capability is essential for deployments, resource allocation, and traffic management in Azure Virtual Network (VNet) environments. During normal platform operations, one partition of this PubSub service in AZ-01 became unhealthy and automatically attempted to fail over to a secondary replica. The failover did not complete successfully, resulting in a partial loss of control plane availability within AZ-01. We intervened to investigate and attempted a manual failover of the primary partition, but this attempt was also unsuccessful. Shortly afterward, we observed a similar condition in AZ-03, which led to a partial loss of control plane availability in AZ-03 as well. As the investigation progressed, we suspected that a previously deployed update to a regional control plane dependency had introduced a latent regression. This issue did not surface during earlier validation and only manifested when failover conditions were triggered under sustained production load. As part of our mitigation efforts, we identified a version from the prior week that represented a Last Known Good (LKG) state. We first applied this rollback in AZ-03, which successfully restored control plane service health in that zone. Based on this, we began rolling back the affected components in AZ-01. By design, rollback operations are executed in stages by Azure Fabric controllers using update domains to ensure platform safety, while recovery proceeds incrementally. While mitigation was in progress, the platform was unable to maintain two healthy instances of the PubSub service across availability zones simultaneously, which is a requirement for normal replication and control plane operations. This resulted in a loss of quorum of the service. As the system attempted to rebalance, impact shifted between availability zones, leading to periods of degraded behavior across multiple zones. Similar failure patterns began to appear in AZ-02 and again in AZ-03, expanding the scope of impact across the region. For AZ-02 we initiated and completed a rollback, and although AZ-03 had previously shown recovery following the rollback, subsequent instability indicated that the rollback in that zone had not fully completed, because of an orchestration fault. As impact reemerged, rollback operations in AZ-03 were restarted and then completed, fully restoring service health. How did we respond? • 11:30 UTC on 24 April 2026 – Customer impact began. We observed failures or delays when customers attempted to provision, scale, or update resources in the affected region. • 11:38 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We detected an issue in AZ-01. A control plane partition became unhealthy and automatic failover attempts did not complete successfully. • 11:38–13:40 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We attempted manual failover in AZ-01. These efforts did not successfully restore service. • 13:40 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We identified a recently deployed update as the likely cause of the issue. • 13:50 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We began observing similar symptoms in AZ-03, indicating the issue was affecting multiple availability zones. • 14:07 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We initiated rollback to a previously known good version in AZ-03. • 15:03 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We observed significant recovery in AZ-03. Control plane availability exceeded 99%. • 15:04 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We initiated rollback actions to AZ-01. • 18:52 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We observed significant improvement in AZ-01 as rollback progressed. • 19:02 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We confirmed AZ-01 had recovered to greater than 99% availability, while the rollback continued in the background. • 19:05 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We observed similar symptoms in AZ-02 as load redistributed across the region. • 19:10 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We initiated rollback to a known good version in AZ-02. • 21:02 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We observed instability reappear in AZ-03. We determined this was because the rollback had not yet completed across all update domains. Consequently, we manually unblocked the rollback across remaining update domains in AZ03 to ensure stable recovery. • 22:39 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We confirmed rollback was fully completed in AZ-03. • 23:22 UTC on 24 April 2026 – We confirmed rollback was fully completed in AZ-02, completing PubSub mitigation across all affected zones. • 00:15 UTC on 25 April 2026 – We validated downstream service recovery and PubSub health across all zones in the region. How are we making incidents like this less likely or less impactful? • We have assessed the risk of occurrence in other high volume regions, and have taken steps to rollback this PubSub service in these regions out of an abundance of caution. (Completed) • We are investing in improving our test coverage surrounding the failure cases and load patterns that contributed to this incident, to catch issues like this one before they reach production. (Estimated completion: TBD) • We are working to reduce rollback complexity, to be able to mitigate issues like this more quickly in future. (Estimated completion: TBD) • This is our Preliminary PIR to share what we know so far. After our internal retrospective is completed (generally within 14 days) we will publish a Final PIR with additional details. How can customers make incidents like this less impactful? • Consider using Availability Zones (AZs) to run your services across physically separate locations within an Azure region. To help services be more resilient to localized failures like this one (which predominantly impacted zones at different times) many Azure services support zonal, zone-redundant, and/or always-available configurations: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/availability-zones/az-overview • For mission-critical workloads, customers should consider a multi-region geodiversity strategy to avoid impact from incidents like this one that impacted a single region: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/architecture/patterns/geodes and https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/well-architected/design-guides/regions-availability-zones • More generally, consider evaluating the reliability of your applications using guidance from the Azure Well-Architected Framework and its interactive Well-Architected Review: https://aka.ms/AzPIR/WAF • The impact times above represent the full incident duration, so are not specific to any individual customer. Actual impact to service availability varied between customers and resources – for guidance on implementing monitoring to understand granular impact: https://aka.ms/AzPIR/Monitoring • Finally, consider ensuring that the right people in your organization will be notified about any future service issues – by configuring Azure Service Health alerts. These can trigger emails, SMS, push notifications, webhooks, and more: https://aka.ms/AzPIR/Alerts

The system has been stable and functioning normally for the past 48 hours. Our internal investigation found no application-level anomalies. We are closing this incident while the root cause analysis (RCA) from our infrastructure provider is still ongoing. We will share updates as soon as they become available. Thank you for your patience.

The service has been fully restored after the rollback was performed. We appreciate your patience. A detailed Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be shared once available.

This issue has been resolved, and customers can now log in to Workspot Control and access non-persistent VMs without any issues. The platform is stable, and normal operations have resumed. We will continue to monitor the environment to ensure stability. We will share a post-incident summary once our investigation ends and relevant details are available.

This incident has been resolved, and no Workspot customers have reported experiencing the issue. Here is the summary of the AWS incident: https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/

This issue has been resolved in accordance with the Microsoft article: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/release-health/status-windows-11-25h2#issue-details. The problem is addressed in the October Windows non-security preview update (KB5067036) and all subsequent updates. Microsoft recommends installing the latest Windows updates, as they include important improvements and fixes, including this resolution. Additionally, we have not received any further reports of this issue from customers who have applied the recommended Microsoft updates.

Microsoft has informed us that the outage in the region has been mitigated. Please, find the summary below, as per Microsoft: STATUS: Mitigated 9/10/2025 9:55:15 PM UTC SUMMARY OF IMPACT: What happened? Between 09:12 UTC and 18:50 UTC on 10 September 2025, a platform issue resulted in an impact on multiple Azure services in the East US 2 region, more specifically, two zones (Az02 and Az03). Impacted customers may have experienced error notifications when performing service management operations, such as creating, deleting, updating, scaling, starting, or stopping, for resources hosted in this region. The primary impacted service was Virtual Machines or Virtual Machine Scale Sets, but this would have resulted in issues for services dependent on such Compute resources, such as Azure Databricks, Azure Kubernetes Service, Azure Synapse Analytics, Backup, and Data Factory. Customers who still see failed or unhealthy resources should attempt to update or redeploy the resource. What do we know so far? Our investigation identified that the issue impacting resource provisioning in East US 2 was linked to a failure in the platform component responsible for managing resource placement. The system is designed to recover quickly from transient issues, but in this case, the prolonged performance degradation caused recovery mechanisms themselves to become a source of instability. The incident was primarily driven by a combination of platform recovery behavior and sustained performance degradation. While customer-generated load remained within expected limits, internal platform services began retrying failed operations aggressively when performance issues emerged. These retries, intended to support resilience, instead created a surge in internal system activity. How did we respond? 09:12 UTC on 10 September 2025 – Customer impact began. 09:13 UTC on 10 September 2025– Our monitoring systems observed a rise in failure rates, triggering an alert and prompting our team to initiate an investigation. 12:08 UTC on 10 September 2025 – We identified unhealthy dependencies in core infrastructure components as initial contributing factors. 13:34 UTC on 10 September 2025 – Began mitigation efforts that included - Restarted critical service components to restore functionality, rerouted workloads from affected infrastructure, initiated multiple recovery cycles for the impacted backend service, on recovery, internal workloads processed through backlogs to get to the current healthy state, and executed capacity operations to free up resources. 18:50 UTC on 10 September 2025 – After a period of monitoring to validate the health of services, we were confident that the control plane service was restored, and no further impact was observed on downstream services for this issue. What happens next? Our team will be completing an internal retrospective to understand the incident in more detail. We will publish a Preliminary Post Incident Review (PIR) within approximately 72 hours to share more details on what happened and how we responded. After our internal retrospective is completed, generally within 14 days, we will publish a Final Post Incident Review with any additional details and learnings. To get notified when that happens, and/or to stay informed about future Azure service issues, make sure that you configure and maintain Azure Service Health alerts – these can trigger emails, SMS, push notifications, webhooks, and more: https://aka.ms/ash-alerts For more information on Post Incident Reviews, refer to https://aka.ms/AzurePIRs The impact times above represent the full incident duration, so they are not specific to any individual customer. Actual impact to service availability may vary between customers and resources – for guidance on implementing monitoring to understand granular impact: https://aka.ms/AzPIR/Monitoring Finally, for broader guidance on preparing for cloud incidents, refer to https://aka.ms/incidentreadiness Stay informed about your Azure services - Visit Azure Service Health to get your personalized view of possible impacted Azure resources, downloadable Issue Summaries, and engineering updates. - Set up service health alerts to stay notified of future service issues, planned maintenance, or health advisories.

GCP 14:00 PDT We have implemented mitigation for the issue in us-central1 and multi-region/us and we are seeing signs of recovery. Please see GCP's status page for more details. https://status.cloud.google.com/incidents/ow5i3PPK96RduMcb1SsW

This release will require an update window of up to 10 minutes. During this window, Trends users cannot log in to Workspot Trends. All other services, Control, Watch, and end-user sessions will not be impacted. To know more about Workspot Trends, Please refer: https://docs.workspot.com/docs/using-workspot-trends

This release will require an update window of up to 10 minutes. During this window, Trends users cannot log in to Workspot Trends. All other services, Control, Watch, and end-user sessions will not be impacted. To know more about Workspot Trends, Please refer: https://docs.workspot.com/docs/using-workspot-trends

This release will require an update window of up to 10 minutes. During this window, administrators will not be able to log in to Control, and end users will not be able to launch new non-persistent desktop sessions. Existing end-user sessions will not be impacted, and end users can launch persistent desktops.

This release will require an update window of up to 10 minutes. During this window, administrators cannot log in to Workspot Watch. All other services, Control, Trends, and end-user sessions will not be impacted. To know more about Workspot Watch release updates, Please refer: https://docs.workspot.com/docs/using-workspot-watch

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.